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ABSTRACT 
RECONCILING DISCONTINUITIES AND DISRUPTIONS: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTEGRATED TYPOLOGY 
David Jeffery Kern 
Old Dominion University, 2009 
Director: Dr. Rafael Landaeta 
Radical innovations are often characterized by a rapid shift from one dominant design to 
another. The theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation present two important 
and independent explanations for why these shifts occur. This research tests the 
usefulness of combining these two theories into a single integrated typology. First, a 
typology is constructed that classifies shifts in dominant designs according to the theories 
of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. Next, the usefulness of this typology is 
tested with a taxonomy derived from 100 randomly selected shifts in dominant designs 
from across a broad range of industries. This research reconciles the theories of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation and proposes an integrated typology to assist 
managers in determining the circumstances under which each theory is best applied. 
Additionally, the resulting taxonomy suggests anomalies - shifts in dominant design that 
are not well classified by either theory - that illuminate promising avenues for future 
research. 
This dissertation is dedicated with all my love to my wife, Pamela, and my children, 
Michael and Margaret. Innovation may bring change, but love is constant. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research Problem 
The theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation serve as foundations for a 
large body of research into how radical innovations occur. Unfortunately for engineering 
and technology managers, these important theories are not well integrated. Are these 
theories completely independent? Are there circumstances where both apply? Where 
neither applies? This dissertation explores what these theories are, how they evolved, 
and proposes an answer to these questions. 
The theory of discontinuous innovation models the emergence of a new dominant 
design as an evolutionary cycle (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Dosi, 1982; Romanelli & 
Tushman, 1994) where periods of incremental innovation are interrupted by the 
introduction of technological advances or discontinuities. Industry turmoil ensues as the 
discontinuity is incorporated into various candidate designs. Eventually, a new dominant 
design emerges and signals return to an era of incremental innovation. 
The theory of disruptive innovation models the emergence of a shift in dominant 
design as part of a disruptive cycle where the interplay of technological and market forces 
create disruptive opportunities for new designs (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003a). Incumbent firms pursue improvements to their products in order to 
satisfy their most demanding customers. Over time, the technological performance of the 
product exceeds the demands of many customers. At this point, new entrants to the 
This dissertation follows the journal format of the Academy of Management Journal. 
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market that have created technologically inferior but market satisfying designs are able to 
invade the primary market and shift the market's dominant design. 
The existing literature does not consistently integrate these two theories. Sainio 
(2004) emphasizes the similarities in these theories. She notes that both discontinuous 
and disruptive innovations are capable of transforming existing markets or creating new 
markets as new dominant designs emerge. According to Sainio (2004), firm 
competencies distinguish discontinuous innovations from disruptive innovations. 
Discontinuous innovations are either competence-enhancing or competence-destroying 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), while disruptive innovations are always competence-
destroying for established firms within the market. 
Henderson (2006) focuses more specifically on the types of competencies that 
might distinguish discontinuous from disruptive innovation. She notes that discontinuous 
innovations impact the technological competencies of the industry while disruptive 
innovations impact market competencies. However, while firm competencies may be 
closely linked to which firms survive the innovation (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Henderson, 2006; Tushman et al., 1986), other economic or technical factors may play a 
larger role in the emergence of the dominant design in the marketplace (Adner, 2002; 
Henderson, 2006). 
The theories present themselves as distinct, independent phenomenon. 
Christensen (2006) argues that disruptive innovation is often misinterpreted by 
researchers because the word "disruptive" has a more general connotation. From the 
perspective of disruptive theory, discontinuous innovation is classified as sustaining. The 
theory of discontinuous innovation (Tushman et al., 1986) was developed before 
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Christensen published his theory and is silent on the subject. More recent publications by 
the authors of discontinuous innovation describe disruptive innovation as specific 
phenomenon in a more general description of innovation (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & 
Anderson, 2002). 
Research into each of these theories continues largely independently. This is a 
problem because different researchers continue to classify radical innovations differently 
(Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Garcia & Calantone, 2002). This has the potential of 
confounding the results of innovation research and confusing practitioners. A 
comprehensive classification scheme is needed that integrates the theories of radical 
innovation for engineering and technology managers. As Garcia et al. (2002: 111) point 
out, 
Because new product researchers have not found consistency in labeling 
and identifying innovations, we cannot expect practitioners to have 
learned from our research endeavors. Managers looking for an 
understanding of how to address the idiosyncratic problems associated 
with radical innovations will have difficulties finding the holy grail from 
our research efforts. 
Purpose 
The purposes of this study are to (a) construct a typology that engineering and 
technology managers can use to integrate the theories of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation by classifying shifts in dominant designs and to (b) test the usefulness of this 
typology with a quantitatively constructed taxonomy. The interdependent variables of 
the typology are derived from each theory of innovation. The objects of the taxonomy 
that is used to test the integrated typology are shifts in dominant designs that are 
predicted by both theories. 
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Significance of Research Problem. Innovations are an important economic 
engine and a source of competitive advantage. From the time of Schumpeter's 
description of innovation as "creative destruction," researchers have searched for 
theoretical structures to guide the development of innovations (Scherer, 1992). The 
market implications of discontinuous innovation are significant while our ability to 
develop business strategies to take advantage of discontinuity remain limited (Bessant, 
Birkinshaw, & Delbridge, 2004; Bessant, Lamming, Noke, & Phillips, 2005). The 
opposite is true in the case of the theory of disruptive innovation. Several case studies 
indicate that market strategies based upon the theory of disruptive innovation have been 
effective (Christensen, 2006) while critics show concern for potential weaknesses in the 
disruptive body of knowledge (i.e. generalizability, selection bias, etc.) (Danneels, 2004). 
McKelvey (1975: 573) explains how generalizability improves with an adequate 
classification scheme: 
If a useable classification existed, there would be no need for contingency 
theory. Biologists do not need contingency theories because their 
taxonomy and classification scheme makes it clear that one does not apply 
findings about reptiles to mammals unless one is dealing broadly with the 
subphyla level of invertebrates. Organization and management theorists 
need contingency theories because there is no taxonomy to make clear that 
one does not, for example, and only for example, apply findings from 
small British candy manufacturers to large French universities. 
The theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation are de facto classification 
schemes. The presence of independent classification schemes that have not been 
reconciled hampers the practical application of these theories in real-life, multi-
dimensional organizations (Carper & Snizek, 1980). A validated typology that integrates 
the two theories will aid engineering managers who want to apply these theories in their 
practice and contribute to a more general understanding of innovation. 
Contributions to Knowledge and Practice. Hass et al. (1966) note that a well 
constructed organizational taxonomy would "(1) be strategically helpful for refining 
hypotheses; (2) aid in the investigation of the validity and utility of existing typologies 
based on logical and intuitive considerations; (3) serve as a basis for predicting 
organizational decisions or change; and (4) permit researchers to readily specify the 
universe from which their samples of organizations could be drawn" (Carper et al., 1980: 
73). This research proposes that an empirically validated system of classification 
reconciling the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation will: 
Provide confirmatory analysis by validating the results of the typology 
deduced from existing theory, thus extending the generalizability of both 
theories. 
Assist Engineering and Technology Managers in understanding how and 
when to apply these theories of radical innovation to the complex 
situations that they encounter. 
Enable researchers to better understand the circumstances under which 
each theory holds sway or if there are circumstances where both theories 
(or neither) should be considered. 
Examine the resulting data structure to explore potential relationships 
between the two theories and to guide further research. 
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Research Questions 
This dissertation explores the following descriptive questions with regard to the 
theories of disruptive innovation and technological discontinuities: 
1. What is the current state of research into these theories? What is known and 
what remains open to research? 
2. What typology can be deduced from these two theories? 
3. To what extent does the resulting taxonomy confirm the theories of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation? 
a. Are the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation 
substantiated? 
b. Are there cases of shifts in dominant design where both theories seem 
to operate? 
c. Are there cases where neither theory seems to operate? 
Additionally, this dissertation explores several inferential questions: 
4. What does the data structure infer regarding our understanding of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation? 
5. What relationships appear to exist between these two theories? How might 
these theories be altered to better fit the empirical data? What new theories 
are required? 
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Definitions 
Taxonomy. Taxonomy - the science of classification - partitions and labels 
"many different items into groups or clusters that share common traits" (de Jong & 
Marsili, 2006: 214). Classification systems or taxonomies are useful for two reasons 
(Copi, 1972). First, for practical reasons, taxonomies help us retrieve information. 
Second, they help highlight similarities and differences in the topics being researched. 
The primary criticism of taxonomy as a classification system is that it is inherently 
descriptive, but while taxonomies may not constitute theory (Doty & Glick, 1994), they 
may well constitute a hypothesis (Copi, 1972). 
Typology. The terms typology and taxonomy are sometimes used 
interchangeably and sometimes used with specific meaning (Rich, 1992). This research 
chooses the latter approach. A typology is an a priori classification scheme constructed 
from theory (Miner, 2002; Rich, 1992). It depends heavily upon rational argument as 
opposed to empirical analysis of data. A system of classification that is theoretically 
derived and populated with empirical data is considered in this research to be a typology. 
A taxonomy is an empirically derived categorization often using multivariate analysis of 
existing data (Miner, 2002). In short, typologies explain and taxonomies describe. 
Radical Innovation. There is no consensus on the definition of radical innovation 
(Dahlin et al., 2005; Green, Gavin, & Aimansmith, 1995; McDermott & O'Connor, 
2002). Some researchers define an innovation as radical if it incorporates a new 
technology and meets new market needs (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Sorescu, Chandy, & 
Prabhu, 2003); if it is a high risk and costly innovation with little supporting 
technological or business experience (Green et al., 1995; McDermott et al., 2002); if it is 
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new-to-the-world and has great impact on markets and producers (Markides, 2006); or if 
the product, the process needed to produce the product, and the service that product 
provides is new to the marketplace (Mensch, 1985). 
Radical innovation is most often represented in the literature as the extreme end 
of a spectrum of change (Cabello-Medina, Carmona-Lavado, & Valle-Cabrera, 2006). 
While there is great value in achieving a stable, agreed upon definition of radical 
innovation (Dahlin et al., 2005), that task lies beyond the scope of this research. When 
this research refers to radicalness, it is intended in the most commonly applied sense -
that the radicalness of an innovation is related to the degree of change or newness/novelty 
of the innovation (Cabello-Medina et al., 2006; Gatignon et al., 2002). Radical 
innovations are a general category of which discontinuous innovations and disruptive 
innovations are subcategories. 
Dominant Design. Dominant designs are a rare example of a concept upon which 
there is relative agreement within the literature of innovation. Utterback & Abernathy 
(1975) describe a dominant design as the event in the life cycle of a market where the 
multiple designs generated by a new technology are consolidated into a single 
architecture. Henderson & Clark (1990: 14) describe the dominant design as 
incorporating " a basic range of choices about the design that are not revisited in every 
subsequent design." Sahal (1981) describe dominant designs as "technological 
guideposts" that incremental innovations improve over time. They tend to emerge as a 
synthesis of "proven concepts from the past" (Sahal, 1981: 309) and the more adaptable 
the design is to the task environment, the greater the potential advance of subsequent 
innovations. Dosi (1982) compares the emergence of technological changes to the theory 
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of scientific paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). He argues that dominant designs represent a 
technological paradigm that shapes the direction of the development of the technology 
(the technological trajectory) while at the same time establishing boundaries. 
It is not clear whether every dominant design is the result of a preceding radical 
innovation. Abernathy (1978: 57) argues that"... a design approach becomes dominant 
.. .when the weight of many innovations tilts the economic balance in favor of one design 
approach." Dosi (1982) argues that incremental innovation occurs along the technological 
trajectory defined by the existing technological paradigm. Radical innovation triggers a 
technological paradigm shift that results in a new dominant design. Shifts in dominant 
design are predicted by the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. Many 
believe that dominant designs can only be identified once they have occurred (Gallagher, 
2007). 
Discontinuous Innovation. A discontinuous innovation occurs when the 
trajectory of existing technologies are interrupted by a new technological trajectory 
(Anderson et al., 1990). This view has been incorporated into the theories of 
organizational ecology and has supported a punctuated equilibrium theory of radical 
innovation (Tushman & O Reilly, 1996). From this evolutionary perspective, 
discontinuous innovation is caused by the introduction of a major new product or service 
that results in the major changes to the industry. The literature of discontinuous 
innovation will be examined in detail in the next section. 
Disruptive Innovation. The literature of disruptive innovation combines 
perspectives from the theories of resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and 
resource allocation (Burgelman, 1983) to explain how new products in less capable 
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(Christensen & Bower, 1996) or adjacent markets (Christensen et al., 2003a) can disrupt 
existing markets. Disruptive innovations are new products or services that enter the 
market place with new value propositions. The new value might be reduced cost or new 
attributes. In either case, the new values invade existing markets and result in rapid shifts 
to a new dominant design. The effectiveness of a disruptive innovation is heavily linked 
to the business model that deploys the new product or service (Christensen, 2006). 
Disruptive innovation will also be examined more closely in the next section. 
Theories of Contextual Technology 
Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour (1997) describe many perspectives that may be 
adopted in conducting research into the theories of innovation (See Table 1). This 
research adopts the perspective of contextual technologists which is consistent with 
theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. Contextual technologists focus on 
the generation of innovations and how they are commercialized and marketed. They 
focus on the innovation as a primary attribute within an industry context. They consider 
primarily technical innovations of both the product and process type. The interactions 
between innovations and their environments are the primary emphasis of research. As 
Anderson (1988: 190-191) notes, 
Since the mid-1960s, there has been an underlying agreement among 
organizational scholars that is usually termed the "open-systems" view. It 
suggests that organizations cannot be understood independently of their 
environments. Outcomes arise from the interplay between the 
organization and its environment, and form the fit between them. Clearly, 
this fit cannot be static and unchanging. Environments change. So must 
organizations, populations of organizations, and communities of 
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TABLE 1 
Perspectives in Innovation Research 
(Adapted from Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour, 1997) 
Perspectives 
Economists 
Contextual 
Technologists 
Organizational 
Technologists 
Variance 
Sociologists 
Process 
Sociologists 
Stage of Process 
Generation 
Idea generation 
Project definition 
Generation 
Commercialization 
Marketing 
Diffusion 
Level of Analysis 
Industry 
Innovation/Industry 
Generation • Organizational 
Idea generation Sub-system 
Problem solving adoption 
Adoption 
Initiation 
Adoption 
Initiation 
Implementation 
Adoption 
Initiation 
Implementation 
Organization 
Innovation/Organization 
Type of Innovation 
Product/process 
Technical 
Radical 
Product/process 
Technical 
Radical/incremental 
Product/process 
Technical 
Radical/incremental 
Product/process 
Technical/admin 
Radical/incremental 
Product/process 
Technical/admin 
Radical/incremental 
organizations...The question "how do technologies evolve?" is a subset of 
the questions "how do environments evolve?". 
Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour (1997) classified the theory of discontinuous innovation 
as belonging to the perspective of the contextual technologists. The theory of disruptive 
innovation emerged after this research was published, but it also fits best in the 
contextual technologist's category. The next section of this dissertation expands on this 
topic by placing the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation within the 
broader perspective of the theories of contextual technology. 
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Organization of Research 
An overview of this research is provided in Figure 1. Five sections follow this 
introduction. A review of the theories of contextual technology answers three questions: 
What is the current state of research into the theories of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation? How did each theory develop? What are the relevant variables? Following 
this literature review, a typology is constructed that integrates the theories of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation. This typology forms the central hypothesis that 
this research proposes to test. 
The next section describes the methodology of this research in detail. It describes 
the population of data that is mined and the sampling techniques that are employed. It 
examines the reliability and validity of the instruments used to measure the variables in 
the data sample. It also describes the procedures that are followed to construct the 
desired taxonomy and concludes with a discussion of the internal and external validity of 
this research. 
Lastly, the final two sections of this dissertation present an analysis of the data 
collected and conclude by answering the questions that first framed this dissertation. 
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FIGURE 1 
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THEORIES OF CONTEXTUAL TECHNOLOGY 
This section reviews several theories and their related typologies as they describe 
innovation from the perspective of contextual technology. It will be shown that these 
theories can be grouped according to the three dimensions of innovation that they attempt 
to explain: changes in component performance, markets, and system architecture. The 
theory of discontinuous innovation is a theory of core performance. The theory of 
disruptive innovation is a theory of markets and system architecture. Any typology that 
integrates the two theories must include all three dimensions. The next chapter examines 
a new typology - a hypothesis - that integrates these two theories. Overall, these two 
chapters answer the first two research questions (1 and 2) and prepare the way for a test 
of this dissertation's ability to reconcile the theories of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation. 
Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction is the foundation of most innovation 
research today (Scherer, 1992). In 1942, Schumpeter (1976) observed many of the 
improvements in our standard of living at the turn of the 20th century and noted that big 
businesses drive our capitalist economy. He emphasized that capitalism is not a static 
equilibrium of economic transactions, but instead, a dynamic evolutionary process. 
Schumpeter acknowledged the complex environment within which our capitalist society 
operates. War, revolution, and other outside factors (e.g., natural catastrophe, weather, 
disease, changes in law) influence our economic activity (Clemence, 1951; Schumpeter, 
1935). Non-cyclical changes in underlying variables (e.g., increases in population) 
consistently spur economic growth (Clemence, 1951; Schumpeter, 1935). Despite these 
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FIGURE 2 
Schumpeter's Factors of Economic Development 
Outside 
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New Goods 
and Services 
Growth 
Factors 
two factors, the core activity of capitalism is to compete in the production of goods and 
services for economic consumption. Therefore, the greatest engine driving capitalism is 
the creation of new goods and services (Schumpeter, 1976) (See Figure 2). 
Schumpeter's description of creative destruction challenged the economic views 
of his day: 
Innovation led not only to superior new goods and services; it 
simultaneously undermined the market position of firms committed to old 
ways of doing business. It destroyed old monopolies while creating new 
economic value. (Scherer, 1992: 1418) 
Schumpeter (1976) drew two conclusions. First, the effects of the creation of new goods 
and services are only revealed as time passes. Second, this model of economic change is 
an "organic process." Its constituent parts cannot be studied in isolation. As Schumpeter 
(1976: 83-84) states, "Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only 
against the background of the process and within the situation created by it." 
(+/-) 
(+) 
(+) 
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Theories of Component Performance 
Theories of component performance classify innovations according to the price 
and performance of a dominant attribute. Product innovations improve the performance 
of the dominant attribute through technological advances in the core components of the 
product. Process innovations reduce the cost of the product by improving the efficiency 
of the product delivery system. In these theories, radical innovation results in large 
changes in product or process performance. The theory of discontinuous innovation is a 
prominent member of the theories of component performance. 
Abernathy & Townsend (1975) were among the first to characterize the 
development of industries as occurring in stages of process and product innovation. 
Utterback & Abernathy (1975) expanded on this development and created one of the 
earliest of the modern typologies with empirical evidence of linkages between a firm's 
competitive strategies, its production resources, and its ability to innovate. Utterback & 
Abernathy (1975) hypothesized that the competitive environment within which a firm 
operates strongly influences its competitive strategy. They model firm strategy as a 
dynamic process with three stages of development. In stage I, products are new to 
market and production processes are immature. This stage is characterized by a corporate 
strategy of maximizing product performance. In stage II, the market identifies key 
product characteristics and firms compete to maximize sales by differentiating their 
products. The manufacturing process becomes more specialized and focuses on making 
the process more efficient. In this second stage, corporate strategy focuses on 
maximizing sales. In stage III, the product design is fully defined as market and 
production factors become specialized to the point that improvements become expensive. 
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FIGURE 3 
The Abernathy/Utterback Model of Innovation 
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Corporate strategy in this final stage is to minimize cost. Utterback & Abernathy (1975) 
combine these factors in a model of product and process development (Figure 3). This 
model is sometimes called the Technology Life Cycle model (DeBresson & Lampel, 
1985a; Sood & Tellis, 2005) or the Industrial Development Model (Benkenstein & Bloch, 
1993). 
Utterback et al. (1975: 642) emphasized that innovation is a dynamic process, 
"The essential idea here is that a process, or productive segment, tends to evolve and 
change over time in a consistent and identifiable manner." This model also integrates 
environmental and technological factors. One criticism of the Abernathy/Utterback 
model points out that this model depicts innovation as a continuous 
process. In reality, each innovation is a small disruption or change that carries with it 
opportunities for change (DeBresson et al., 1985a). As a result, the Abernathy/Utterback 
model is more descriptive of an industry and the dominant firms within that industry. It 
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is does not represent the most likely path of every firm in the industry (DeBresson & 
Lampel, 1985b). 
The Abernathy/Utterback model classifies innovations as either product or 
process. The interactions between products and processes are dependent upon the 
technological maturity of the industry (Stage I, II, and III). Time is an element in this 
model as the overall process is expected to move from Stage I through Stage III in 
sequence. The classification of innovations in the Abernathy/Utterback model is 
represented as a typology in Figure 4. 
Abernathy & Utterback (1978) further classified innovations as either radical or 
incremental. While they granted that the gains from incremental innovation often eclipse 
the gains from the initial radical innovation (Enos, 1967; Hollander, 1965), the topic of 
radical innovation captured their focus. Extending their earlier model of dynamic 
innovation (Utterback et al., 1975), they concluded that radical innovations occur early in 
the product/firm lifecycle. They reasoned that small firms with flexible production 
processes and close ties to the needs of the marketplace are largely responsible for 
successful radical innovations. Technological and market uncertainty are key incentives 
that drive small firms and deter larger firms in the Stage I industry environment. As 
products mature, uncertainties about the technologies needed to produce the product and 
key product characteristics are reduced. Large firms now have incentive to invest in the 
research and development necessary to pursue innovations that will incrementally 
improve performance while driving down cost. In all of these arguments, technology 
alone does not drive the model; it is the interplay between technology, market needs, and 
the firm's production processes. 
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FIGURE 4 
A Typology of the Abernathy/Utterback Model of Innovation 
Stage I 
Stage II 
Stage III 
Time 
Innovation 
I 
Product Process 
Product innovations outnumber process innovations as 
firms maximize product performance to gain market 
share. 
Product innovations decline and process innovations 
multiply as key performance parameters are identified 
and firms continue to distinguish their products. 
Process innovations dominate as the product parameters 
are now fully defined and innovation focuses on 
minimizing cost. 
Abernathy (1978) expanded his model of innovation to include what he describes 
as a dominant design in his book, The Productivity Dilemma. The predominant mode of 
innovation shifts from product to process when a dominant design emerges. Once this 
shift occurs, improvements to the dominant design are achieved through incremental 
innovations. Abernathy (1978: 57) argued that a dominant design is not itself the result 
of a radical innovation, "To the contrary, a design approach becomes dominant.. .when 
the weight of many innovations tilts the economic balance in favor of one design 
approach." Unfortunately, dominant designs can only be identified once they have 
occurred (Gallagher, 2007). 
In the theories discussed thus far, technology does not drive innovation as much 
as it enables it (Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy et al., 1975). Abernathy (1978) noted how 
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the introduction of the metal, vanadium, into automobile manufacturing triggered the 
design of the Ford Model T. According to Abernathy (1978), the discovery of this 
relatively low cost, high strength alloy caused Henry Ford to embark upon a new 
business strategy that resulted in the development of the Model T. It was the strategy and 
not the metal that resulted in Ford's competitive success. Abernathy (1978: 170) noted, 
"Evidence from a variety of different viewpoints suggests that innovations do not 
frequently occur through a process wherein advanced technologies seek out new needs, 
but instead a new understanding about needs draws in the best available technology." 
The Abernathy/Utterback model is an important step in the development of our 
understanding of innovation. It synthesizes incremental and radical innovation into a 
model of product and processes innovation. It predicts that innovation is greatest when 
markets and firm factors are most uncertain. Productivity is enhanced by reducing 
market and production uncertainty. Therefore, innovation is inversely proportional to the 
productivity of the firm's production processes. The role of corporate strategy is to 
balance the competing demands for innovation and productivity. It also predicts that the 
likelihood of a radical innovation decreases as time advances. Abernathy (1978) caveats 
the deterministic nature of his model. While difficult to execute, strong environmental 
influences can reverse the process and demand a change in design. In the end, Abernathy 
(1978: 59) stated that, "because improvements are cumulative, the chance decreases with 
time that a single innovation will change a favored approach". Figure 5 depicts an 
updated typology of Utterback & Abernathy's (1978) model of innovation. 
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FIGURE 5 
An Updated Typology of the Abernathy/Utterback Model of Innovation 
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dominant design. Product innovations are 
many while process innovations are few. 
Product innovations decline and process 
innovations multiply as key performance 
parameters are identified and firms 
continue to distinguish their products. 
Process innovations dominate as the 
product parameters are now fully defined 
and innovation focuses on minimizing 
cost. 
DeBresson & Lampel (1985a) critiqued the assumptions behind the Abernathy/ 
Utterback model arguing that the model implies a deterministic progress through each 
stage in linear fashion. They felt that empirical evidence requires a less linear view of 
technology development with the ability to jump forwards or backwards as strategic 
circumstances dictate. Markets and competition may allow different stages to exist 
simultaneously. They also criticized the life-cycle model's weak treatment of 
technological discontinuities and radical innovations that resulted "from an accumulation 
of incremental changes and recombination of existing technologies" (DeBresson et al., 
1985a: 174). 
DeBresson & Lampel (1985a) emphasized that the Abernathy/Utterback model is 
more valuable at the industry level of analysis than at the firm level. They demonstrated 
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that production processes (custom, batch, and line) influence interactions between 
product and process beyond what are predicted by the Abernathy/Utterback model. Most 
of all, they argued that managers must constantly assess whether continued incremental 
development along existing model lines is being threatened by radical innovation. 
Adner & Levinthal (2001) examined the Abernathy/Utterback model through the 
lens of economic competition. They proposed that the assumptions of the Abernathy/ 
Utterback model do not sufficiently emphasize the importance of the maturing customer 
demand. They explained that customers establish a functionality threshold below which 
they will not consider purchasing a product and a net utility threshold that represents the 
maximum price that a customer is willing to pay for a product. Adner & Levinthal 
(2001) developed an economic model to study the interaction of product and process 
innovation on product performance and price. Their model produces three stages of 
development that do not directly correlate with the Abernathy/Utterback model. In the 
Adner/ Levinthal model, the first stage represents attribute equalization where either 
product or process innovation might dominate as industries respond to unmet market 
demands. The second stage, market expansion is dominated by process innovation as 
industries move to exploit their footholds in the market by lowering cost. The final stage, 
demand maturity, favors both product and process innovation as the prices stabilize and 
as firms in the industry pursue both product and process innovations in order to 
differentiate their offerings. Adner & Levinthal (2001: 627) concluded that, 
Viewing the evolution of technology through a demand-based lens 
suggests that the early evolution of technologies is guided by responding 
to the unsatisfied needs of the market. After sufficient development, 
however, firms face the intriguing possibility that these guiding needs 
have largely been satisfied. The framework developed here suggests that 
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product maturity may be as much a function of satisfied needs as it is of 
exhausted technologies. 
Tushman & Anderson (1986) focused on understanding the implications of 
technological discontinuities. As businesses interact within industries, they spur each 
other to make incremental changes that improve a product's performance or reduce 
product cost as they jockey for competitive position. Technological discontinuities occur 
when a great technological advance occurs and the industry no longer finds the previous 
group of technologies competitive (Tushman et al., 1986). 
Tushman & Anderson (1986) investigated technological discontinuities within the 
cement, airlines, and microcomputer industries (Table 2). Their central assumption was 
that technological progress is evolutionary in nature, 
Case studies across a range of industries indicate that technological 
progress constitutes an evolutionary system punctuated by discontinuous 
change. Major product breakthroughs (e.g., jets or xerography) or process 
technological breakthroughs (e.g., float glass) are relatively rare and tend 
to be driven by individual genius. (Tushman et al., 1986: 440) 
Technological advances, individual choices, and environmental conditions combine to 
produce an evolutionary view that industries follow the path of incremental innovation 
for relatively long, stable periods. However, the technological advances of products and 
processes are not always incremental. Industries are interrupted infrequently, but 
significantly, by discontinuous innovations (Tushman et al., 1986) in an echo of 
Schumpeter's description of creative destruction. 
Technological discontinuities were further classified into either competence-
enhancing or competence-destroying technological shifts (Tushman et al., 1986). Firms 
in industries undergoing competence-enhancing technological shifts find that they 
already possess the knowledge, skills, and ability to pursue the new technology. 
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TABLE 2 
Technological Discontinuities in the Cement, Airline, and Minicomputer Industries 
(Adapted from Tushman & Anderson, 1986) 
Cement Industry Barrel per Day production Capacity from 1890-1980 
Year Innovation % Improvement Impact on Firm 
Competence 
1894 Rotary Kiln 310% Destroying 
1909 Edison Long Kiln 120% Enhancing 
1967 Dundee Kiln 190% Enhancing 
Airline Industry Seat-Miles per Year Capacity from 1930-1978 
Year Innovation % Improvement Impact on Firm 
Competence 
1932-1936 Boeing 247, DC-2, 410% Enhancing 
DC-3 
1959 Boeing 707-120 250% Enhancing 
1969 Boeing 747 150% Enhancing 
Minicomputer Industry Central Processing Unit Cycle Time from 1956-
Year Innovation % Improvement Impact on Firm 
Competence 
1962 Pac Bell PB-250 1000% Niche Opening 
(transistors) 
1964 DECPDP-8 750% Destroying 
(Integrated Circuits) 
1971 Data General 200% Enhancing 
Superdata SC 
(Semiconductor 
Memory) 
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FIGURE 6 
A Typology of Tushman & Anderson's (1986) Model of Discontinuous Innovation 
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The development of screw propellers for ships and fan jet engines for airplanes are 
examples of competence-enhancing innovations (Tushman et al., 1986). In each of these 
cases, aircraft manufacturers and shipyards were able to adapt existing knowledge, skills, 
and abilities to take advantage of the new technology. 
Alternatively, in competence-destroying technological shifts, existing firms find 
they do not possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities to compete. Using examples such 
as the introduction of automobiles or the substitution of diesel locomotives for steam, 
Tushman & Anderson (1986) suggested that competence-destroying technological shifts 
will typically be introduced by new entrants to the industry and fundamentally alter the 
ability of existing firms to compete in the industry environment. As a result, many 
existing firms may not survive the transition. Tushman & Anderson's (1986) model for 
classification of discontinuous innovation is provided in Figure 6. 
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FIGURE 7 
Anderson & Tushman's (1990) Technological Cycle 
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Four years later, Anderson & Tushman (1990) integrated their views on 
technological discontinuities into a model of a technological cycle. Drawing upon data 
from the glass container, flat glass, cement, and minicomputer industries, they 
demonstrated that there are two boundary events of concern in the progress of 
technological innovation. When technological discontinuities occur, they initiate an 
intense period of competition where industry firms adapt their products and process to 
find the combination of attributes (performance, quality, and cost) that customers prefer. 
This period of competition was labeled by Anderson & Tushman (1990) as the era of 
ferment. The era of ferment is terminated when customers select a dominant design. At 
this point, the focus of innovation shifts to incremental improvements in product 
attributes. This era was labeled the era of incremental change (see Figure 7). 
Anderson & Tushman (1990) emphasized several characteristics of this 
technological cycle: 
Technological discontinuities usually result in a new dominant design 
unless there are market mechanisms (legal, statutory, etc.) in place that 
protect existing designs. 
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Sales demand peaks following the emergence of the dominant designs 
implying that many customers wait for design stability before making 
their purchase. 
The technological discontinuity that begins the era of ferment rarely 
becomes the dominant design. The competition of designs in the era of 
ferment usually adapts or modifies the original discontinuity. 
Additionally, while the technological capacity of the dominant design 
absorbs most of the attributes improved by the technological 
discontinuity, it is usually more conservative than the most advanced 
technology at the time. 
While their earlier research (Tushman et al., 1986) found that new 
entrants are more likely to introduce competence-destroying 
discontinuities, they found that both new-entrants and existing firms 
contributed to the introduction of dominant designs indicating increased 
role for existing firms in the era of ferment 
On average, the combined effect of the technological discontinuity and 
the era of ferment accounted for approximately 80% of the technological 
advance for the industries studied. Eras of incremental change 
accounted for the remaining 20%. 
A typology representing Anderson & Tushman's (1990) updated model of discontinuous 
innovation is presented in Figure 8. 
Anderson & Tushman (1990) suggested that firms initiating a technological 
discontinuity often do not end up determining the dominant design because of the many 
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FIGURE 8 
An Updated Typology of Anderson & Tushman's (1990) Model of Discontinuous 
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factors (social, political, consumer preference, etc.) that combine in the design selection 
process. In the case of a competence-destroying technological discontinuity, Anderson & 
Tushman (1990) expected new entrants to the industry to have an advantage in the 
ensuing competition. Instead, they found that both incumbent and new entrants were 
capable of fielding the resulting dominant design. This suggests that incumbents are able 
to exploit other strengths in their value chains while re-investing in the technical skills 
that new technologies demand (Anderson & Tushman, 1991). 
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TABLE 3 
Complementary Assets (Adapted from Teece, 1986) 
Core Assets Complementary Assets 
Technological Competitive Manufacturing 
Competence 
Distribution 
Service 
Complementary Technologies 
Teece (1986) explained that a firm's complementary assets, such as marketing, 
manufacturing, and after-sales service support, may influence a firm's ability to take 
advantage of a technological innovation (Table 3). Teece (1986) characterized 
complementary assets as either generic, specialized, or co-specialized. Generic 
complementary assets are those assets that do not need to be adapted to the innovation. 
Assets are specialized when there is a unilateral reliance of the innovation on the asset or 
the asset on the innovation. Assets are co-specialized when the assets and the innovation 
are co-dependent. For example, if the innovation is a new sneaker, manufacturing assets 
may be generic because the injection mold process can easily adapt to the innovation. 
Teece (1986) used shipping containers to distinguish co-specialized from 
specialized assets. The containerization of shipping cargo is an innovation that is co-
dependent upon specialized handling gear at ports and is dependent upon trucking for 
distribution out of ports. Trucks can be modified for various cargos - including 
containers - relatively easily. Therefore, the port assets are co-specialized assets and 
trucks are specialized assets with respect to the innovation of shipping containers. Teece 
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(1986) concluded that complementary assets will significantly affect which firms will 
profit from innovation. 
Rothaermel & Hill (2005) examined the concept of complementary assets and 
incorporate their findings into Anderson & Tushman's (1990) model of discontinuous 
innovation. Examining data from the computer, steel, pharmaceutical, and 
telecommunications industry, they provided evidence that incumbent firms fare worse 
after a competence-destroying technological discontinuity when complementary assets 
are generic and fare better when complementary assets are specialized or co-specialized. 
Rothaermel & Hill's (2005) contribution to the typology of discontinuous innovation is 
shown in Figure 9. 
Murmann & Frenken (2006) proposed a two dimensional typology in their 
research into dominant design. They categorized innovation along dimensions of 
performance and knowledge. Innovations with relatively small gains in performance and 
knowledge were classified as incremental. Innovations with significant performance 
gains but modest knowledge gains were classified as radical-performance sense. 
Innovations with significant knowledge requirements but modest performance gains were 
classified as radical-knowledge sense. Innovations with both performance and 
knowledge gains were classified radical squared. 
In many ways, Murmann & Frenken's (2006) system of classification maps to the 
theory of discontinuous innovation (Tushman et al., 1986). Radical-performance sense 
might be equivalent to discontinuous competence-enhancing innovations. Radical 
squared innovations might then equate to discontinuous competence-destroying 
innovations. The remaining category, radical-knowledge sense, has no equivalent in the 
31 
FIGURE 9 
An Updated Typology Following Rothearmel & Hill's (2005) Introduction of 
Complementary Assets into the Model of Discontinuous Innovation 
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theory of discontinuous innovation and is difficult to interpret since no underlying theory 
is presented for this typology. 
The typologies and theories of component performance contribute to the practice 
of innovation management in many ways. The technology life-cycle suggests that 
managerial action should be compatible with the maturity of the technology within the 
industry (Abernathy et al., 1978) and the maturity of the market demand (Adner et al., 
2001). Industry shakeouts are triggered more by technological change than by economic 
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downturns (Anderson et al., 1991). Technological discontinuities and unpredictable 
market demand combine to create uncertainty for technology managers (Anderson et al., 
2001) and firm survival is strongly influenced by the firm's technological competence 
(Tushman et al., 1986) and complementary assets (Rothaermel et al., 2005). 
These theories have been used to evaluate managerial tools for project evaluation 
(Benkenstein et al., 1993); assess the impact of strategic alliances (Rothaermel, 2002) and 
managerial recognition of the discontinuity (Kaplan, Murray, & Henderson, 2003) on 
firm success; and interpret national level policies during periods of ferment (Dalum, 
Pedersen, & Villumsen, 2005). The primary limitation of these studies is noted by 
Anderson (1988: 197) , "Almost all longitudinal studies suffer from the twin problems of 
a small sample size and limited generalizability." 
In summary, there have been two major theoretical typologies that emerge from 
the theories of component performance. First, there is the technology development cycle, 
defined by Utterback & Abernathy (1975), where product and process innovations are 
modeled against a maturing technology. Radical innovations are seen primarily as the 
technological advances that launch the development cycle. Second, there is the theory of 
discontinuous innovation where a more holistic view of technology development is 
proposed (Tushman et al., 1986). 
The theory of discontinuous innovation suggests that industries are periodically 
disturbed by technological developments that cause fundamental changes in the products 
or processes. These disturbances, or discontinuities, are followed by an era of ferment 
where firms compete to adapt to the new technology and create a new design for the 
industry. Once a dominant design emerges, competition shifts to incremental 
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development as firms adopt the dominant design and compete for their share of the 
market. The development of the typologies of component performance is summarized in 
Table 4. 
Theories of Component Performance and Markets 
Theories of component performance and markets explore interactions between 
customer preferences in the market and the technological development of components to 
classify innovations. The technological dimension of these theories retains the sense of 
determinism, the relentless march of scientific progress expressed in Anderson & 
Tushman's (1990) technological cycles. The market dimension, however, begins to 
introduce a more capricious variable to the innovation equation. For these researchers, 
industry changes introduced by innovations that shift customers' perceptions of product 
quality or performance are categorized along with innovations in component 
performance. 
Ansoff (1965) created an early typology of corporate growth by mapping the 
development of new products to the needs of the market (See Figure 10). The purpose of 
this typology was to develop categories of corporate growth that would better describe 
the strategic choices of the firm. The appropriate strategy for growth with existing 
products in existing markets is to increase market share or market penetration. Strategies 
that pursue new products or new markets with existing products are categorized as 
product development and market development respectively. Ansoff (1965) felt that a 
corporate strategy of diversification that pursued both new products and new markets 
provided a weaker link to corporate strategy because it required both new marketing 
skills and new product technology. Given the obvious linkages between corporate 
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FIGURE 10 
AnsofPs (1965) Growth Matrix 
Present Market Need 
New Market Need 
Market Penetration 
Market Development 
Product Development 
Diversification 
Present Product New Product 
growth, new product development, and innovation, Ansoff s matrix is an early and 
important foundation to the typologies of component performance and markets. 
Abernathy & Clark (1985) explored innovation from the perspective of its 
relationship with firm competencies. The purpose of their research was to create a 
framework for categorizing innovation from a perspective of understanding the role of 
innovation in the competitive environment. Their hope was that corporate strategy would 
be better informed by understanding the impact of market context on technological 
progress. 
In considering the effects of innovation on firms, they defined a concept they 
called "transilience" - an innovation's "capacity to influence a firm's existing resources, 
skills, and knowledge" (Abernathy et al., 1985: 5). They developed a scale that measured 
an innovation's impact on a firm's knowledge in both the market and technology 
dimensions. For example, some innovations rely on a firm's knowledge of existing 
FIGURE 11 
The Typology of Transilience (Adapted from Abernathy & Clark, 1985) 
Requires New Market 
Competency 
Uses Existing Market 
Competency 
Niche Creation 
Regular 
Architectural 
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Uses Existing 
Technological 
Competency 
Requires New 
Technological 
Competency 
markets while others require knowledge of new markets. A similar scale was constructed 
to measure the impact of innovation on a firm's technical knowledge. By measuring 
innovations from the U.S. auto industry against these two variables, firm market and 
technological competencies, they provided examples of four different types of 
innovation. 
Abernathy & Clark (1985) described innovations that synthesize new technical 
capabilities with new markets as architectural - innovations that whole industries can be 
built upon. Innovations that use existing technology to exploit new markets are 
categorized as niche innovations. These are innovations that may gain temporary 
advantage by leading an industry but can be easily copied by competing firms. 
Innovations that employ new technologies in existing markets are categorized as 
revolutionary, and innovations that incrementally improve existing technologies in 
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existing markets are categorized as regular (See Figure 11). Danneels (2002) employed a 
similar typology in his later research into the impact of product innovation on 
organizational renewal, albeit with different category labels. Veryzer (1998) mapped the 
technological advance of component performance against the perceptions of customers 
regarding product novelty. Small changes are labeled continuous, and radical changes 
are discontinuous. Veryzer (1998) used the term "discontinuous" less in the specific 
sense of a quantitative discontinuity in a product technology curve (Tushman et al., 1986) 
and more as other researchers use radical vs. incremental. 
Veryzer's typology does not map directly to a larger theory of innovation. It 
suggests that customer perceptions of product performance are equally important in the 
categorization of innovation. Products with little novelty either in technology or 
customer perception of product capability are categorized as continuous innovations. If 
the technology change is small but the perceived product capability is significant, the 
innovation is categorized as commercially discontinuous. The innovation is categorized 
as technologically discontinuous if the technological change is significant and the 
customer perception of change is minor. The final category is for a product that is both 
technologically and commercially discontinuous (Figure 12). 
Chandy & Tellis' (1998) typology echoes the logic of Ansoff s matrix in its 
classification of innovation according to technological advance and customer need. 
However, Chandy & Tellis (1998: 475) defined radical product innovation as "new 
products that (1) incorporate substantially different technology from existing products 
and (2) can fulfill key customer needs better than existing products." 
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FIGURE 12 
Veryzer's Typology of Product Innovation (Adapted from Veryzer, 1998) 
Same Technological 
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Same Product 
Capability 
Enhanced Product 
Capability 
Where Ansoff (1965) looked to fulfill new customer needs, Chandy & Tellis 
(1998) looked to fulfill existing needs better. Additionally, Chandy & Tellis (1998) 
introduced a financial component into the typology. They measured not the fulfillment of 
customer need, but the fulfillment of customer need per dollar. 
Chandy & Tellis (1998) used their matrix to identify a link between managers in 
highly competitive industries (computer hardware, photonics, and telecommunications) 
who reported having introduced radical product innovations and the willingness of these 
managers to cannibalize existing resources and technologies. Their typology is largely 
self-explanatory and similar to others examined earlier (See Figure 13) in that it creates 
four categories (incremental, technological breakthrough, market breakthrough, and 
radical innovation) as the products of technological advance and fulfillment of customer 
need per dollar. Herrman, Tomczak, & Befurt (2006) extended the research of Chandy & 
Tellis (1998) in their research into the determinants of radical product innovation 
FIGURE 13 
Chandy & Tellis (1998) Typology of Product Innovation 
Low Newness of 
Technology 
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Innovation 
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High Customer Need 
Fulfillment per Dollar 
although, again, the labels of each category change and the customer need per dollar 
variable is simplified to customer need. 
Danneels (2002) constructed a now familiar 2x2 matrix typology by 
distinguishing the competencies required to develop technology from the competencies 
used by organizations to serve customers. Product innovations that utilize existing 
technological and customer competencies are labeled exploitative. Product innovations 
that utilize new technological or new customer knowledge or skills are labeled as 
leveraging technological or customer competencies respectively. Innovative products 
that require new technological and customer competencies are labeled explorative. 
Danneels (2002: 1105) argued that a competency-based typology "provides a better 
understanding of the nature of various types of product innovations, their various 
challenges and requirements, and their implications for firm renewal." 
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Herrmann et al. (2006) distinguished radical innovations based upon their 
technological and market novelty. Innovations that use existing technologies and are 
familiar to customers are labeled incremental. When new technologies are introduced 
that are transparent to customers, innovations are labeled as company-related product 
innovations. When existing technologies are combined to produce new customer value, 
the innovation is labeled as customer-related product innovation. Radical innovations 
introduce both novel technologies and novel utility from the perspective of the customer. 
The typologies of component performance and markets continue the theme that 
managers should take contextual factors into account in their pursuit of innovation 
(Abernathy et al., 1985). Innovative skill requires more than the ability to use new 
technology to improve the performance of products. It also requires understanding of the 
importance of customer perceptions (Veryzer, 1998), customer needs (Chandy et al., 
1998; Herrmann et al., 2006) and firm competence in new and existing markets 
(Abernathy et al., 1985; Danneels, 2002). As a result, different types of innovation may 
require different managerial processes (Danneels, 2002). 
Research founded on these typologies reinforces the idea that management of a 
firm's technical skills is central to innovative success (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997; 
Mitchell & Singh, 1993). Managers that successfully expand their firms into new 
technical sub fields survive longer and achieve greater market share (Mitchell et al., 
1993). In highly competitive markets with clear market signals, incremental strategies 
that focus on differentiating their product from their competitors and minimize the costs 
associated with innovation fare better (Gatignon et al., 1997). When market demand 
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becomes less certain and customer perceptions of value and need are more variable, firm 
strategies emphasizing the customer and technological competencies are more successful 
(Gatignon et al., 1997). While a willingness to cannibalize firm resources may be 
necessary to introduce radical innovations (Chandy et al., 1998; Herrmann et al., 2006), 
few firms introduce radical innovations (Sorescu et al., 2003) and even fewer firms are 
persistently innovative (Geroski, Van Reenen, & Walters, 1997). In general, firms with 
greater per product marketing and technological capacity receive greater returns on their 
innovations investment (Sorescu et al., 2003). 
Unlike the typologies that focused solely on component performance, these 
typologies do not explore the interplay of process and product innovation. Additionally, 
these typologies have not spurred theoretical models as widely used as the technology life 
cycle (Utterback et al., 1975) and the cycles of discontinuous innovation (Anderson et al., 
1990). A summary of the typologies of component performance and markets is provided 
in Table 5. 
Theories of Component Performance and System Architecture 
When researchers began to look at the product itself as a system (Henderson et al., 
1990), a new dimension in radical innovation was revealed. Early research into the 
systems views of innovation supports the typologies of component performance and 
focuses on the more holistic view of the innovation within the organization and its 
environment (Normann, 1971; Rosenbloom, 1978; Sahal, 1981). Appreciation of the 
product as a system also contributed significantly to the birth of the theory of disruptive 
innovation (Christensen, 1992b). 
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Normann (1971) studied the relationships between organizational sub-systems 
and new product development. He viewed the product as a relationship between the firm 
and it's environment. Innovation is the process that manages changes in this relationship. 
Managerial action should be guided by a sense of "consonance" between new products 
and their environment: 
Consonance is a state of correspondence or mapping relationships between 
environment, product, and organization. Thus the product dimensions 
should correspond to the needs and values in the environment, while the 
specialized tasks of the organization must correspond to the product 
dimensions. Lack of correspondence will result in inefficiency. 
(Normann, 1971:204) 
Rosenbloom (1978) also viewed the firm as an open system interacting with its 
environment. He noted that while many empirical studies have been conducted looking 
at specific innovations, they lacked an "integrative theory" that might explain important 
relationships with a few key variables. Rosenbloom (1978) argued that a more 
integrative view might be developed at a higher level of abstraction by studying 
industries and firms. He stated that firms must take into account both external and 
internal influences in considering a strategy of technological innovation. He found that 
the innovation process, the firm's organizational structure, and the external environment 
all interact to result in a technological innovation. 
Sahal (1981) established four systems principles that govern the general process 
of technological innovation: 
The Principle of Technical Guideposts. ".. .the process of innovation 
invariably leads to a certain pattern of machine design" (Sahal, 1981: 309) 
These guideposts become the basic design which incremental innovations 
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improve over time. They tend to emerge as a synthesis of "proven concepts 
from the past" (Sahal, 1981: 309) and the more adaptable the design is to the 
task environment, the greater the potential advance of subsequent innovations. 
Finally, Sahal notes that the process of technological innovation is 
evolutionary and that "evolutionary processes tend to be both self-generating 
and self-constraining" (Sahal, 1981: 310). This principle tends to guide the 
short-term evolution of the process of innovation. 
The Principle of Creative Symbiosis. The evolution of a dominant design 
tends to result in a fixed form with increasing complexity. Creative symbiosis 
occurs when two or more designs recombine in such a way that the greater 
system is simplified redefining the guidepost and opening the door to further 
development. This principle tends to guide the long-term evolution of the 
process under study. 
The Putty-Clay Principle. Technical know-how tends to be task or object 
specific. As a result, while know-how is putty-like looking forward, it tends 
to harden like clay in hindsight. This principle highlights the difficulty of 
acquiring relevant know-how and the extent to which know-how tunes out to 
be system/design specific. 
The Principle of Technological Insularity. It is inherently difficult to 
transfer technical know-how. This is closely related to the putty-clay 
principle. ".. .Unlike pure scientific knowledge, which is equally available to 
all, technical know-how is largely product and plant specific." (Sahal, 1981: 
59) 
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Henderson & Clark's (1990) typology of component performance and system 
architecture is borne out of research into case studies of innovation that are categorized as 
incremental innovations yet have great influence on the financial fortunes of leading 
firms in the industry. They examined the photolithography industry and found four 
examples where incremental technical changes - minor changes in component 
performance - combined with significant changes in relationships between the 
components, resulting in a change of leadership in the field. Henderson & Clark (1990: 
16) postulated that this occurs because architectural knowledge is distinct from 
component knowledge: 
Since architectural knowledge is stable once a dominant design has been 
accepted, it can be encoded in these forms and thus becomes implicit. 
Organizations that are actively engaged in incremental innovation, which 
occurs within the context of stable architectural knowledge, are thus likely 
to manage much of their architectural knowledge implicitly by embedding 
it in their communication channels, information filters, and problem-
solving strategies. Component knowledge, in contrast, is more likely to be 
managed explicitly because it is a constant source of incremental 
innovation. 
Henderson & Clark's (1990) typology maps the development of core technology 
changes against architectural changes (See Figure 14). In this typology, incremental 
innovation is coupled with stable product architectures. Radical innovation is 
characterized by significant changes in both component technology and product 
architecture. Henderson & Clark (1990) present two new innovation categories to the 
field of innovation research - modular and architectural innovation. Modular innovation 
occurs when core technologies change but the product architecture remains unchanged. 
The transition from analog to digital telephones is an example of modular innovation. 
Architectural innovation occurs when the component technologies remain relatively the 
FIGURE 14 
Henderson & Clark (1990) Typology of Component versus System Innovation 
Unchanged 
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Between Components 
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Core Technology 
Reinforced 
Core Technology 
Overturned 
same (minor changes may occur but the key knowledge remains unchanged) while the 
relationship between the components is changed. According to Henderson & Clark 
(1990), the introduction of portable fans would be viewed as an architectural innovation 
over existing ceiling fans. The fans have similar component technologies (fan blade, 
motor, housing units), but the size and configuration of the product is greatly different. 
Theories of System Architecture and Markets 
Christensen (1992b) applied Henderson & Clark's (1990) definition of 
architectural innovation to the industry turmoil he observed in the hard disk drive 
industry. Christensen (1992b; 1993) documented five waves of architectural innovations 
and the resulting shifts in industry leadership - as measured by market share - between 
1973 and 1989. In each case, the size of the components shrunk and relationships 
between components changed as architectural designs were altered. Time and again, new 
entrants captured significant market share from incumbent market leaders by introducing 
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new architectures to the market. Christensen (1992, 1993) confirmed that incumbent 
industry leaders retained competence in the core technologies throughout these 
transitions. When incumbents introduced the new architectures, the technical parameters 
of hard drives produced by incumbents were on par with the hard drives produced by new 
entrants that introduced the new architecture. In fact, Christensen (1992, 1993) 
documented several instances where the research teams of incumbents invented the new 
architecture. Yet, incumbent firms struggled to market the innovation until forced by 
competitive demands of the market. Christensen (1993) noted that the technology life 
cycle model did not explain the waves of innovation he observed: 
Generalizations that radically new technologies tend to be brought into 
industries by entrant firms; that established firms will excel primarily at 
the types of innovation that build on established technological 
competencies; or that established firms lead in component-level 
innovation because of their relatively greater ability to countenance 
greater complexity, risk, and expense seem to be inaccurate and 
insufficient to explain these patterns of innovation in the disk drive 
industry. (Christensen, 1993: 553) 
Christensen (1997) explained this pattern in his well-known book, The 
Innovator's Dilemma. Disruptive innovations (Christensen, 1997; Christensen, Anthony, 
& Roth, 2004) change the market structure of an industry, displacing the knowledge and 
investments of mature incumbent businesses without requiring a radical advance in 
technology. As a new, potentially disruptive innovation emerges, it appears unattractive 
to incumbent businesses in the industry. Its technical performance is inferior to existing 
designs and its profit potential from the perspective of the incumbent business is too 
limited to pursue. Instead, entrepreneurs begin to employ this new technology in small 
markets of little interest to incumbents. Once established, these entrepreneurs have great 
incentive to develop their new technology to its fullest advantage. 
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FIGURE 15 
Low-End Disruptive Innovation (adapted from Christensen, Anthony & Roth, 2004) 
High 4 > 
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Low Disruptive 
Innovation 
Low High 
Customer Need Fulfillment Per Dollar 
Time passes and incumbent businesses find that the process of incremental 
innovation has caused the technical performance of these niche innovations to exceed the 
demands of the average customer, often with additional competitive value added such as 
reduced cost or improved convenience. At this point, incumbent companies become 
vulnerable to disruption. They find it difficult to compete with the new innovations and 
customers flock to the entrepreneurs in search of increased value as the disruption occurs 
(See Figure 15). 
According to Christensen's (1997) theory (See Figure 16), disruptive innovations 
offer worse product performance than sustaining innovations. Sustaining innovations 
improve product performance. These advances may be either incremental or 
discontinuous. Disruptive innovations satisfy minimum customer needs while presenting 
a change in product design that is valued by the market. "Products based upon disruptive 
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FIGURE 16 
Christensen's (1997) Early Typology of Innovation 
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technologies are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to 
use" (Christensen, 1997: xv). 
Adner (2002) explained how customer needs and price might explain the 
disruptive phenomenon. He showed that markets can be defined by the functional 
benefits that they offer to customers. When two markets are present, one of three 
competitive situations may arise. First, there may be no competitive overlap between to 
the two market and they may continue to develop in isolation. Second, each market may 
be motivated to compete in the opposing market. In this case, the competition is likely to 
be marked by increasing product performance and decreasing product cost. Lastly, one 
market may be asymmetrically motivated to compete in the second market. In this case, 
the satisfied market continues to drive up performance while the asymmetrically 
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FIGURE 17 
Disruptive Typology Updated with Adner's (2002) Model of Economic Behavior 
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motivated market drives down cost. This third example is suggestive of disruptive 
innovation. 
Adner's (2002) model of asymmetric competition modifies Christensen's theory 
(Figure 17). Christensen (1997) postulated that new attributes such as size and 
convenience drive market behavior once performance needs are met. Adner's (2002) 
model shows that cost plays a strong role in the disruption. When two competing 
products cost the same, customers are likely to choose the product with the best 
performance as long as the customer's functional utility threshold is met. However, if the 
disruptive product exceeds the functional utility threshold of customer at a lower cost, 
then it will be preferred over existing products even if they possess superior performance. 
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Christensen & Raynor (2003) updated the theory of disruptive innovation to 
included situations where new system architectures competed in a new market rather than 
in a low-end niche of existing markets. The mechanism of disruption remains the same. 
Rather than competing in the same market, the disruptive innovation competes from a 
different market. When asymmetric motivation (Adner, 2002) is present, the disruptive 
technology improves until its functional utility exceeds the demands of customer in the 
existing market. When this happens, customers adopt the disruptive innovation often at a 
reduced cost. Christensen & Raynor (2003) labeled this form of disruption as new 
market disruption. 
Markides (2006) disagreed with Christensen and argued that disruptive 
technological innovations should be distinguished from disruptive business models that 
uses existing technologies. Disruptive business models such as Internet banking and low 
cost airlines tend to capture a limited market share while disruptive technological 
innovations tend to dominate markets. Additionally, while existing firms are urged to 
form separate business units to pursue disruptive innovations (Christensen et al., 2003a), 
firms have many ways to adapt to disruptive business models (Markides, 2006). Markides 
(2006) also introduced the concept of a new-to the-world product as an innovation that 
does not fit into the existing models of disruptive innovation. New-to-the-world products 
(cars, computers, etc.) have great disruptive effects as radical innovations to both 
businesses and customers. Christensen (2006) agreed that the new-to-the-world category 
deserves study, but declined to categorize it as a form of disruptive theory. 
Govindarajan & Kopalle (2006) introduced the concept of a high-end disruption. 
They found that a significant innovation in technology may create a new product that is 
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inferior in terms of the attributes valued by mainstream customers but significantly better 
in others. The initial market for the high-end disruption is small and the cost is high, but 
continuing advances in technology bring the price of the product down and the 
mainstream market is invaded from above. The cellular telephone is provided as an 
example. However, Christensen (2006) explained that just because one technology 
supplants another emphasizing new attributes it is not automatically disruptive. The 
disruptive model requires a disruptive business model relative to the existing dominant 
design. Figure 18 shows the current forms of the typology of disruptive innovation. 
The theory of disruptive innovation has been the subject of much debate 
(Danneels, 2004; Tellis, 2006) but Christensen provides convincing evidence of the 
strength of the disruptive model (Christensen, 2006). He emphasized that disruption is a 
relative effect. The company that introduces an architectural innovation into a low-end 
market niche follows a path of sustaining innovation in order to compete with 
mainstream market products. This same product continues to appear disruptive from the 
perspective of existing mainstream market firms. Additionally, Christensen (2006) 
argued that disruptiveness is not inherent in the product. Disruptiveness is a process and 
a business strategy. Disruption occurs as a result of the interactions between product 
attributes, customer needs, and the asymmetric motivation of market segments. 
The theory of disruptive innovation has been applied in a wide variety of 
industries and situations. Disruptive theory has been used to assess the impact of tax 
incentives on innovation (White, 2001); guide investment decisions (Anthony & 
Christensen, 2005); assess the radiology profession (Chan, 2006) , the banking industry 
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FIGURE 18 
Current Typology of Disruptive Innovation 
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(Albrecht, Andreas, Tawfik, & Harald, 2006), the education profession (Christensen, 
Aaron, & Clark, 2003b) and even macroeconomic policy in foreign affairs (Christensen, 
Craig, & Hart, 2001; Hart & Christensen, 2002) - to name just a few. 
Christensen, Anthony, & Roth (2004) provided the following prescriptions for 
managers in the application of disruptive theory: 
Begin with an analysis of the marketplace. What are customer needs and have 
they been met or exceeded? What business models are in place? Are any new 
models emerging? 
- Evaluate the competition from the perspective of Adner's (2002) models of 
competition. What symmetric and asymmetric motivations are in place? 
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Make strategic choices in line with your firm's abilities and motivations. If a 
disruptive model is chosen, evaluate the need to spin out an independent 
organization in order to compete against existing markets. 
Integrating Theories of Contextual Technology 
Innovation researchers confuse fundamental concepts (Gatignon et al., 2002) and 
do not use consistent definitions or measures of innovation (Ehrnberg, 1995). For 
example, one research team defines discontinuous innovation as "major changes or 
innovations in basic products or services or programs offered or markets served, of the 
creation of new major product/service programs leading to new or expansion of current 
markets" (DeTienne & Koberg, 2002: 353). As a result, this researcher found that 
discontinuous innovation occurred often in a three year period. This directly contradicts 
the research of Anderson and Tushman (1986) who found that large technological 
advances, which they associated with discontinuous innovation, occur only rarely. 
The research of Gatignon et al. (2002) suggests that innovations are best 
described by product complexity, locus of innovation, innovation type, and innovation 
characteristics. They adopted a systems-architectural view of innovation in that products 
are more or less complex. Products are composed of core subsystems tightly linked 
together with peripheral subsystems less tightly linked to product function. The locus of 
innovation occurs either within the core subsystem or in peripheral subsystems. 
Gatignon et al. (2002) characterized innovation types as either generational or 
architectural. Generational innovation changes subsystems while leaving the linkages 
between subsystems intact. Architectural innovation changes the linkages while leaving 
the subsystem intact. Discontinuous innovation would be considered generational. The 
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disruptive innovation described by Christensen (1993) in the disk drive industry is 
architectural. The descriptions of innovation as incremental, radical, competence-
enhancing, and competence-destroying are considered characteristics of innovation. 
Gatignon et al. (2002) distinguished the need to acquire new competence as a 
characteristic separate from the impact of innovation on existing competencies. 
After constructing and validating measures for variables of complexity, locus, 
type and characteristics, Gatignon et al. (2002) constructed a linear regression to measure 
the impact of these variables on the time needed to market an innovation and the 
perceived marketing success of the innovation. Several of their findings confirm earlier 
research: 
• Complex innovations take longer to market than simpler innovations. 
• Innovations to core subsystems take less time to market if it builds on existing 
competencies. 
Some of their findings are unexpected, however: 
• Innovations to peripheral subsystems took longer to market than innovations to 
core subsystems. 
• Architectural innovations took longer to market and were not associated with 
commercial success, which runs counter to many case studies provided in the 
disruptive literature. 
Sainio (2004) attempted to reconcile the theories of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation with a typology of technological change and markets. From Sainio's (2004) 
perspective, both discontinuous innovations and disruptive innovations introduce new 
technologies. They transform existing markets and create new markets. However, this 
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perspective blurs many distinctions between the theory of discontinuous innovation and 
the theory of disruptive innovation. Discontinuous innovations improve the performance 
of core technologies, while disruptive innovations introduce architectural innovations 
with existing technologies (often with worse performance in product attributes valued by 
mainstream markets). These distinctions are lost in Sainio's (2004) typology because the 
technological dimension does not account for multiple performance attributes and the 
possibility that some new products may actually have inferior performance when 
compared to existing technology. Finally, the core-architecture dimension introduced by 
Henderson & Clark (1990), which is a central argument in the theory of disruptive 
innovation, is not represented. 
Even typologies seem to have dominant designs. Drawing on Google Scholar™, 
each of the typologies in Figure 19 was entered and the number of citations recorded was 
noted. The areas of the circles in Figure 19 roughly correspond to the number of Google 
Scholar™ citations. The data used in this figure is included in Appendix A. Granted, 
citation analysis is an inexact measure of article importance (Seglen, 1994). Just as 
dominant designs often do not contain the most advanced technology (Anderson et al., 
1990), the most cited articles might not be the best scientific argument. However, 
dominant designs are considered dominant because of their influence on follow on 
design. Similarly, the number of times an article is cited is likely to reflect its influence 
on subsequent research. 
Figure 19 suggests that there have been five dominant typologies proposed 
between 1975 and today: the technology development cycle (Abernathy et al., 1978), the 
theory of discontinuous innovation (Tushman et al., 1986), the typology of transilience 
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(Abernathy et al., 1985); the introduction of architectural innovation (Henderson et al., 
1990), and the theory of disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997). There are three 
primary dimensions explored in these typologies: component performance, markets, and 
system architecture. Out of these typologies, two theories tend to dominate the literature 
of radical innovation at the industry level of abstraction - the theory of discontinuous 
innovation and the theory of disruptive innovation. The next chapter integrates these 
three dimensions into an integrated typology and positions the theories of discontinuous 
and disruptive innovation within it. 
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INTEGRATING THE THEORIES OF DISCONTINUOUS AND DISRUPTIVE 
INNOVATION 
The science of classification is integral to the process of scientific research and 
theory development (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). The scientific method gathers 
knowledge by observing, forming and testing hypotheses through careful experimenting, 
analyzing and communicating (Shrake, Elfner, Hummon, Janson, & Free, 2006). Popper 
(1959: 276) described the scientific method as a "quasi-inductive" path. Inductive logic 
is used to form hypotheses and deductive logic to test these same hypotheses. Theories 
are created and form a hypothesis to explain observed patterns. Hypotheses are then 
tested through deductive logic. This sequence of "model —•deduction — • testing—• 
induction —• thinking—• model" is also referred to as the "empirical cycle of critical 
rationalism" (Nijland, 2002: 214). The results of these tests enter the body of scientific 
knowledge as results are published - preferably in a manner that allows experiments to be 
replicated by others in the field. 
It is problematic to say that theories are proven. No matter how thorough the 
deductive test, there is always some population that remains untested. Successive 
empirical tests may further substantiate a theory, but it is never proved. In fact, a theory 
that cannot be disproved is considered by many to be of no value (Grattan-Guinness, 
2004). More commonly, the deductive test largely agrees with the hypothesis but some 
adjustment is needed. The results of tests are considered and inductively adapted to 
existing theory. A new hypothesis is created, and the cycle repeats. 
This research adopts McKelvey's (1982) rationale relating the science of 
classification to the inductive-deductive cycle of the scientific method. The inductive 
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phase of the scientific cycle proposes to explain why something occurs. It relies upon 
logic and a priori rational thought. Typologies are a priori classifications that are built 
from theories. Therefore, typologies are representations of the inductive side of the 
inductive-deductive cycle. The deductive counterpart to the typology is the taxonomy. 
Taxonomies describe a sample of a selected population. If a comparison of the sample 
described by the taxonomy corresponds to the classification predicted by the typology, 
then the explanation underlying the typology is substantiated. This chapter established 
the a priori assumptions on which this typology is based. 
A Framework for an Integrated Typology 
This section creates a framework for an integrated typology based a priori 
assumptions drawn from the literature of contextual technology. The typologies of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation are then deconstructed into their component 
variables and placed within the framework of the integrated typology. Each variable is 
examined to determine how it is measured and how it relates to the other variables. The 
new typology predicts the classification of radical innovations using the variables of both 
theories. 
Hierarchical Systems. Products are best described as a hierarchy of systems 
where each level of the hierarchy is represented by subsystems and a design that links the 
subsystems together (Murmann et al., 2006; Tushman & Murmann, 1998). (See Figure 
20) This system hierarchical view is present in Henderson & Clark's (1990) components 
and architectures, Christensen's (1992b) description of a hard disk drive as a nested 
architecture, Schilling's (2000) product modularity, and Murmann & Frenken's (2006) 
framework for research on dominant designs. 
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FIGURE 20 
A Product as a Hierarchical System 
The product is defined by individual components and the system architecture that 
result in a physical artifact with performance that is valued by customers at an established 
cost. Innovations within this hierarchical system will be measured as a change in 
performance or a change in cost at the product level of abstraction. Murmann & Frenken 
(2006) recommend that empirical research track the location where innovations take 
place. This typology will distinguish between innovations in components, innovations in 
the system architecture, and innovations to both. 
The impacts of innovation differ as they are viewed throughout the hierarchy of 
the complex system within which it resides. For example, the rotary kiln transformed the 
U.S. cement industry between 1889 and 1895. The rotary kiln dramatically increased the 
barrels/day production output of American cement manufacturers while significantly 
reducing labor costs (Eckel, 1908). Anderson & Tushman (1990) classified the rotary 
kiln as a discontinuous improvement in the industrial capacity of cement manufacturers. 
However, customers buying cement were more likely to notice the increased availability 
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and the reduced cost that the rotary kiln made possible. Therefore, products in this 
typology will follow the convention used by both Tushman & Anderson (1986) and 
Christensen (1997). The product characteristics of the innovation being classified will be 
measured from the perspective of the industry segment where the firm offering the 
product interacts with customers of the product. In the case of the cement industry, the 
innovative product is the rotary kiln. The attribute most valued by kiln customers was the 
barrel/day making capacity of the machine. The customers of concern are cement 
manufacturers and not the cement buying public. 
Product Utility is a function of performance and cost. Adner & Levinthal (2001: 
615) described a product's net utility threshold as the "highest price a consumer is willing 
to pay for a product that just meets his or her requirements." The idea that customer's 
demand more performance and reduced cost is integral to the economic value of 
innovation. Anderson & Tushman (1986, 1990) mapped product performance. 
Christensen's (1997) theory of disruption relies specifically on the concept of a utility 
threshold. Disruptions occur when customers whose performance demands have been 
over met are given a lower cost opportunity. This typology will distinguish between 
changes in performance and changes in cost. 
Markets. The focus of this research is on how discontinuous and disruptive 
innovations cause the dominant designs in markets to change. The simplest models for 
market change assume that all markets develop dominant designs and the innovations 
either slowly adapt these designs (incremental innovation) or change them (discontinuous 
or disruption). Empirical research demonstrates that markets are more complex. First, 
dominant designs do not always emerge. Nair & Ahlstrom (2003) suggest that dominant 
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designs may co-exist when the technology is complex and regulatory practices inhibit 
information sharing. Additionally, they note that the improvement of component 
performance may delay the choice of a dominant design as all competing designs benefit. 
This is further substantiated by Srinivasan, Lilien, & Rangaswamy's (2006) study where 
33 of 63 products categories where dominant designs had not yet emerged. They provide 
evidence that suggests that the emergence of dominant designs might be delayed or 
stalled when the cost of sharing information is high (high appropriability), the utility of 
the product does not depend on other users (network effects), and when the innovation is 
more radical. However, the purpose of this research is to integrate the theories of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation. Therefore, this typology will focus on the 
simple model of market change. Innovations either create a new market or change 
existing markets. The introduction of complexity into our understanding of market is 
beyond the scope of this research. 
The theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation can each be positioned 
within this typology. The theory of discontinuous innovation is a theory of component 
performance. It predicts the change in existing markets and new technologies increase 
product performance. The theory of disruptive innovation is a theory of system 
architectures and markets. It predicts change in existing markets as new architectures are 
developed from existing technologies and are introduced to customers whose demands 
have been exceeded by existing products (See Table 6). 
Deconstructing Discontinuous Innovation 
The term discontinuous can be as difficult to define as the term radical (Ehrnberg, 
1995; Garcia et al., 2002). Discontinuities can be viewed across multiple industries, 
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TABLE 6 
Dimensions of an Integrated Typology 
Innovation Theory 
Discontinuous 
Disruptive 
Locus of Innovation 
Component 
X 
Architecture 
X 
Product Utility 
Performance 
X 
X 
Cost 
X 
Markets 
Existing 
X 
X 
New 
X 
within industries and within marketplaces (Garcia et al., 2002). While many researchers 
have measured discontinuities on a Likert scale based on questionnaires filled out by 
industry experts or senior managers (Garcia et al., 2002), this research focuses 
specifically on measures used by Tushman & Anderson's (1986, 1990) theory of 
discontinuous innovation. 
In general terms, the theory of discontinuous innovation is wholly consistent with 
Foster's description of the S-curves of technology. "Technological change is a bit-by-bit, 
cumulative process until it is punctuated by a major advance" (Tushman et al., 1986: 
441). Foster (1986) describes a technological discontinuity as the overtaking of one 
technology by another (overlapping S-curves). He describes technological advances as 
advancing on S-curves where performance is plotted against development effort. 
According to Foster (1986), the maturity of a technology is indicated when the 
technological return on investment (performance gain over effort) or slope of the S-curve 
shows diminishing returns. When a new technology's S-curve surpasses an existing 
technology, this causes a technological discontinuity. Foster (1986) noted that a major 
impediment for companies attempting to navigate a discontinuity is managing the 
transitions of skills from the old S-curve to the new (Figure 21). 
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FIGURE 21 
Foster's S-Curves and Technological Discontinuity 
High 
Technological 
Performance 
Low 
Development Effort 
The key variables that distinguish incremental innovations from discontinuous 
innovations are technological performance, technological design and time. Tushman & 
Anderson (1986) measured the technological performance of innovations in the cement, 
domestic airline and minicomputer industries. In each case, the parameters chosen to 
represent technological performance were identified a posteriori from the literature of the 
industry. In the cement industry, the barrel per day capacity of cement kilns was chosen. 
A year-by-year comparison was made of industry kiln capacity and the percentage 
improvement in kiln capacity was plotted over time. Seat-miles per year were similarly 
used to measure technological advance in the domestic airline industry and central 
processing unit time per cycle in the minicomputer industry. In each case, Anderson & 
Tushman (1990) used the most advanced technology on the market - the largest capacity 
kiln, the fastest minicomputer, or the largest seat-mile per year plane - to measure 
technological change. 
Technological 
Discontinuity 
Limit of New 
Technology 
Limit of Old 
Technology 
New Technology 
Old Technology 
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Discontinuities were first described as "sharp price-performance improvements" 
(Tushman et al., 1986: 441). Price clearly contributes to why kiln capacity is important 
in the cement industry and why seat-miles/year is important in the domestic airline 
business. The advent of digital technology dramatically lowered the cost/per month of 
transmitting facsimiles (Baum, Korn, & Kotha, 1995). The work of Adner & Levinthal 
(2001) further emphasizes the significance of price in the innovation of products. 
Discontinuities might also result in significant changes in quality (Anderson et al., 1990). 
The introduction of radial tires significantly improved the safety of bias ply tires while 
also reducing the average cost/mile (Sull, Tedlow, & Rosenbloom, 1997). 
However, in the literature cited above, price reductions, quality improvements and 
new dominant designs all resulted from a rapid advance in technological performance. 
The transition from analog to digital facsimile technology reduced the time necessary to 
transmit a page of data over phone lines from about 3 minutes to less than 1 minute 
(Baum et al., 1995). Improvements in the technological performance of facsimile 
transmission directly reduced operating costs since the time necessary to transmit a fax is 
directly related to the cost of the transmission over existing phone lines. Similarly, the 
improved life expectancy of a radial tire (40,000 miles versus 12,000 for a bias ply tire) 
directly translates into improved safety and reduced operating cost (Sull et al., 1997). 
Although not explicitly stated, there seems to be an underlying assumption within the 
theory of discontinuous innovation that an industry chooses its key measures of 
technological performance precisely because they will also deliver the price and quality 
improvements that industry customers demand. Table 7 provides a summary of measures 
of technological performance. 
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Ehrenberg (1995: 445) asks, "How much change must there be for there to be a 
technological discontinuity?" There is no consensus on an answer. Tushman & 
Anderson (1986,1990) noted peaks in technological performance. Others noted 
significant changes or step jumps in performance (Saul et al, 1997; Baum et al., 1995). 
Perhaps this is why discontinuities are difficult to identify a priori. What is clear is that 
technological discontinuities result in new dominant designs (Anderson et al., 1990). 
Typically S-curves plot technological performance against development effort 
(Foster, 1986) or time (Christensen, 1992a). During the high growth periods of the S-
curve, significant growth might be observed and might confuse discontinuities with 
incremental innovation. Anderson & Tushman (1990: 607) distinguished between 
rapidly developing incremental innovation and discontinuous innovation by specifying 
that discontinuous innovations are also characterized by a new technological design: 
Product discontinuities are fundamentally different product forms that 
command a decisive cost, performance, or quality advantage over prior 
product forms. 
Each of Anderson & Tushman's (1990) product discontinuities is characterized by 
changes in the technology of core components. Jet engines replace piston engines. 
Diesel engines replace steam engines. As shown in Chapter Two, the locus of the 
technological change for discontinuous product innovation is expected to be in the 
product's core components rather than in its architecture as defined by Henderson & 
Clark (1990). The interdependent variables that describe discontinuous innovation are 
shown in Figure 22. Stated in their null form, the first set of hypotheses of this research 
are: 
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FIGURE 22 
Defining Variables of Discontinuous Innovation 
Theory of Discontinuous 
Innovation Hypothesis i 
, 
New Technology 
Core Component 
Technological 
Performance 
along Established 
Trajectories 
Introduced in 
Main Industry 
Hypothesis 1. There is no natural grouping of discontinuous innovations 
where a new technology is introduced into a products core and results in a new 
dominant design that significantly outperforms previous designs along established 
performance parameters while competing in the main market of an industry. 
Hypothesis la. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the introduction of new technology is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis lb. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the introduction of a new core component is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis lc. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the improvement of performance along established trajectories is not a 
necessary component. 
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Hypothesis Id. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the introduction of the new dominant design within the main market of 
the industry is not a necessary component. 
Deconstructing Disruptive Innovation 
Researchers describe many types of innovation as disruptive. Denning 
(2007: 22) describes the theory of disruption as a sort of a Kuhnian paradigm 
shift, where "Disruptive innovations shift to new paradigms (new belief systems 
and practices); because they change who has power, they are likely to be resisted 
and not win immediate social acceptance." Others have tried to expand the 
original concept to include "top-down" innovations (Carr, 2005; Rao, Angelov, & 
Nov, 2006), technological fusion (Hacklin, Raurich, & Marxt, 2004), or business 
model innovation (Markides, 2006). 
Christensen (2006: 42) laments his use of the word disruptive: 
The term disruptive has many prior connotations in the English language, 
such as "failure" and "radical," in addition to the phenomenon to which I 
applied it. I fear this is why we see so much post hoc definition by the 
uninformed. As noted following, Grove (1998) proposed that the 
phenomenon should be labeled the "Christensen Effect" to eliminate this 
misunderstanding. Possibly we should have taken his advice. 
This research relies upon Christensen's definition of the theory to identify the variables 
used to classify disruptive innovations. 
As described earlier, low-end disruptions occur when technological performance 
exceeds market needs. At this point, architectural innovations that offer new value in the 
market take hold and replace existing dominant designs. Therefore, the variables of 
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TABLE 8 
Measures of Technical Performance in Low-end Disruption 
Reference 
Christensen 1992a 
Christensen 1997 
Technological Disruption 
14 inch - 8 inch Hard Disk 
Drive 
8 inch-5.25 inch Hard 
Disk Drive 
5.25-3.5 inch Hard Disk 
Drive 
Cable driven - Hydraulic 
Excavator 
Integrated Steel Mills -
Minimills 
Laser Jet - Ink Jet Printer 
Performance Measure 
Hard Disk Capacity in 
Mbytes 
Bucket Capacity in Cubic 
Yards 
Quality of the Output Steel 
Printer Speed in Pages per 
Minute 
technological performance, market need, system design, and market value must 
be defined in order to classify low-end disruptive product innovations. 
Christensen identifies key technological parameters in a manner similar to 
the research of discontinuous innovation (Table 8). His initial research measured 
the technological performance of hard disk drives using disk capacity in Mbytes 
(Christensen, 1992b). For example, Christensen (1992a) notes that in 1980, the 
14 inch hard disk drives dominate the minicomputer market with a capacity of 
nearly 400 Mbytes when low-end 8 inch drives could only achieve 40 Mbytes. 
By 1984, 94% of minicomputers were using 8 inch drives or smaller with a disk 
drive capacity of roughly 300 Mbytes. When the disruption from 14 inch drives 
to 8 inch drives occurred, the technological performance of the dominant design 
lowered. Christensen's The Innovator's Dilemma shows a repeating pattern of 
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FIGURE 23 
Technological Performance during a Low-End Disruption 
(Adapted from Christensen 1997) 
High 
Hard Disk 
Drive 
Performance 
Low 
Time 
Technology Curve Market Need 
A - Substitution of 14 inch drives for 8 inch drives in mainframe computers 
B - Substitution of 8 inch drives for 5.25 inch drives in minicomputers 
C - Substitution of 5.25 inch drives for 3.5 inch drives in desktop computers 
low-end disruptions as low-end designs replace existing higher market dominant designs 
(Christensen, 1997). After the disruption, the technical performance of the new design 
continues to improve, often at the same pace that it previously improved (See Figure 23). 
In order to understand this phenomenon, one must distinguish between the 
average technological performance of the chosen parameter and what Christensen 
describes as the technological performance demanded by market need. The technological 
performance shown in Figure 23 as a solid line, is calculated from the average value of 
the parameter being measured (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995). These curves are 
typically drawn on log-linear graphs as straight lines and as such represent an average 
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exponential growth rate. Market need (the dotted lines in Figure 23) is calculated by rank 
ordering the products offered in a given year and measuring the technological parameter 
of the median priced product (Christensen et al., 1995: 257): 
Because drives with higher capacities were available in the market than 
the capacities offered with the median-priced systems, we state .. .that 
the.. .trajectories .. .represent the capacities 'demanded' in each market. In 
other words, the capacity per machine was not constrained by 
technological availability. Rather, it represents a choice for hard disk 
capacity, made by computer users, given the prevailing costs. 
A recurring observation in the disruptive literature is that the technology curve of 
an industry typically grows more rapidly than market demand (Christensen et al., 2004: 
278-279): 
However, firms almost always improve their products faster than 
customers can change to use the new innovations. Therefore, incumbent 
firms tend to create new products and services at a pace .. .that outstrips 
the ability of customers in various levels or tiers of the market to use the 
improvements. 
According to Christensen, it is this growing gap between the technological capacity of the 
product and the market need that creates the opportunity for disruption. 
Adner (2002) explained that disruption is one of three potential results when two 
markets - in this case a low-end and a high-end market - compete. If the low-end product 
holds no appeal to the high-end market and vice versa, then the markets remain in 
competitive isolation. When the low-end product and the high-end product both appeal 
to each other's markets, a competitive symmetry develops. Low-end disruption results 
when the low-end product appeals to the high-end market but the high-end product holds 
no appeal to the low-end market. Adner (2002) called this competitive asymmetry and 
suggests that this is an underlying feature of disruptive innovation. Adner (2002) also 
proposed that Christensen's focus on dollar/megabyte may be wrong. Instead, Adner 
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(2002) suggested that absolute price may be the more important factor. "Customers with 
sufficiently satisfied functional requirements are more concerned with differences in 
absolute price than with differences in price/performance points" (Adner, 2002: 684). He 
noted that while 3.5 inch disk drives have disrupted 5.25 inch disk drives, laptops have 
not disrupted desktop computers even though they offer functional parity in all areas 
except price. 
The current analysis suggests that the essential aspect of consumer choice 
which allows for disruptive displacement may be consumers' decreasing 
marginal utility from performance improvements beyond their 
requirements, rather than a new found appreciation for previously 
marginal attributes. (Adner, 2002: 684-685) 
Adner & Zemsky (2003) explored the relationship between technology capacity 
and market demand. They demonstrated that while the gap between technology capacity 
and market demand - a gap they called 'performance over supply'- assists in disruption, 
it is not necessarily required. Instead, Adner & Zemsky (2003) showed the disruptive 
influence of the lower margin costs of low-end technologies. Using economic models, 
they illustrate how new technology firms who have achieved low margin costs have 
incentives to pursue high volume strategies. Combined with advancing technological 
capacity, the lower margin products have great disruptive potential because they can offer 
the capacity demanded by the market at reduced cost. 
The theory of disruptive innovation has evolved from its early focus on 
technology to its current focus on business models (Christensen, 2006). The 
technological dimension remains a prerequisite condition for disruption. The 
performance over supply that Christensen (1997) observed and the competitive 
asymmetry that leads to disruption that Adner & Zemsky (2003) theorized both require 
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FIGURE 24 
Henderson & Clark (1990) Typology of Component versus System Innovation 
Unchanged 
Relationship Between 
Components 
New Relationship 
Between Components 
Incremental 
Innovation 
Architectural 
Innovation 
Modular 
Innovation 
Radical 
Innovation 
Core Technology 
Reinforced 
Core Technology 
Overturned 
the improvement of technological performance in core components, but disruption is " a 
business model problem, not a technology problem" (Christensen, 2006: 48). Disruption 
results when the business models of two markets develop products that compete 
asymmetrically. 
The innovative change that is observed in a disruption is a change in value or cost. 
Christensen (1997) originally proposed that new attributes such as size, reliability, or cost 
might become the basis of competition after a disruption. Adner (2002) suggested that 
cost alone might be sufficient. 
The theory of disruptive innovation initially measured system design changes 
according to the typology of Henderson & Clark (1990) (Christensen, 1997) (See Figure 
24). Christensen (1997) first described disruptive innovations as originating from 
architectural innovation. New entrants in niche markets create new product designs by 
putting existing core technologies together in new architectures. The margin costs of 
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these new designs are much better than in high end products but the initial performance 
of the new product is insufficient to compete asymmetrically for the higher markets. 
When the disruption occurs, the new market dominant design does not represent a leap 
forward in technological capability. Instead, it represents a new architecture with 
improved values (new attributes or reduced cost) for high-end market customers. 
More recently, Christensen (2006: 49) has rescinded his emphasis on a 
technological foundation to disruptive innovation: 
I decided that labeling the phenomenon as disruptive technology was 
inaccurate. The technology did not make the incumbent response difficult. 
The disruptive innovation in business models made it vexing, and I have 
subsequently sought to sue the term disruptive innovation. 
As a result, Christensen & Raynor's (2003) list of disruptive innovations sometimes use 
new technologies (inkjet printers), old technologies (minimills), and changes in core 
technologies (Seiko watches) and existing core technologies (Southwest Airlines). In the 
end, the technologies new and old are recombined in a new architecture with a new 
business model that competes asymmetrically with the dominant industry model. 
So far, disruptive innovation has been discussed primarily from the perspective of 
low-end disruption. In The Innovator's Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful 
Growth, Christensen & Raynor (2003a) introduced the concept of new market disruption 
to the theory of disruptive innovation. In new market disruptions, new products are 
offered to new customers rather than the low-end market customers we have previously 
been discussing. Christensen & Raynor (2003) described the first personal computers 
and the first battery powered pocket radios as new market products. As the new markets 
develop, they enjoy advantages over low-end markets in that they can establish lower 
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FIGURE 25 
Defining Variables of Disruptive Innovation 
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Industry or in New 
Industry 
margin costs and new product attributes without competing against established markets. 
Eventually, the improvements of core technologies allow these new market products to 
compete asymmetrically with established markets and pull customers from existing 
markets into the new market creating a "new market" disruption. 
While the development of the new market differs from the development of low-
end markets, the variables of technological performance, market need, system design, and 
market value are sufficient to describe the disruption since the core mechanism 
underlying both low-end and new market disruptions is asymmetric competition. The 
variable of source market is included to describe whether the disruption originated in a 
low-end market or in a new market (See Figure 25). Stated in their null form, the second 
set of hypotheses in this research are: 
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Hypothesis 2. There is no natural grouping of disruptive innovations 
where a new architecture is introduced that results in a new dominant design that 
equals or underperforms existing designs along established parameters while 
shifting competition to new performance parameters (such as size or reliability) 
or reduced cost while competing in the low end or from an adjacent market of an 
industry. 
Hypothesis 2a. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, 
the introduction of a new architecture is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 2b. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, 
the presence of a dominant design that equals or underperforms existing designs 
along established parameters is not a necessary condition. 
Hypothesis 2c. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, 
the improvement of performance along new parameters or the reduction in cost is 
not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 2d. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovation is present, 
the introduction of the new dominant design in the low end of existing markets or 
within adjacent markets is not a necessary component. 
Completing the Integrated Typology 
Table 9 identifies the seven variables that are required to define the theories of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation. There is no simple 2 or 3 dimensional construct 
that will fully distinguish discontinuous innovations from disruptive. The literature of 
contextual technology tends to partition discontinuous and disruptive innovations as 
distinct and separate phenomena. Therefore, this integrated typology establishes the 
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TABLE 9 
Integrated Typology for Classifying Shifts in Dominant Design 
Dimensions of 
Typology 
Locus of 
Innovation 
Product 
Utility 
Market 
Component 
Component 
System 
Architecture 
Performance 
Performance 
Cost 
Existing 
Interdependent 
Variables 
New Technology 
Introduced 
Core Component 
Change 
System Architecture 
Change 
Product Performance 
along Establish 
Parameters 
Customer Shift in 
Established Parameters 
Reduced Cost 
Where was the New 
Product Introduced? 
Discontinuous 
Innovation 
Yes 
Yes 
Better 
Main Industry 
Disruptive 
Innovation 
Yes 
Same or Worse 
Yes 
Yes 
Low-end or New 
Market 
criteria upon which to classify product innovations as either discontinuous or disruptive 
based upon these seven variables. This serves several purposes. First, it establishes a 
starting point for a typology that is firmly grounded in the literature of innovation. 
Second, it provides the hypothesis required to evaluate the usefulness and generalizability 
of these theories in describing a sample of innovations. Third, this typology enables this 
research to distinguish between shifts in dominant design that are predicted by the 
typology and anomalies that require further investigation. 
The appearance of dominant designs is a signal event identifying innovations with 
the potential to be either discontinuous or disruptive. As described earlier, Anderson & 
Tushman (1990) explained that a new dominant design ends the era ferment initiated by 
the discontinuous innovation (See Figure 7). 
A dominant design is the second watershed event in a technology cycle, 
marking the end of the era of ferment. A dominant design is a single 
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architecture that established dominance in a product class (Abernathy, 
1978; Sahal, 1981). Once a dominant design emerges, future 
technological progress consists of incremental improvements elaborating 
the standard and the technological regime becomes more orderly as one 
design becomes its standard expression. (Anderson et al., 1990: 613) 
Christensen & Bower (1996) cited the shift in the dominant designs of hard disk drives as 
they described the waves of disruptive innovation that occurred in the mainframe and 
minicomputer industries. 
Hence, all but one of the makers of 14-inch drives were driven from the 
mainframe computer market by entrants firms that got their start making 
8-inch drives for minicomputers. The 8-inch drive makers, in turn, were 
driven form the minicomputer market, and eventually the mainframe 
market, by firms which led in producing 5.25-inch drives for desktop 
computers. (Christensen et al., 1996: 205-206) 
This research uses shifts in dominant design as the taxa or object of classification in our 
research. 
A sample of dominant design shifts from various industries classify into three 
groups using this method. First, those shifts that result from discontinuous innovations. 
Second, shifts in dominant designs that result from disruptive innovation. Third, any 
shifts in dominant designs that are not well described by either theory. Combining the 
variables identified in our earlier deconstruction of the theories, the variables can now 
recombined into an integrated typology in Figure 26 and Table 9 that will predict the 
grouping of classification of discontinuous and disruptive innovations according to 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Stated in its null form, the third hypothesis of this research is: 
Hypothesis 3. A taxonomy constructed from shifts observed in the 
dominant design of an established industry does not display natural clusters of 
innovation as predicted by the typology (Table 9) constructed from the theories of 
discontinuous innovation and disruptive innovation. 
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FIGURE 26 
Integrated Theories of Discontinuous and Disruptive Innovation 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research Design for Multivariate Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology this research employs 
to test the hypotheses developed in the previous section. The goal is to collect data on a 
sample of innovations across many industries and test to see how well the data can be 
structured using the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. This research 
does not attempt to predict the occurrence of a shift in the dominant design, or to 
establish the dependence of a dominant design shift on variables such as system design or 
product performance. Additionally, this research distinguishes between the 
technological, market, and industry factors that combine to cause a shift in a dominant 
design from the ability of firms within the industry to survive the shift. Multivariate 
techniques that explore the interdependent nature of our variables are best suited to 
answer our research questions when variables are not being defined as dependent or 
independent (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). The structured approach 
to multivariate analysis as proposed by Hair et al. (2006) is used as shown in Figure 27. 
The Research Problem. The problem proposed in this research is to test the 
usefulness of an integrated typology constructed from the theories of discontinuous and 
disruptive innovation. Each of these theories was developed independently and has 
evolved over time to be among the most important theories used to describe the evolution 
of technological innovation in industries from a contextual technology perspective. An 
integrated typology is proposed that predicts how the variables identified can be used to 
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FIGURE 27 
Approach to Multivariate Data Analysis (Adapted from Hair et al., 2006) 
Define the Research Problem, 
Objectives and Choose the Most 
Appropriate Technique 
Develop Procedures for the Analysis 
Evaluate the Assumptions Inherent in 
the Chosen Technique 
Conduct the Analysis and Evaluate the 
Model's Fit to the Research Problem and 
Objectives 
Interpret the Results of the Analysis 
Validate the Results of the Analysis 
classify shifts in dominant designs according to the theories of discontinuous and 
disruptive innovation (See Table 9 from the previous section). 
The Research Objective. The objective of this methodology is to design a test to 
determine how well the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation describe the 
shifts of dominant designs observed at the industry level (Hypothesis 1 and 2) and to test 
how well a single typology can be used to integrate the theories into a single 
classification structure (Hypothesis 3). Cluster analysis is well suited to meet both of 
these objectives. If the theories could be described with only two or three variables, then 
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simple descriptive analysis might suffice to test for structure in the data. However, the 
literature review conducted earlier shows many two-dimensional typologies of innovation 
that have been constructed over the years and none capture the full multi-dimensional 
complexity of innovation. "It is difficult for humans to obtain an intuitive interpretation 
of data embedded in a high-dimensional space" (Jain, Murty, & Flynn, 1999: 268). 
Cluster Analysis. Cluster analysis does not produce a result that is true or false. 
Instead, it provides a structuring of the data that is more or less useful (Everitt, Landau, & 
Leese, 2001). The theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation predict that 
clusters should exist (Hypothesis 1 and 2). They describe the grouping of variables that 
should be most effective in identifying the common features of each type of innovation 
(contributing to homogeneity within each predicted cluster) and that should distinguish 
between each type of innovation (contributing to heterogeneity between groups). The 
predicted presence of clusters is an important precondition to cluster analysis. "We want 
to cluster only if clusters exist...the ability of procedures to find non-existent clusters is 
established" (Cormack, 1971: 345-346). 
It is important to re-emphasize that cluster analysis is inherently subjective (Jain 
etal., 1999:290). 
As a task, clustering is subjective in nature. The same data set may need to be 
partitioned differently for different purposes. For example, consider a whale, an 
elephant, and a tuna fish [Watanabe 1985]. Whales and elephants form a cluster 
of mammals. However, if the user is interested in partitioning them based on the 
concept of living inwater, then whale and tuna fish are clustered together. 
Typically, this subjectivity is incorporated into the clustering criterion by 
incorporating domain knowledge in one or more phases of clustering. 
It is the underlying theory and the purpose of our research that makes cluster analysis 
appropriate. This research does not test if the theories of discontinuous or disruptive 
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innovation are true or false. In essence, this research tests the usefulness of the theories 
of discontinuous and disruptive innovation in classifying the shifts of dominant designs 
as observed in industry. 
The use of cluster analysis to test hypothesis is well established (Aldenderfer et 
al., 1984; Hair et al., 2006; McKelvey, 1982). 
...although viewed principally as an exploratory technique, cluster 
analysis can be used for confirmatory purposes. In such cases, a proposed 
typology (theoretically based classification) can be compared to that 
derived from the cluster analysis" (Hair et al., 2006: 569) 
In using cluster analysis to test a proposed typology, it is important that the form of the 
clusters can be deduced from the typology that is being tested (Romesburg, 1984). This 
is why Hypothesis 3 is expressed in the form of Table 9. This is the hypothesized 
grouping of variables deduced from the theories of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation that is expected to produce clusters in our analysis. 
Techniques of discriminant analysis, factor analysis, principal component 
analysis, multidimensional scaling, and structural equation modeling were also 
considered for this analysis before choosing cluster analysis as the most appropriate 
technique. Discriminant analysis uses a priori theory to construct clusters. 
It is important to understand the difference between clustering 
(unsupervised classification) and discriminant analysis (supervised 
classification). In supervised classification, we are provided with a 
collection of labeled (preclassified) patterns; the problem is to label a 
newly encountered, yet unlabeled, pattern. Typically, the given labeled 
{training) patterns are used to learn the descriptions of classes which in 
turn are used to label a new pattern. In the case of clustering, the problem 
is to group a given collection of unlabeled patterns into meaningful 
clusters. In a sense, labels are associated with clusters also, but these 
category labels are data driven; that is, they are obtained solely from the 
data. (Jain etal., 1999:265) 
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Discriminant analysis is useful once the groups are defined and it is necessary to classify 
a new object to either one group or the other (Everitt et al., 2001). For example, if it was 
well established which innovations were discontinuous and which were disruptive, then 
discriminant analysis could be used to develop coefficients for each of the variables here 
and compare them to theory. However, a central research question of this research is 
whether discontinuous and disruptive innovation are truly distinct phenomenon (H3); 
therefore, discriminant analysis was rejected (as was logistic regression - regression with 
a binary dependent variable). 
Factor analysis and principal components analysis are particularly useful in 
analyzing the role of variables in describing a multivariate array of data. The objective of 
these techniques is to reduce the dimensionality of the data while retaining the maximum 
amount of information in the data set (Hair et al., 2006). These techniques are often used 
in conjunction with cluster analysis to manipulate the variables used to construct the 
cluster analysis (Aldenderfer et al., 1984; Everitt et al., 2001; Hair et al., 2006). Others 
caution that use of these techniques in cluster analysis without first understanding the 
underlying cluster structure and the effect that these dimensionality changes might cause 
should be avoided (Kettenring, 2006). Factor analysis was rejected because it might 
reduce the dimensionality of the variables in Table 9 in such a way that they cannot be 
directly mapped back to the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. It is 
important for us to see how the variables described by theory interact in order to draw 
conclusions required to test our hypotheses. Multidimensional scaling was also rejected 
because (1) it is typically used in the mapping of people's perceptions to object (not 
considered useful in the testing of our hypotheses) and (2) its manipulation of the 
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variables into "perceptions" would hide the inherent relationship between the variables of 
the theories of innovation and the results of the analysis. 
Finally, structured equation modeling is a plausible approach but would require 
modeling dependent relationships between the variables of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation in order to support a confirmatory factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006). The 
intent of this research is not to test the ability if the theories of innovation to predict shifts 
in dominant designs (dependence) but instead to test their ability to classify or describe 
innovations. From this perspective, cluster analysis is viewed as a simpler approach that 
does not depend on dependence between specific variables. This research examines the 
interactions between all of the variables (interdependence) in order to test our research 
hypotheses. 
Cluster analysis has frequently been used to analyze the classification of 
innovative firms. De Jong & Marsili (2006), Peneder (2002), and Evangelista (2000) 
used cluster analysis to identify clusters of innovative firm types (capital driven, S&T 
based, Supplier-dominated, etc). The "industry cluster" was a central theme of Porter's 
The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) and has spurred the use of cluster analysis 
to identify regions of economic activity (Jacobs & Jong, 1992). Lawless & Anderson 
(1996) used cluster analysis to identify niches in markets in their study of generational 
innovation. 
Adams (2003) used cluster analysis to explore a generalized classification of 
innovation. He employed a three-step methodology to explore innovation in the United 
Kingdom's National Health Service. First, he inductively generated a set of variables 
from literature reviews and semi-structured interviews. The results of this research were 
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TABLE 10 
Innovation Types from Adams (2003) Cluster Analysis 
Variable 
Disruption 
Risk 
Adaptability 
Actual Operation 
Observability 
Scope 
Complexity 
Uncertainty 
Relative Advantage 
Variable Description 
Changes existing practices 
in a disruptive manner 
Threatens individuals or 
the organization; inherently 
risky 
Ability to modify the 
innovation 
Satisfaction of original 
need 
Visibility of innovation to 
others 
Extent of change required 
by the innovation 
Extent of change required 
in interdependent systems 
Lack of knowledge, 
concern over feasibility 
Extent of improvement 
Innovation 
Type I 
Low 
Low 
High 
High 
High 
Innovation 
Type II 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Innovation 
Type III 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Profile 
created by innovation 
Extent that individual, 
group or organizational 
visibility is raised 
Low 
coded using content analysis to develop the attributes to be used for classification. 
Second, Adams (2003) conducted a cluster analysis and validated the existence of three 
clusters of attributes (shown in Table 10). He concluded his research by conducting 
further semi-structured interviews to explore the meanings of the clusters identified in his 
cluster analysis. 
90 
Adams (2003) approached the topic more from the perspective of a sociologist 
than a technologist (Gopalakrishnan et al., 1997). His research does not include any 
reference to the theories of discontinuous or disruptive innovation. As a result, while his 
research provides us an example of how cluster analysis might be used to develop a 
classification of innovation, it provides little assistance in aiding our test of how best to 
integrate the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. 
Procedures for Cluster Analysis 
The procedures for conducting cluster analysis are broken into three broad phases 
(1) examination of the data field; (2) selection of the methods or algorithms for 
clustering; and (3) assessment of the results (Kettenring, 2006). The procedures outlined 
in Hair et al. (2006) (See Figure 28) form the basis for cluster analysis in this research. 
Clustering Objective. The objective of the clustering analysis is to construct a taxonomy 
that can be compared to descriptions of theory (Hypothesis 1 and 2) and the proposed 
typology (Hypothesis 3) in order to test the usefulness of the theories of discontinuous 
and disruptive innovation in the description of shifts in dominant designs within 
industries. 
Clustering Variables. The selection of the clustering variables has a significant 
impact on the subsequent formation of clusters. 
Any application of cluster analysis must have some rationale upon which 
variables are selected. Whether the rationale is based upon an explicit 
theory, past research, or supposition, the researcher must realize the 
importance of including only those variables that (1) characterize the 
objects being clustered, and (2) relate specifically to the objectives of the 
cluster analysis. (Hair et al., 2006: 569-570) 
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FIGURE 28 
Procedures for Cluster Analysis (Adapted from Hair et al., 2006) 
Define the Objectives of the Cluster 
Analysis and the Selection of the 
Clustering Variables 
Determine Procedures for Handling the 
Data (Sample Size, Similarity, and 
Standardization) 
Evaluate the Assumptions Inherent in 
Cluster Analysis 
Construct the Clusters and Assess Their 
Fit to the Research Objectives 
Interpret the Results of the Analysis 
Validate the Results of the Analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is to test a specific set of hypotheses that are linked with 
established theories of innovation. It is not intended as an inductive exploration of data 
structure. As a result, the variables of this analysis must be directly related to the 
variables identified in our hypothesis (Romesburg, 1984). "Ideally, variables should be 
chosen within the context of an explicitly stated theory that is used to support the 
classification" (Aldenderfer et al., 1984: 20). The variables of this research were deduced 
from the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovations outlined in Chapters 2 and 
3 and are shown in Figure 26. 
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As the cluster analysis is conducted, the variables are examined to determine their 
role in the formation of clusters: 
The researcher is always encouraged to examine the results and to 
eliminate the variables that are not distinctive (i.e., that do not differ 
significantly) across the derived clusters. This procedure enables the 
cluster techniques to maximally define clusters based only on those 
variables exhibiting differences across the objects. (Hair et al., 2006: 570) 
In this analysis, each of the variables will be examined for their contribution to the 
formation of clusters. Variables "that do not differ significantly across clusters" will be 
considered for removal and discussed in the cluster analysis results. 
Some cluster analysis begins with a primary component analysis in order to 
project the multiple dimensions of the data into a smaller number of dimensions to make 
the results more informative (Everitt et al., 2001). Others caution that the ability of 
researchers to cull information from complex data sets may be confounded by reducing 
the data's dimensionality except in special circumstances (Kettenring, 2006). Since our 
theory and resulting hypothesis provide us with the variables of our analysis, there is no 
desire to reduce the dimensionality of this data with techniques such a primary 
component analysis or factor analysis. 
• New Technology (Pi= 0 (Existing) or 1 (New)). Does the shift in dominant 
design introduce a new technology to the industry or does it use existing 
technology in the industry in a new way? The variable is specifically worded to 
examine technology from the perspective of the industry. For example, the 
construction of cylinders was not a new technology in general but was first 
applied to the process of manufacturing cement in the construction of a rotary kiln 
in about 1892. Tushman & Anderson (1986) considered this a new technology. 
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Alternatively, the use of electric arc furnaces in the metals industry spans decades 
but the evolution of the use of the electric arc furnace in minimills used an 
existing technology in a new and disruptive business model. Christensen (1997) 
would consider this the use of an existing technology. This is a binary variable 
with values of 0 for existing technologies and 1 for new technologies. 
• Core Component Design (P2= 0 (Existing) or 1 (New)). Does the shift in 
dominant design represent a change to the core components of the product 
design? Henderson & Clark (1990) distinguished between changes to core 
component and changes to system architectures. This variable measures changes 
in core component design as change in dominant designs are observed in order to 
test Hypothesis 1. This is a binary variable with a value of 0 if no changes are 
detected in core technologies and 1 for changes observed in core technologies. 
• System Architecture Design (Pj= 0 (Existing) or 1 (New)). Does the shift in 
dominant design introduce a change to the system architecture of the product 
design? Christensen associated changes to system architectures with disruptive 
innovation in the disk drive industry (Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al., 1996). 
This binary variable monitors for changes in the system architecture as predicted 
by Hypothesis 2. This is a binary variable with a value of 0 if no changes are 
detected in the system architecture and 1 if changes in the architecture are 
observed. 
• Performance along Established Parameters (P4 = 1 (Improved Performance), 
0 (Same Performance), or -1 (Worse Performance)). How does the 
performance of the product along established parameters change when the shift in 
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dominant design is observed? This parameter is measured differently by 
Tushman & Anderson (1986) and Christensen (1997). Tushman & Anderson 
(1986) identified key performance parameters in industries and mapped the % 
change in the most capable design each year. Discontinuities were identified as 
large changes in capabilities that were associated with changes in product design. 
Christensen mapped the average performance of all products in a given year to 
map performance or what he termed technological "capacity" (Christensen, 
1993). Tushman & Anderson (1986) expected the performance to improve when 
a discontinuity occurs. Christensen (1993, 1997) expected performance to remain 
the same or get worse when a disruption occurs. This research measures the 
change in performance as an ordinal value (1, 0 or -1) by comparing the 
performance of the new dominant design to existing designs. 
• Performance along New Parameters (Ps = 0 (Existing) or 1 (New)). How does 
the performance of the product along new parameters change when the shift in 
dominant design is observed? Christensen (1997) argued that the basis of 
competition within an industry shifts as disruptive waves of innovations take 
place. Products that once competed on the basis of technological capacity 
(performance) now compete on the basis of size or quality and eventually will 
shift to competition based solely upon the basis of price as the product becomes a 
commodity. This variable is intended to detect this shift. If the new dominant 
design displays a significant change that improves performance along a new 
parameter, such as improved quality or reduced size and weight, then the variable 
will be given a value of 1. If no significant shift is noted, the variable is set to 0. 
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• Cost Performance (P(, = 1 (Higher Cost), 0 (Same Cost), or -1 (Lower Cost)). 
How does the cost of the product change when the shift in dominant design is 
observed? Neither theory emphasizes cost. Christensen (1997) cited cost savings 
as potential new benefit to be gained but focuses on the impact of technical 
capacity exceeding market demand. Alternatively, Adner (2002: 684) pointed out 
that cost may be an important factor in disruption, "Customers with sufficiently 
satisfied functional requirements are more concerned with differences in absolute 
price than with differences in price/performance points." Tushman & Anderson 
(1986, 1990) did not cite cost as a factor in their theory. When Adner (2002) 
spoke of cost, it was from the perspective of the individual customer was defined 
as the price of the product to the customer. However, when companies are the 
customers of the innovation, as in the case of the Owens Automatic Bottling 
Machine (Anderson & Tushman, 1990), the purchase price does not represent the 
value that the company places on the purchase. It is the innovation's impact on 
the company's profits that are most important. This research measures the change 
in cost as an ordinal value (1, 0 or -1) by comparing the cost of the new dominant 
design to existing designs from the perspective of the design's customer. 
• Industry Migration (P7 = a (Main), b (Low-End), or c (New)). What industry 
did the new dominant design originate in? The theory of discontinuous 
innovation speaks directly to this variable, but in each of the examples used by 
Tushman & Anderson (1986, 1990), the innovation originated in the industry 
where the dominant design shift occurred. The theory of disruptive innovation 
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specifically cites low-end markets (Christensen, 1997) and new markets 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003) as the original markets for disruptive innovations. 
Data Handling Procedures 
The data set to be analyzed is defined as an N-by-P matrix where N represents 
shifts in dominant design and P represents the variables P\ through Pj as shown 
in Equation (1). 
r 
N innovations 
P variables 
X n X12 X13 X14 X15 Xi6 X n 
X21 X22 X23 X24 X25 X26 X27 
X31 X32 X33 X34 X35 X36 X37 
X«i X„2 X„3 X„4 X„5 X„6 X nl 
(1) 
Sample Size. Sample size does not relate to statistical significance or statistical 
power in cluster analysis in the traditional sense of statistical inference (Everitt et al., 
2001; Hair et al., 2006; Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990; Kettenring, 2006). "Cluster 
analysis has no statistical basis upon which to draw inferences from a sample to a 
population... Therefore, if possible, a cluster analysis should be applied from a 
confirmatory mode, using it to identify groups that already have established conceptual 
foundation for their existence" (Hair et al., 2006: 560). The theories of discontinuous and 
disruptive innovation provide the conceptual foundation of this research. 
In order to test the usefulness of the theories of discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation, the research sample must be large enough to provide evidence of 
generalizability. The sample for this research does not need to be large. It is testing for 
the presence of two large clusters in the data field. Even 10 data points can be sufficient 
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to test for the presence of two clusters. However, the size of the sample must be 
sufficiently large to complete the validity tests that will be discussed later. 
While cluster analysis does not statistically infer relationships in the sample 
population (real world), it is possible to test a null hypothesis that the clusters formed are 
due to random variation in the data set - a kind of Type 1 error. This methodology will 
be discussed in the section on validity measures. Sample size does impact our ability to 
reject the null hypothesis that our clusters have formed from random variation and 100 
data points proved sufficient to meet all the tests of validity required by this 
methodology. 
Data Collection. Two data sets were collected. First, a small pilot data set was 
systematically selected from a population of dominant design shifts described in the 
literature. Half of the data points were drawn from the literature of discontinuous 
innovation and half from the literature of disruptive innovation. This first data set was 
used to test and refine this methodology with a known data set. The research sample data 
set was drawn from a simple random selection of 100 industries from the 1175 six-digit 
code industries classified in the 2007 North American Industrial Classification System. 
Archival analysis of industry literature from each of the 100 sampled industries was 
examined to identify candidate shifts in dominant design. For both data sets, the relevant 
data points for each variable (Pi through Pi) were recorded as described earlier. 
Procedures for Outliers. Hair et al. (2006) noted three potential reasons for the 
presence of outliers (objects that stand out from the remainder of the variate): (1) The 
data point may suffer from some sampling error and the data is suspect; (2) The data 
point may represent some small structure within the data; and (3) The data may represent 
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a larger structure in the data population that is not well represented in the data sample for 
some reason. The data sample collected here was examined using standard univariate 
(histogram) and bivariate (scatterplot matrix) techniques prior to cluster analysis. The 
purpose of this review was to uncover any category (1) outliers. Outliers were noted but 
not removed in this first review. 
When the cluster analysis was complete, the data sample was reviewed again for 
outliers that might be only be visible in a multivariate construct. At this point outliers 
were examined and separated from the data sample so that the cluster analysis could be 
run again in order to more clearly see the groups that are expected to represent 
discontinuous and disruptive innovations. Outliers that are not representative of the 
population should be deleted from the analysis (Hair et al., 2006). In every case, outliers 
were assessed to evaluate whether they represented category (1), (2), or (3) and are 
addressed in the conclusion of this analysis. These outliers proved to be a rich source for 
identifying potential avenues for future research. 
The deductive portion of a complete theory-building cycle can be 
completed by using the model to predict ex post what will be seen in other 
sets of historical data or to predict what will happen in the future. The 
primary purpose of the deductive half of the theory-building cycle is to 
seek anomalies, not avoid them. This is how theory is improved. 
(Christensen, 2006: 45) 
Similarity and Dissimilarity. Similarity measures record the closeness between 
two objects and dissimilarity measures the distance between two objects. Both similarity 
and dissimilarity are measures of proximity. Similarity measures are typically used to 
measure categorical data and dissimilarity measures are typically used to measures 
continuous data (Kaufman et al., 1990). This research measures proximity of object i and 
j by the dissimilarity, d (i ,j). 
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This research analyzes three types of data: asymmetric binary data, ordinal data, 
and nominal data. Our measurements of new technology (Pi), core components (P2), 
system architectures (P3) and technological performance along new parameters (P5) are 
used to represent aspects of the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. The 
theory of discontinuous innovation emphasizes the presence of new technology and core 
components. The theory of disruptive innovation emphasizes the role of architectural 
innovation. The distinction between symmetric and asymmetric binary data is based 
upon whether one result is emphasized more than the other or whether each result is 
given equal weight (Gan, Ma, & Wu, 2007). Since our typology (See Table 10) does not 
give equal weight to the binary states of 1 and 0, our research will treat the variables P\, 
P2, P3 and P5 as asymmetric binary variables. 
A well-known method for measuring the dissimilarity of asymmetric binary 
variables with a range of (0,1) is Jaccard's coefficient (Gan et al., 2007; Kaufman et al., 
1990). This method is based upon a 2-by-2 contingency table that compares the binary 
variable results between two objects (See Figure 29). 
The measures technological performance (P4) and cost performance (P6) used in 
this research are ordinal variables. This research will use a straightforward method of 
placing the ordinal values in rank order and transforming the data to a scale between 
(0,1). The dissimilarity of the resulting ordinal variables with be measured using the 
Manhattan method as recommended by Kaufman et al. (1990) in Figure 30. 
The last remaining variable, Industry Migration {Pi), is a nominal variable with 
three possible states. In this case, dissimilarity is measured with the simple matching 
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FIGURE 29 
Jaccard's Coefficient, d (i ,j) (Adapted from Kaufman et al., 1990) 
Object i 
1 0 
Object; 
\ a b a+b 
0 c d c + d 
a + c b + d 
b + c 
d(i,j) = 
a + b + c 
FIGURE 30 
Procedures for Transforming the Ordinal Variables P4 and P^ to Dissimilarity 
Coefficients (Adapted from Kaufman et al. (1990)) 
Convert each variable/ to rank order 1 thru/ 
Compute the dissimilarity of the objects using a standardized Manhattan Distance 
I z ' i _ zJf I 
di, (f) 
Range of variable/ 
coefficient in Equation 2. Where P is the total number of variables and u is the number 
of variables that match between object / and/ 
P-u 
d(i,j)= (2) 
Proximity measures must be combined in order to estimate dissimilarity between 
objects with a data matrix of mixed variables - as in this research. Kaufman et al. (1990) 
provide a function for this purpose that is shown in Equation 3 and is the function that is 
used in this research to measure dissimilarity. It measures the proximity of the 
asymmetric binary variables (JPJ, PI, and P3) with the Jaccard coefficient. It takes the 
ordinal variables (P4 and P^) that have been converted to a scale between 0 and 1 and 
their proximity will be measured with a Manhattan distance function as described in 
Figure 26. The final variable, P7, is nominal and will be measured with a simple 
matching function of assigning 0 to the distance, d/J^, if the variables are identical and 1 
if they are different. 
Z^uopSfdf 
d(i,j)= (3) 
£f=\ top Oij 
Standardization. The scale represented by each variable has a large impact on the 
results of the cluster analysis (Kettenring, 2006). The asymmetric binary variables (Pi, 
Pi, P3 and P5), the ordinal variables (P4 and P^), and the nominal variable, P7, are 
standardized on a scale from 0 to 1 by the proximity measures discussed in the last 
section. Therefore, special procedures for standardization are not required. 
Assumptions in Cluster Analysis 
The Sample is Representative of the Population. In order to ensure that clusters 
identified in this analysis have validity in describing the process of innovation in our 
industries, the research sample must be representative of the larger population. 
Discontinuous and disruptive innovations have been applied across many industries. 
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There are no industries identified in the literature where these theories would not have 
potential application. The main sample drawn in this research is a simple random 
selection of 100 industries from the 1175 six-digit code industries classified in the 2007 
North American Industrial Classification System. The use of a random selection method 
ensures that the sample is representative of all industries classified in the 2007 North 
American Industrial Classification System. 
Multicollinearity. Variables that exhibit multicollinearity can skew the results of 
cluster analysis. In these cases, the variables that are correlated will be more heavily 
weighted than those that are not since each variable is equally weighted in cluster 
analysis (Hair et al., 2006). A simple correlation analysis is conducted to determine if the 
extent of multicollinearity warrants the elimination of any variables from the cluster 
analysis. 
Conduct the Cluster Analysis 
Select the clustering algorithm. There are two general types of clustering 
algorithms - those that divide or partition data and those that arrange data into 
hierarchies. Partitioning methods do what the term partition implies. Data is clustered 
such that each object is assigned to one and only one group and each group has at least 
one object within it (Kaufman et al., 1990). Hierarchical methods create a tree like 
structure by either divisive or agglomerative methods (Kaufman et al., 1990). Divisive 
methods start with the entire data set and dividing groups of objects until the data set is 
divided into its component objects. Agglomerative methods start with all the individual 
objects and begin to clump similar objects together until the entire data set is recombined. 
Hierarchical methods are often displayed in trees or dendrograms. 
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Since the objective is to test the partitioning of our data into categories of 
disruptive and discontinuous innovation, a clustering by partition is the desired end result. 
Partitioning methods are further subdivided into hard and soft methods. Hard methods 
assume that that each object is assigned to one cluster or another. Soft methods such as 
fuzzy clustering methods allow for the possibility that clusters may overlap and 
individual objects may belong to both clusters. "The ability to describe such ambiguous 
situations is an important advantage of the fuzzy approach" (Kaufman et al., 1990: 43). 
This research employs the K-means fuzzy clustering methods implemented in the S-
PLUS™ 7.0 for Windows software package. Theory predicts at least two predominant 
clusters (K= or > 2). K-means clustering assigns a membership coefficient for each data 
point to indicate the affinity of each data point with the clusters identified. This method 
of clustering is well suited to handling mixed data types (Jain et al., 1999). 
Multiple cluster solutions will be tested (K=2,3, and 4) to determine which 
provides the best fit for the data sample. The normalized version of Dunn's coefficient 
and the highest average silhouette width each provide insight into what will be 
considered the best-fit solution. The normalized Dunn's coefficient measures the 
"fuzziness" of the clustering solution to the data on a scale of 0 (worst fit) to 1 (best fit) 
(Everitt et al., 2001; Kaufman et al., 1990). Cluster solutions with a normalized Dunn's 
coefficient near the value of 1 are very distinct. Each cluster is sharply defined. 
Silhouette width is used to measure the quality of any cluster analysis solution that 
partitions data. Silhouette widths measure the interobject dissimilarities within a cluster. 
Clusters with high silhouette widths (on a scale of 0 to 1) have less internal dissimilarity 
than clusters with low silhouette widths. The average silhouette width is an average of 
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the silhouette widths of the cluster solution and is a standard measure of the overall 
quality of the partition solution (Kaufman et al., 1990). It is expected that the K= or > 2 
solution will fit best if the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation account for 
the majority of the data. In the end, the validity of any clustering algorithm is tested by 
theoretical and external validity (Hair et al., 2006). 
Cluster Interpretation and Validation 
The interpretation of clusters normally involves analysis of the variable states 
represented in each cluster and identifying distinguishing characteristics (Hair et al., 
2006). In this research, the expected relationship between the variables and the cluster 
solution is predicted in hypothesis 1, 2 and 3. It is expected that this research will 
develop a better understanding of the usefulness of the theories of discontinuous and 
disruptive innovation to describe the sample of design shifts collected and analyzed here. 
Strongly formed clusters (cluster solutions with a high Dunn coefficient) represent a high 
level of usefulness. Weak clusters indicate weaknesses in our source theories to 
distinguish shift in dominant design as either discontinuous or disruptive. It is possible 
that new clusters in the sample may be observed. In that case, the cluster solution will be 
compared to the theories of Chapter Two for possible explanation. 
Several methods are used to check the cluster solution for validity. First, the 
sample set is randomly divided and each set is tested using the same clustering solution to 
validate the clusters for internal consistency (Hair et al., 2006). Second, a null data set is 
formed by randomly developing variables with a Monte Carlo approach - using similar 
characteristics to the sample data set (Aldenderfer et al., 1984). The clustering procedure 
used on the sample set is then be used on the Monte Carlo data set to compare the quality 
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(Dunn coefficient and silhouette values) of the research cluster result with a data set 
known to be random. Third, Fisher's exact test is used to compare the statistical 
significance of the clusters formed compared to the random Monte Carlo data sets. The 
final test of validity is whether there is external, theoretical validity for the solutions 
found. Do clusters form as predicted by hypotheses 1,2, and 3? Do new clusters formed 
that are not explained in the research? 
ANALYSIS OF DATA AND RESULTS 
A Pilot Study of the Proposed Methodology 
The pilot study tests the ability of the cluster analysis methodology described in 
the previous section to distinguish between shifts in dominant design that have been 
classified as discontinuous or disruptive by prior research. The results of the pilot study 
presented here both validate the procedures outlined in the previous section and build 
confidence in the methodology's ability to test the proposed typology with a larger 
randomly sampled data set. 
Data Collections Procedures for the Pilot Study. Ten innovations were 
systematically chosen to form a data set for this pilot study. Five innovations were 
chosen to represent shifts in dominant design from the literature of discontinuous 
innovation. A similar set of five innovations were chosen from the literature of 
disruptive innovation. In total, the ten innovations chosen represent empirical data drawn 
from existing theory and represent ten very different industries (See Table 11). 
The data collection protocol established in the preceding section was used to code 
each shift in dominant design and its associated innovations according to the variables, Pi 
through Pi (See Table 12). Additional data was sought from industry trade journals and 
other available archival data as necessary. Summary descriptions of each of these shifts 
in dominant design are contained in Appendix B. 
Pilot Study Results. One outlier was noted when the pilot data set was examined 
using univariate (histogram) analysis. The data point, D5 (Radial Automobile Tires) is an 
outlier as the only data point in the pilot data set where cost, P(>, increases. Radial tires 
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TABLE 11 
Pilot Study Innovation Design Shifts 
Type of Innovation 
Discontinuous 
Innovations 
Disruptive 
Innovations 
Old Design 
Packard Bell 250 
12 Bit, hybrid 
analog/digital computer, 
transistors 
Douglass DC-7C 
Hand Blown Glass 
Group 2 Analog Fax 
Machines 
Bias Ply Automobile 
Tires 
Laser Jet Printers 
Integrated Steel Mill 
8 inch Hard Disk Drive 
Cardiac Bypass Surgery 
Full Service Brokers 
New Design 
DEC PDP-8 
16 Bit minicomputer, 
core memory, integrated 
circuits 
Boeing 707-120 Aircraft 
AN/AR Series Owens 
Machine Bottle 
Manufacture 
Group 3 Digital Fax 
Machines 
Radial Automobile Tires 
HP Thinkjet 
Steel Minimill 
5.25 inch Hard Disk 
Drive 
Balloon Angioplasty 
Internet Stock Brokers 
Reference 
Anderson & Tushman 
(1990) 
Anderson & Tushman 
(1990) 
Anderson & Tushman 
(1990) 
Coopersmith (1993) 
Sulletal.(1997) 
Christensen (1997) 
Christensen(1997) 
Christensen & Bower 
(1996) 
Christensen & Raynor 
(2003) 
Claude-Gaudillat & 
Quelin (2006) 
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cost 30- 50% more than bias ply tires, and their longer life translates to a lower cost per 
mile basis with less trips to tire dealers for replacements (Sull et al, 1997). This is 
reflected in the data set as an increase in expected performance (P4 =1) while the cost 
also increases {P(, = 1). Radial tires represent a category 2 or 3 outlier (representative of a 
subset underrepresented in the pilot study). It will be removed from analysis so as not to 
dilute the cluster analysis of the remaining nine data points. This category (^4=1, -P6=l) 
will be examined again in the full data set. 
Excluding data point D5 (as noted in the above paragraph), the variables for 
changes in core components {Pi) and cost (P^) show no variability across the pilot data 
set. To include these variables in the cluster analysis would dilute the ability of cluster 
analysis to form data clusters from the remaining variables (Hair et al., 2006). These two 
variables are removed from the cluster analysis of the pilot data set. The data set was also 
examined with bivariate (scatterplot) analysis; however, with so few data points, no 
conclusions were drawn. 
The pilot study data table was examined for multicollinearity. Although there are 
few data points in this sample, there was a strong correlation between new systems 
architectures {Pi) and the advance of system performance along new parameters {Pi). It 
is conceivable that these two variables are linked since new parameters such as reduced 
size or improved quality often require new system architectures. When two variables in a 
cluster analysis are interrelated, they exert an undue influence on the result of the analysis 
(Hair et al., 2006). Since it is desired that each variable exert the same influence in this 
analysis, the variable P3 was excluded from pilot test cluster analysis. A dissimilarity 
matrix was constructed (Table 13) and analyzed using the algorithms, DAISY and 
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TABLE 13 
Pilot Study Dissimilarity Matrix 
Data 
Set 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
X 
1 
2 
3 
X 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
2 
0.5 
X 
9 
10 
X 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
3 
0.5 
0 
X 
16 
X 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
4 
0.5 
0 
0 
X 
X 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
5 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
6 
0.25 
0.75 
0.75 
0.75 
X 
X 
27 
28 
29 
30 
7 
0.625 
0.875 
0.875 
0.875 
X 
0.625 
X 
31 
32 
33 
8 
0.75 
1 
1 
1 
X 
0.5 
0.167 
X 
34 
35 
9 
0.125 
0.625 
0.625 
0.625 
X 
0.125 
0.5 
0.625 
X 
36 
10 
0.75 
1 
1 
1 
X 
0.5 
0.167 
0 
0.625 
X 
FANNY, implemented in S-PLUStm 8.0 for Windows (Note that D5 was not included in 
the analysis). Potential two and three cluster solutions were considered (See Table 14). 
The high average silhouette width of the three cluster solution (>0.5) indicates strong data 
structure and suggests high confidence in the three cluster solution (Kaufman et al., 
1990). Values of k > 3 were not explored since the FANNY clustering algorithm does 
not allow clustering at k values greater than or equal to N/2. 
The remaining pilot study variables (Pi, P4, P5, and Pi) were examined to evaluate their 
ability to discriminate across the two and three cluster solution. The three cluster 
solution shown in Table 14 was chosen as the best representation of the data for testing 
the research hypotheses. 
Figures 31 and 32 illustrate the three cluster solution using silhouette widths and a 
projection of the first two components of a primary component analysis onto two 
I l l 
TABLE 14 
Cluster Analysis Results (Pilot Study) 
Number of 
Clusters (k) 
k = 2 
k = 3 
Dunn's Coefficient 
Normalized 
0.555 
0.784 
Average Silhouette 
Width 
0.515 
0.835 
dimensions. Table 15 shows the membership coefficients for each data point in the k=3 
cluster solution. 
Pilot Study Discussion. The pilot study correctly identified 8 of 9 data points and 
confirms the ability of this research methodology to test the ability of the proposed 
taxonomy to integrate theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. The three 
cluster solution generated by the methodology displays both internal and external 
validity. This small data set is too small to split in half to test for methodological 
reliability in the formation of the clusters as suggested by Hair, et al. (2006). The pilot 
study three cluster solution was compared with a Monte Carlo data set with the same 
overall statistical distribution as the pilot study data set variables (Aldenderfer et al., 
1984). The frequencies of the data sets within each cluster solution was compared to the 
Monte Carlo data set with Fisher's exact test to test the statistical significance of the data 
within each cluster. External validity was tested by comparing the three cluster pilot test 
solution with the original source research that identifies data points 1, 2, 3,4, and 5 with 
discontinuous innovation and data points 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 with disruptive (See Figure 
33). 
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FIGURE 31 
Silhouette Plot of the Pilot Study Three Cluster Solution 
0.0 0.2 
Average silhouette width : 0.83 
—I 1— 
0.4 0.6 
Silhouette w idth 
0.8 1.0 
FIGURE 32 
Two Dimension Representation of the Pilot Study Three Cluster Solution 
Component 1 
These two components explain 100 % of the point variability. 
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TABLE 15 
Membership Coefficients of the Pilot Study Three Cluster Solution 
Innovation Data 
Set 
1 
6 
9 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
10 
Cluster One 
Membership 
Coefficient 
0.79 
0.80 
0.93 
0 
0 
0 
0.14 
0.02 
0.02 
Cluster Two 
Membership 
Coefficient 
0.12 
0.08 
0.03 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.09 
0.01 
0.01 
Cluster Three 
Membership 
Coefficient 
0.09 
0.12 
0.04 
0 
0 
0 
0.77 
0.97 
0.97 
The pilot study fuzzy three cluster solution displays internal validity as compared 
to the Monte Carlo solution. The values of Dunn's coefficient normalized, and the 
average silhouette width of the fuzzy three cluster solution are significantly greater than 
the Monte Carlo solution. The data sets that form the three cluster solution are 
statistically significant (p = .07) as compared to the random Monte Carlo data set with 
Fisher's exact test. The power of this test is limited by the small sample size (n=9). 
External validity is corroborated by noting that with the exception of data point 1, 
the three clusters agree with expected theoretical result. Cluster two contains data points 
2, 3 and 4 - all previously identified as discontinuous innovations. Cluster one contains 
data points 1, 6, and 9 - data points 6 and 9 are previously identified as disruptive 
innovations that created new markets. Cluster three contains data points 7, 8, and 9 - all 
previously identified as disruptive innovations that first started in low end markets. 
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FIGURE 33 
Comparison of the Pilot Study Three Cluster Solution 
with a Monte Carlo Three Cluster Solution 
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
Comoonent 1 _ Component 1 
Pilot Study Three Cluster Solution Monte Carlo Three Cluster Solution 
Solution 
Pilot Study Three Cluster 
Monte Carlo Three Cluster 
Dunn's Coefficient 
Normalized 
0.784 
0.331 
Average Silhouette 
Width 
0.835 
0.322 
Data point 1 is the exception that proves the rule. Anderson & Tushman (1990) 
identified the PDP-8 as a discontinuous innovation because it is one of the first 
minicomputers to introduce the integrated circuit. Voelcker (1988), however, pointed out 
that customers valued the PDP-8 because of its reliability, reduced size and reduced cost. 
A big factor in both the increase reliability and reduced cost was DEC's introduction of 
an automated wire wrapping production process that eliminated the need for hand 
assembly. The PDP-8 was introduced directly into the new minicomputer industry. 
However, Voelcker (1988) also noted that the real popularity for the minicomputer came 
because it was appropriating customers who could not afford the low end of the 
mainframe market whose computers costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. The use of 
an automated wire wrapping process to achieve a smaller and more economical 
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architecture is a characteristic typical of a disruptive innovation. The appeal of the new 
DEC PDP-8 to a new market of customers that previously could not afford 
minicomputers is a characteristic similar to disruptive innovation. The DEC PDP-8 
shares more characteristics of disruptive innovations than discontinuous innovations 
while having some characteristics of both. 
Analysis of the Research Sample 
This section presents the results of analysis performed on a random selection of 
innovations from across a broad spectrum of industries to test the typology constructed 
by this research. In the first result, the presence of disruptive innovation could not be 
distinguished from outliers removed to improve the cluster analysis. This required the 
development of dummy variables to amplify the signal of disruptive innovation within 
the data set and a second analysis of the data. This section describes and discusses the 
results of both analyses. 
Analysis of the First Research Data Set 
Data Collections Procedures for the First Research Data Set The research data 
set was drawn from a simple random selection of 100 industries from the 1175 six-digit 
code industries classified in the 2007 North American Industrial Classification System. 
Archival analysis of industry literature from each of the 100 sampled industries was 
examined to identify candidate shifts in dominant design. For both data sets, the relevant 
data points for each variable (P\ through Pi) were recorded as described earlier. 
The data collection protocol established in the preceding section was used to code 
each shift in dominant design and its associated innovations according to the variables, P\ 
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through Pj. Additional data was sought from the Encyclopedia of American Industries 
(Pearce, 2005), industry trade journals and other available archival data. 
Univariate Analysis of the First Research Data Set. Histograms were 
constructed and reviewed for outliers as recommended by Hair et al. (2006). As before, 
if the review revealed a category (1) error, then the data set was corrected and the 
analysis repeated. Two outliers were noted in the P2 (Core Component) variable set. 
Two data points were noted where no significant dominant shift have occurred. The 
delivery of heating oil has not significantly changed since the oil fired furnaces became a 
common means of heating the home. Additionally, the invention of the telephone book 
followed quickly the invention of the telephone and has not significantly changed 
throughout the last century. These data points were treated as category (2) outliers and 
identified for later removal and are discussed later in the results. With the exceptions of 
the two outliers just noted, the variable P2 did not change across the data set. This 
variable was later removed from the cluster analysis as recommended by Hair et al. 
(2006) in order to minimize diluting the effects of the remaining variables. In the pilot 
data set, it was noted that the variable P(, (Cost) did not vary across the pilot sample set. 
In the research data set, 36% of the data points showed an increase in cost. The variable 
P(, will be included in the cluster analysis of the research sample. 
Only three instances of new market innovations (P7 = c) were noted in the data 
set. This was treated as a category (3) outlier. The body of research on disruptive 
innovation has highlighted many instances of new market innovations. Under 
representation of this subset is not considered significant since a sufficiently large 
number of low end innovations (P7 = b) are present and will serve to represent the theory 
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of disruptive innovation in the data set. These data points were not removed since the 
value of observing how these data points were clustered outweighed any concern that 
these outliers might dilute the remaining data set. 
Bivariate Analysis of the First Research Data Set The scatter plot shown in 
Figure 34 was constructed and reviewed as recommend by Hair et al. (2006). All 
bivariate combinations that represented 5 or less data points in the research data points 
were examined as outliers. As before, if a category (1) error was noted, it was corrected 
and the scatterplot analysis was re-performed. Twenty one data points were identified as 
outliers. Eighteen data points were removed from further analysis as category (2) outliers 
that were representative of small subsets in the research population that were not critical 
to the research objectives. The three data points with P7 (Market) = c were included in 
the cluster solution as recommended by Hair et al. (2006) since they are likely to 
represent valid groups in the cluster analysis. The outliers that were removed are circled 
on the scatterplot shown in Figure 35. 
The remaining data set was examined for multicollinearity as recommended by 
Hair et al. (2006). A correlation matrix (see Table 16) of the six remaining variables 
across 82 remaining data points reveals a strong correlation between P4 (Cost) and Pj 
(Market) that was not obvious in the scattergram analysis. Correlations in the data 
suggest that there is an underlying structure. Correlations of greater than or equal to 0.26 
are statistically significant (p<.01). A preliminary cluster analysis was conducted 
comparing the results with Pi (Market) included and excluded. The inclusion of Pj did 
not significantly alter the results. Since Pj (Market) is a highlighted feature of the 
FI
G
U
R
E 
34
 
Sc
at
te
rp
lo
t 
o
f t
he
 
Fi
rs
t 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
a 
Se
t 
- - -
1.
0-
0.
8-
0.
6-
0.
4-
0.
2-
n
n
-
1 
Q
-
=
 
M
z 
ili
 w 4:|E ;|E Nh -
i 
i 
i 
0.
00
.2
0.
40
.6
0.
81
.0
 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
"
 
I 
o
 p) o 42 (?) o 23 o 12 o11 o 27 o o 14 © o30 3 o 12 O32 
o
 
o
 
39
 
15
 o o 
43
 
5 
o
 
6  
o
 
o
 
19
 
3
5  
o
 
o
 
20
 
34
 
o
 tr.
 
9 
o
 
44
 
o
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.
00
.2
0.
40
.6
0.
81
.0
 o
 
o
 o
 
98
 
•
 
ft 
1 
2 S5
 
3 2) 3 2) r 
i 
i 
o
 
81
 
17
 o
 
o
 
66
 
15
o
 
1
7
o
 
38
°
 
60
 o 
34
°
 
o
 
<£
 
21
o
 
74
 o
 
1 
1 
1 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 
-
1-
.O
.B
.6.
&
.Q
CE
a.9
6.«
.0 
-
W
XM
U
M
SS
aa
B&
.O
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
O
 O
 
o
 
81
 
.
 
*
 
•
 
19
 
•
 
o
 
12
 9 3 19 o '3
 
3 13 O a 16 o 
o
 
54
 
13
o
 
,
4
o
 o
 
38
 
4
3  
o
 
30
°
 
51
 o
 
<£
 
18
o
 
60
 o 
0.
00
.2
0.
40
.6
0.
81
.0
 o
 o
 
o
 
o
 o
 17
 
•
 
o
 
11
 
o
6 
';-
) 15 
o
 3 o 12 <3>,
 
r\ 
i 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
66
 
p* 
1 
•
 
1 
o
 
o
 
8 
l9
 
o
 
o
 
6 
2
6 
©
 
9 
40
 
o
 
o
 
(ol
) 
6 
o
 
J? 
60 
„
 
o
 
o
 
1 
[ 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
62
 1 
Ps
 
3 «
 
1 
1 
°
18
 
16
°
 
©
 
42
 
22
 
o
 
o
 (C
 
o
l0
 
11
 
o
 
52
 
24
 
O
 
o
 
0.
00
.2
0.
40
.6
0.
81
.0
 o
 o
 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 1 1 G o 19 o42 ! 1 1 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 
P(
, 
2 
,d
) 
1 
1 
T 
1 
1 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
34
 1 2o 32 o ! 1 1 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 o
 
o
 o
 
o
 76
 
•
 1 1 1.0 I 
I o o o o o o o o o o o o Pi
 
21
 
i o o
 
o
 
o
 o
 
o
 
o
 
3 
1 
~
 
1 
1 
1.
5 
2.
0 
2.
5 
3.
0 -
1 
n
 
-
0.
8 
-
0.
6 
-
0.
4 
[-0
.2 
-
n
o
 
-
1.
0 
-
0.
8 
-
0.
6 
-
0.
4 
-
0.
2 
-
n
o
 
~
 z z -1
.0
 
-
0.
8 
-
0.
6 
-
0.
4 
-
0.
2 
-
o
n
 
- z -3
.0
 
-
2.
0 
-
1.
5 
-
1 
n
 
119 
TABLE 16 
Correlation Matrix of the First Research Data Set 
Pi 
p3 
PA, 
PS 
P* 
Pi 
Pi 
1.00 
-0.28 
0.31 
-0.04 
0.03 
-0.16 
P3 
1.00 
-0.17 
0.26 
0.21 
0.14 
P* 
1.00 
-0.35 
0.18 
-0.74 
P5 
1.00 
0.13 
0.34 
Ps 
1.00 
-0.32 
Pi 
1.00 
disruptive theory, it was left in the analysis - recognizing that it would likely enhance the 
presence of disruptive innovation in the final cluster result. 
Several of the subsets of data in Table 17 are the equivalent of multivariate outliers. 15 
of the 21 subsets number five or less in number. With the removal of the multivariate 
outliers, the variables P4 (Performance) and P-i (Market) no longer vary across the variate 
and were removed from the resulting cluster analysis. The final research data set used in 
the cluster analysis (47 data points, 4 variables) is shown in Table 17. 
Cluster Analysis of the First Research Data Set. With the removal of more than half the 
data points, a cluster analysis is not required to see the remaining data structure. 
However, for methodological completeness, a cluster analysis and the necessary validity 
checks were conducted prior to assessing the results of this first iteration. A dissimilarity 
matrix was constructed and analyzed using the algorithms, DAISY and FANNY, 
implemented in S-PLUStm 8.0 for Windows. Multiple cluster solutions were generated as 
shown in Figure 35. Every cluster generated resembled discontinuous innovation. 
Therefore, the cluster solution that most closely fit the hypothesis was the k = 1 solution. 
The entire research sample (with outliers removed) is a discontinuous cluster. 
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TABLE 17 
First Research Data Set (All Data Points) 
Number of 
Data Points 
12 
8 
7 
7 
7 
6 
Pi 
New 
Technology 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
^ 2 
New Core 
Component 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
P3 
New System 
Architecture 
0 
Performance 
along 
Established 
Parameters 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
^ 5 
Performance 
along New 
Parameters 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Pe 
Cost 
-1 
-1 
-1 
Industry 
Migration 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
Outliers Removed During Multivariate Analysis 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Outliers Removed 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
-1 
1 
0 
-1 
1 
0 
-1 
-1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
-1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
b 
b 
a 
b 
c 
b 
a 
a 
b 
c 
I During Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
-1 
-1 
1 
-1 
-1 
1 
0 
1 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
a 
b 
a 
a 
b 
b 
b 
b 
a 
a 
b 
b 
a 
121 
FIGURE 35 
Cluster Analysis Results of the First Research Data Set 
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Single Cluster Solution 
Number 
of Data 
Points 
12 
8 
7 
7 
7 
6 
New 
Technology 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
Pi 
New Core 
Component 
P3 
New System 
Architecture 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
PA 
Performance 
along 
Established 
Parameters 
1*5 
Performance 
along New 
Parameters 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
Pi 
Cost 
-1 
-1 
-1 
Pi 
Industry 
Migration 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
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Hypotheses Testing of the First Research Data Set 
Hypothesis 1. There is no natural grouping of discontinuous innovations where a 
new technology is introduced into a products core and results in a new dominant design 
that significantly outperforms previous designs along established performance 
parameters while competing in the main market of an industry. The entire first research 
data set (after outliers are removed) has at least three of the four predicted characteristics 
of discontinuous innovation and 68% of the research sample displays all four of the 
predicted characteristics. The first research data set as a whole is a cluster of 
discontinuous shifts in dominant design. The null of hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
Hypothesis la. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
introduction of new technology is not a necessary component. 15 of the 47 data points in 
the discontinuous cluster (first research data set) did not require a new technology (P\ = 
0) to achieve the dominant design shift. This hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
Hypothesis lb. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
introduction of a new core component is not a necessary component. All 47 data points 
in the discontinuous cluster (first research data set) included the introduction of a new 
core component. This hypothesis is rejected. However, 98 of the original 100 data points 
collected displayed a new core component as a part of the change in dominant design. 
The two data points that did not have a change in core component, did not display design 
shifts. Therefore, while the hypothesis as stated is rejected, it appears that all shifts in 
dominant design require the introduction of new core components and that this 
characteristic is not unique to discontinuous innovation. 
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Hypothesis 1c. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
improvement of performance along established trajectories is not a necessary 
component. All 47 data points in the discontinuous cluster (first research data set) 
included the improvement of performance along established parameters (P4 = 1). This 
hypothesis is rejected. 
Hypothesis Id. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
introduction of the new dominant design within the main market of the industry is not a 
necessary component. All 47 data points in the discontinuous cluster (first research data 
set) introduced the dominant design shift in the main market of the industry (Pj = a). 
This hypothesis is rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 and 3. Since all of the data in the research sample (excluding the 
outliers) is part of the discontinuous cluster, there is no data remaining to reject either 
hypothesis 2 or 3. This, in itself, is an interesting result. It first suggests that examples of 
discontinuous innovation are well established and occur frequently. It further indicates 
that if disruptive innovation is present in this data set, that its presence may be hidden by 
variation within the variables sampled. Disruptive innovation appeared to be an outlier. 
The 53 data points that have been classified as outliers are explored further after a 
discussion of the first research data set results. 
Discussion of the First Research Data Set Analysis Results 
First and foremost, a cluster was found within the 100 data points collected that 
corresponds to the theory of discontinuous innovation. The design shifts represented 
within the discontinuous cluster are shown in Appendix C. The data is organized into the 
six subsets identified in the cluster analysis. Further, the data structure within the 
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discontinuous cluster raises some questions as to the role of the variables new technology 
(Pi), changes in core components {Pi), and the role of changes in design cost {Pi) within 
the theory of discontinuous innovation. 
The discontinuous cluster can be separated into two subsets in order to examine 
the role of new technology (Pi) in these shifts in dominant design. The first subset 
(Pi=l) includes shifts in dominant design such as the shift from silk stockings to nylon 
stockings in the sheer hosiery industry (Hounshell & Smith, 1988) or the shift from a 
distributor to electronic ignition in the gasoline engine industry (McKay, 2008). In these 
subsets, new technologies placed an important role in the new dominant design. The 
second subset (Pi=0) includes the shift from day parks to theme parks in the amusement 
park industry (Adams, 1991) or the replacement of wild crayfish capture with crayfish 
aquaculture (farming) in the shellfish fishing industry (McClain & Romaire, 2004). In 
this second subset of design shifts, the emergence of new dominant designs did not 
require new technologies -just the application of existing technologies in new ways. 
This suggests that while new technologies can be useful in the creation of discontinuous 
design shifts, not all discontinuous design shifts require the introduction of new 
technology. 
All data points within the discontinuous cluster exhibited changes in their core 
components (P2=l)- However, as discussed earlier in the univariate analysis, 98 of the 
100 data points collected showed changes in their core technology. This suggests one of 
two possibilities. First, this variable may not be defined well. This is a relatively crude 
methodology that is only looking for gross effects within the variate. It is possible that 
the binary variable (P2) did not account for variations in the amount of change of core 
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components that is significant in distinguishing categories of innovation. Second, this 
variable may be correlated with the shift in dominant design. Not all innovations result in 
shifts of dominant designs; however, in this research, we have created a typology for the 
purpose of integrating theories that predict shifts in dominant design. Therefore, it is 
possible that all shifts in dominant design exhibit new core components. This is further 
substantiated by the fact that the only two data points that did not exhibit changes in their 
core components were in industries that displayed no significant shifts in their dominant 
designs. 
The discontinuous cluster can be separated into two subsets in order to examine 
the role of cost (P^) in these shifts in dominant design. The first subset (P^ =1) includes 
shifts in dominant design such as the shift from paper milk cartons to high density 
polyethylene (HDPE) milk cartons in the non-folding sanitary food containers 
manufacturing industry (Unknown, 1989) or the shift from non-standardized computer 
training to the development of IT certificates in the computer training industry (Haimson 
& VanNoy, 2004). This subset of discontinuous innovation acts as the models that Adner 
& Levinthal (2001) predict as users are willing to pay for product or process 
improvement. The second subset (Pe = -1) includes the shift from using oil based color 
inks to soy based color inks in the printing of newspapers (Lustig, 2004) or the 
replacement of low temperature long time (LTST) pasteurization with high temperature 
short time (HTST) pasteurization in the dairy cattle and milk production industry (Dicker 
& Wiles, 1978). In this second subset of design shifts, the emergence of new dominant 
designs both improved product performance and reduced the cost to the user of the 
innovation. Adner & Levinthal (2001:612) suggested that once customers are 
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"technologically satisfied" designs tend to converge at a stable price point. This second 
subset of discontinuous innovations seems to represent new dominant designs that find 
ways to deliver superior performance below the existing price points. 
The results of these first tests suggest that discontinuous innovation is perhaps the 
most frequent cause of shifts in dominant design. When pursuing discontinuous 
innovation as a means of creating new dominant designs within industries, engineering 
and technology managers should pay close attention to the relationship between 
performance (P4) and cost (P^) in their designs. When there is sufficient unmet customer 
demand, customers will pay more for the design (P4 = 1, P(, = -1). Second, regardless of 
customer demand, if a new design can deliver superior performance at reduced cost, then 
the design is likely to create a shift in the industry's dominant design (P4 = 1, P(, = -1). 
Much of the literature focuses on the ability of new technologies (PI = 1) to 
enable improvement in performance. These results indicate that architectural innovation 
may provide an untapped resource for engineering and technology managers seeking 
improved performance in their designs. For example, Adams (1991) notes that Walt 
Disney tapped into unmet customer need for a family vacation destination when he 
designed the Disney theme park. Far different from the existing dominant design of day 
amusement parks that were collocated within the mass transportation hub of major cities, 
theme parks offered a place for families to spend several days. Disney used the 
excitement of Disney marketing power to capitalize on the existing popularity of Disney 
movies and the new Wonderful World of Disney television show, to build Disney themes 
into his new park. In total, when it first opened, a day at a Disney park cost twice what a 
family expected to pay at a day park, but they kept coming (Gillette, 1956). 
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The outliers in this research sample were combinations of variables that occurred 
5 times or less within the data set. In total, removal of outliers resulted in excluding 53 of 
the original 100 data points. Additionally, if disruptive innovation is present in this data 
set, it is being excluded as an outlier. As a result, this first analysis of the research 
sample was unable to test hypotheses 2 and 3. The large number of outliers in the data 
set suggests significantly more variety and less grouping within the data sample than was 
observed in the pilot sample. This level of variety is not predicted by the theories of 
discontinuous or disruptive innovation and suggests that further research is needed to 
understand how best to characterize these results. 
The theory of disruptive innovation (Hypothesis 2) has several conditional 
statements which are drawn from the theory of disruptive innovation. New dominant 
designs may equal or underperform existing designs along established parameters. This 
suggests that the value for performance along established parameters (P4) could have 
either a value of 0 or -1. Disruptive innovations can display either new performance 
parameters (P5 = 1) or reduced cost (P& = -1). Also, disruptive innovations are initiated 
by competing in low end markets (P7 = b) or new markets (Py = c). 
It was possible that the presence of disruptive shifts in dominant designs was 
being masked by the conditional nature of the theory. The presence of disruptive 
innovation was tested by recoding the research sample results with dummy variables to 
amplify the methodology's ability to distinguish disruptive innovation. This also 
required recombination of the P5 and Pe variables into a single variable, D^e- In this new 
coding scheme, disruptive innovation was expected to require new architectural design 
(P3 = 1), exhibit equal or underperform existing designs (D4 = 0), shift competition to 
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Table 18 
Conversion Rules for Disruptive Dummy Variables 
Original Variable 
If PA = 0 or -1 
If P4 = 1 
Ifei therP5=l orP6 = -\ 
If neither P5 =1 orP6 = -l 
If P7 = a 
IfP7 = bo rc 
Dummy Variable 
Then set D\ = 0 
Then set D4 = 1 
Then set D$(, = 1 
Then set D56 = 0 
Then set D7 = a 
Then set Dj = b 
new parameters or reduce cost (Z)56 =1), and initiate competition in a low end or new 
market (D-j = b). This also has the effect of converting P4 and P(, into binary data. 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 remain as previously stated. A second research data set was created 
by coding the 100 data points of the research sample as defined in Table 18 and the 
methodology was repeated. 
Three new sets of hypotheses were also created to test the second research data 
set. The hypotheses mirror the original hypotheses and will be used to test the research 
data set that incorporates the new dummy variables. 
Hypothesis 4. There is no natural grouping of discontinuous innovations 
where a new technology is introduced into a product's core and results in a new 
dominant design that significantly outperforms previous designs along established 
performance parameters while competing in the main market of an industry. 
Hypothesis 4a. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the introduction of new technology is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 4b. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the introduction of a new core component is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 4c. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the improvement of performance along established trajectories is not a 
necessary component. 
Hypothesis 4d. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is 
present, the introduction of the new dominant design within the main market of 
the industry is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 5. There is no natural grouping of disruptive innovations 
where a new architecture is introduced that results in a new dominant design that 
equals or underperforms existing designs along established parameters while 
shifting competition to new performance parameters (such as size or reliability) 
or reducing cost while competing in the low end or from an adjacent market of an 
industry. 
Hypothesis 5a. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, 
the introduction of a new architecture is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 5b. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, 
the presence of a dominant design that equals or underperforms existing designs 
along established parameters is not a necessary condition. 
Hypothesis 5c. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, 
the improvement of performance along new parameters or the reduction in cost is 
not a necessary component. 
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TABLE 19 
Integrated Typology for Classifying Shifts in Dominant Design with Dummy 
Variables 
Dimensions of 
Typology 
Locus of 
Innovation 
Product 
Utility 
Market 
Component 
Component 
System 
Architecture 
Performance 
Performance 
Existing 
Interdependent 
Variables 
New Technology 
Introduced (Pi) 
Core Component 
Change (P2) 
System Architecture 
Change (P3) 
Product Performance 
along Establish 
Parameters (D4) 
Customer Shift in 
Established Parameters 
or Reduced Cost (D56) 
Where was the New 
Product Introduced? (Z)7) 
Discontinuous 
Innovation 
Yes 
Yes 
Better 
Main Industry 
Disruptive 
Innovation 
Yes 
Same or Worse 
Yes 
Low-end or New 
Market 
Hypothesis 5d. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovation is present, 
the introduction of the new dominant design in the low end of existing markets or 
within adjacent markets is not a necessary component. 
Hypothesis 6. A taxonomy constructed from shifts observed in the 
dominant design of an established industry does not display natural clusters of 
innovation as predicted by the typology (Table 19) constructed from the theories 
of discontinuous innovation and disruptive innovation. 
Validity of First Research Sample Results 
The reliability of the first research sample results was tested by randomly splitting 
the variate into two groups and testing the resulting cluster solution for internal 
consistency as recommend by Hair et al. (2006). The cluster solutions of the two groups 
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were identical. This, of course, is not surprising since the entire variate was the solution 
cluster. A series of five random data sets were constructed with a Monte Carlo approach 
taking care to ensure that each variable in the randomly constructed variates displayed 
characteristics similar to the research sample as recommend by Aldenderfer et al. (1984). 
With a k=l solution, it is not possible to calculate Dunn's normal coefficient or the 
average silhouette width to compare with the Monte Carlo solution. Using Fisher's exact 
test, the data sets in the single cluster solution occur more frequently than the same data 
sets as averaged across five random sample groups (p<0.01). The external validity of the 
research sample was established with the rejection of the null for hypothesis 1. 
Analysis of the Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables) 
A second research sample was developed using the coding system shown in Table 
18. The resulting research data set (w/dummy variables) was analyzed using the 
methodology discussed earlier. Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6 were created to distinguish 
between the tests conducted in the first analysis of the research sample and tests 
conducted in the second analysis. These hypotheses directly correspond to the original 
three hypotheses without modification. 
Univariate Analysis of the Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables). 
Histograms were constructed and reviewed for outliers as recommended by Hair et al. 
(2006). As before, two outliers were noted in the Pi (Core Technology) variable. These 
data points were treated as category (2) outliers and identified for later removal and 
discussion. With the exceptions of the two outliers just noted, the variable Pi did not 
change across the data set. This variable was removed from the cluster analysis as 
132 
TABLE 20 
Correlation Matrix of Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables) 
/>1 
Pz 
p* 
P56 
Pi 
Pi 
1.00 
-0.37 
0.30 
-0.01 
-0.21 
Pz 
1.00 
-0.08 
0.06 
0.21 
a, 
1.00 
-0.32 
-0.54 
D56 
1.00 
0.24 
D7 
1.00 
recommended by Hair et al. (2006) in order to minimize diluting the effects of the 
remaining variables. No other univariate outliers were noted. 
Bivariate Analysis of the Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables). 
The scatter plot shown in Figure 36 was constructed and reviewed as recommend by Hair 
et al. (2006). Again, all bivariate combinations that represented 5 or less data points in 
the research data points were examined as outliers. Seven data points were identified as 
outliers and removed from further analysis as category (2) outliers. 
The remaining data set was examined for multicollinearity as recommended by 
Hair et al. (2006). A correlation matrix (Table 20) of the five remaining variables across 
93 remaining data points again reveals a strong correlation between DA (Cost) and Dj 
(Market). Correlations of r greater than or equal to 0.26 are statistically significant 
(p<.01). Again, since D7 (Market) is a highlighted feature of the disruptive theory, it was 
left in the analysis - recognizing that it would likely enhance the presence of disruptive 
innovation in the final cluster result. 
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TABLE 21 
Second Research Data Set (w/Disruptive Dummy Variables) 
Number 
of Data 
Points 
22 
14 
12 
8 
7 
7 
6 
Pi 
New 
Technology 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Pi 
New Core 
Component 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
P3 
New System 
Architecture 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
Z>4 
Performance 
Dummy 
Variable 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
» 5 6 
Performance/Cost 
Dummy Variable 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Market 
Dummy 
Variable 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
a 
a 
Outliers Removed During Multivariate Analysis 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
b 
a 
a 
a 
b 
b 
Outliers Removed During Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
2 0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
a 
b 
a 
b 
b 
b 
Table 21 shows the entire research data sample recoded with the dummy 
variables. Several of the data subsets are the equivalent of multivariate outliers. 8 of the 
15 subsets number five or less in number and are removed from the cluster analysis. 
With the variable Pi (New Core Component) removed, the final research data set used in 
the cluster analysis consisted of 76 data points and 5 variables. 
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FIGURE 37 
Cluster Analysis Results of the Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables) 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
•Dunn's Normal Coefficient -C Average Silhouette Value 
Number of 
Clusters (k) 
k = 2 
k = 3 
k = 4 
k = 5 
k = 6 
k = 7 
Dunn's Coefficient 
Normalized 
0.41 
0.61 
0.71 
0.76 
0.90 
1.00 
Average Silhouette 
Width 
0.62 
0.62 
0.71 
0.81 
0.90 
1.00 
Cluster Analysis of the Research Sample (w/Dummy Variables). A dissimilarity 
matrix was constructed and analyzed using the algorithms, DAISY and FANNY, 
implemented in S-PLUStm 8.0 for Windows. Figure 37 shows the cluster solutions that 
were generated. The three cluster solution appears best suited to test the hypotheses under 
investigation in this research, and the high average silhouette width of the three cluster 
solution (>0.5) indicates strong data structure and suggests high confidence in the three 
cluster solution (Kaufman et al., 1990). Figures 38 and 39 illustrate the three cluster 
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FIGURE 38 
Silhouette Plot of the Second Research Data 
Set Three Cluster Solution 
3 
Cl
us
te
r 
1 
C ) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Average Silhouette Width 
1.2 
solution using silhouette widths and a projection of the first two components of a primary 
component analysis onto two dimensions. Tables 22 and 23 show the membership 
coefficients for each data point in the k=3, three cluster solution both graphically and in 
tabular form. 
All six of the cluster solutions generated from k=2 to k=7 indicate strong data 
structure (average silhouette value > 0.5) with decreasing level of fuzziness. The three 
cluster solution was chosen because the first cluster solution that closely resembles the 
discontinuous cluster formed in the previous analysis and the third cluster closely 
represents the expected discontinuous result. 
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FIGURE 39 
Two Dimension Representation of the Second Data Set Three Cluster Solution 
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 
Component 1 
These two components explain 99.44 % of the point variability. 
TABLE 22 
Membership Coefficients of the Second Research Data Set Three Cluster Solution 
Cluster Subgroups 
Cluster One 
Membership 
Coefficient 
Cluster Two 
Membership 
Coefficient 
Cluster Three 
Membership 
Coefficient 
Cluster 1 
22 Data Points 
7 Data Points 
6 Data Points 
0.97 
0.59 
0.57 
0.02 
0.27 
0.30 
0.01 
0.14 
0.13 
Cluster 2 
14 Data Points 
7 Data Points 
8 Data Points 
0.05 
0.29 
0.24 
0.93 
0.56 
0.43 
0.02 
0.15 
0.33 
Cluster 3 
12 Data Points 0.01 0.01 0.99 
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TABLE 23 
Second Research Data Set Three Cluster Solution 
Number 
of Data 
Points 
Px 
New 
Technology 
Pi 
New Core 
Component 
^ 3 
New System 
Architecture 
D4 
Performance 
Dummy 
Variable 
Performance/Cost 
Dummy Variable 
D7 
Market 
Dummy 
Variable 
Cluster 1 
22 
7 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
a 
a 
a 
Cluster 2 
14 
7 
8 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
a 
a 
a 
Cluster 3 
12 0 1 1 0 1 b 
Hypotheses Testing of the Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables) 
Hypothesis 4. There is no natural grouping of discontinuous innovations where a 
new technology is introduced into a product's core and results in a new dominant design 
that significantly outperforms previous designs along established performance 
parameters while competing in the main market of an industry. The entire first cluster 
represents 35% of the research sample and displays all four of the predicted 
characteristics {P\ =1, P2 = 1, D4 = 1, and D7 = a). The null of hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
Hypothesis 4a. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
introduction of new technology is not a necessary component. In this analysis, all of the 
35 data points in the first cluster required a new technology (Pi = 1) to achieve the 
dominant design shift. The null of hypothesis 4a is rejected. 
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Hypothesis 4b. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
introduction of a new core component is not a necessary component. All 35 of the data 
points in the first cluster required the introduction of a new core component {P% =1). 
Hypothesis 4b is rejected. However, as noted before, 98 of the original 100 data points 
collected displayed a new core component as a part of the change in dominant design. 
The two data points that did not have a change in core component, did not display design 
shifts. Therefore, while the hypothesis as stated is rejected, this result suggests that all 
shifts in dominant design require the introduction of new core components and that this 
characteristic is in no way unique to discontinuous innovation. 
Hypothesis 4c. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
improvement of performance along established trajectories is not a necessary 
component. All 35 of the data points in the first cluster included the improvement of 
performance along established parameters (D4 =1). This hypothesis is rejected. 
Hypothesis 4d. If a natural grouping of discontinuous innovations is present, the 
introduction of the new dominant design within the main market of the industry is not a 
necessary component. All 35 data points in the first cluster introduced the dominant 
design shift in the main market of the industry (D7 = a). This hypothesis is rejected. 
Hypothesis 5. There is no natural grouping of disruptive innovations where a 
new architecture is introduced that results in a new dominant design that equals or 
underperforms existing designs along established parameters while shifting competition 
to new performance parameters (such as size or reliability) or reducing cost while 
competing in the low end or from an adjacent market of an industry. The entire third 
cluster displays all four of the predicted characteristics of discontinuous innovation (D3 = 
140 
1, D4 = 0, £>56 = 1, and D7 - b). The third cluster represents 12% of the research sample 
and displays all four of the predicted characteristics of disruptive innovation. The null of 
hypothesis 5 is rejected. 
Hypothesis 5a. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, the 
introduction of a new architecture is not a necessary component. All 12 of the data 
points in the third cluster required the introduction of a new architecture (P3 = 1). 
Hypothesis 5a is rejected. 
Hypothesis 5b. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, the 
presence of a dominant design that equals or underperforms existing designs along 
established parameters is not a necessary condition. All 12 of the data points in the third 
cluster displayed a new dominant design that equaled or underperformed existing designs 
(D4 = 0). Hypothesis 5a is rejected. 
Hypothesis 5c. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovations is present, the 
improvement of performance along new parameters or the reduction in cost is not a 
necessary component. All 12 of the data points in the third cluster showed improvement 
of performance along new parameters or the reduction in cost (D56 = 1). Hypothesis 5a is 
rejected. 
Hypothesis 5d. If a natural grouping of disruptive innovation is present, the 
introduction of the new dominant design in the low end of existing markets or within 
adjacent markets is not a necessary component. All 12 of the data points in the third 
cluster introduced the new dominant design in a disruptive manner (D7 = b). Hypothesis 
5d is rejected. 
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Hypothesis 6. A taxonomy constructed from shifts observed in the dominant 
design of established industries does not display natural clusters of innovations as 
predicted by the typology (Table 19) constructed from the theories of discontinuous and 
disruptive innovation. Table 24 shows the entire research data set separated into the three 
cluster solution and the outliers removed from the cluster analysis. The variables 
predicted by Hypothesis 4 (discontinuous innovation) are shown on the top and the 
variables predicted by Hypothesis 5 (disruptive innovation) are shown on the bottom. 
The shading shows how each data point aligns to Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Individually, the null statements in Hypotheses 4 and 5 have been rejected. The 
typology has been successful in describing 47% of the research sample as modified with 
the dummy variables. All 35 data points of cluster 1 show all the characteristics 
predicted by hypothesis 4. All 12 data points of cluster 2 show all of the characteristics 
predicted by hypothesis 5. Clusters 1 and 3 of the taxonomy shown in Table 24 
correspond with the predictions of the taxonomy constructed in the research (Table 19). 
The shading in Table 24 corresponds to the predicted variable states of Hypotheses 4 and 
5. The null statement of Hypothesis 6 is rejected. 
Discussion of the Second Research Data Set Analysis Results 
As in the analysis of the first research data set, the largest cluster formed 
corresponds to the theories of discontinuous innovation. As stated before, this highlights 
the importance of the theory of discontinuous innovation as a frequent source of shifts in 
dominant designs for engineering and technology managers. 
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TABLE 24 
Second Research Data Set (w/Dummy Variables) 
Number 
of Data 
Points 
22 
7 
6 
14 
7 
8 
"12-
New-
Technology 
.._..!_ _ _ 
i 
l 
i 
^ 2 
New Core 
Component 
P3 
New System 
Architecture 
2)4 
Performance 
Dummy 
Variable 
# 5 6 
Performance/Cost 
Dummy Variable 
Hypothesis 4 (Discontinuous Innovation) 
. I 
I 
1 
I 
Cluster 1 
1 
0 
i i i 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
0 
Cluster 2 
0 j I ! 1 
0 ; 1 | 1 
0 ! I ' 1 
I 
I I 
0 
1 
0 
1 
Cluster 3 
o i i ! i T o | l 
D7 
Market 
Dummy 
Variable 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
Hypothesis 5 (Disruptive Innovation) 
1 
Outliers Removed Durinj 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
i 1 
1 
1 
0 
o 1 
1 
Outli 
0 
o "• 
o 
1 J 
1 
1 
_ _ . . ! _ _ _ ! 
1 
h
 i 
1 
1 
1 
i 
. i , 
...1 
ers Removec 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 1 b 
I Multivariate Analysis 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 1 
1 0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
I During Univariate and Bivariate Analysis 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
a 
a 
b 
b 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
b 
a 
b 
b 
b 
b 
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A comparison of the rejection of hypothesis 4a and the failure to reject hypothesis 
la emphasizes the need to use theory to interpret cluster analysis results. In the first 
analysis of the data set, the discontinuous cluster solution included subsets where new 
dominant designs emerged without the need of new technology (Pi = 0). In this analysis, 
two subsets that were very similar to the first cluster of discontinuous innovations but 
with PI = 0 were grouped in the second cluster. As a result, hypothesis 4a was rejected. 
This research establishes that there are shifts in dominant designs that appear 
discontinuous in every way but that do not require new technology. It is up to 
innovation theory to define whether these shifts are discontinuous or not. As researchers, 
this shows the need to expand the theory of discontinuous innovation to better understand 
the role of new technology in achieving shifts in dominant design. As engineering and 
technology managers, this shows that new dominant designs that improve performance 
and are ready to compete in the main markets of industries do not always require the 
introduction of new technologies. 
As before, the rejection of hypothesis 4b is tempered by the realization that 
essentially all shifts in dominant design displayed changes in core components of the 
design. The redesign of core components does not distinguish discontinuous innovation 
from other forms of innovation. The rejection of hypotheses 4c and 4d substantiate for 
engineering and technology managers that the two attributes that best define and 
distinguish discontinuous innovations as they cause shifts in dominant design is their 
ability to improve the performance of designs along expected parameters and to be 
competitive in the main markets of the industry. 
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TABLE 25 
Deconstruction of Dummy Variable D$6 within Cluster 1 
Pe 
Cost 
P6 = -l 
P6 = 0 
p6=l 
Ps 
Performance along New 
Parameters 
P5 = 0 
19 data points 
-
6 data points 
^ 5 = 1 
3 data points 
-
7 data points 
Cluster 1 can be further separated into subsets in order to examine the role of new 
attributes/cost {D$(,= 0 or 1) in these shifts in dominant design. In order to interpret these 
results, the dummy variable D5(, must be deconstructed into the original variables of P5 
(new attributes) and Pe (cost). When converted back to the original variables, four 
combinations of the variables P5 (new attributes) and P(, (cost) are present (See Table 25). 
This repeats the finding in the first analysis that there seem to be two cost 
conditions (Pe) where discontinuous innovations achieve shifts in dominant designs. 
First, when customers are willing to pay more for the performance features of the new 
design and when the new design improves performance while reducing cost. This result 
also suggests that new designs sometimes provide new attributes that affect competition 
in the main market. The introduction of Global Positioning System technology into the 
geophysical surveying industry and mapping industry is an example of how a new 
technology can improve performance while reducing cost and providing valuable new 
attributes for customers of the service. 
High above the earth, a constellation of satellites orbits our planet, 
transmitting radio signals that allow us to determine where we are on the 
Earth's surface. This Global Positioning System (GPS), when used 
according to the specified procedures, can determine positional coordinates 
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to centimeter-level accuracy anywhere on the surface of the Earth. GPS has 
revolutionized surveying, providing latitude, longitude, and height 
information more quickly, inexpensively, and accurately than was possible 
by traditional surveying methods. (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 2007) 
The rejection of hypotheses 5 thru 5d shows that the use of dummy variables was 
successful in highlighting disruptive innovations in a data set of shifts in dominant 
design. The fact that dummy variables were needed to distinguish discontinuous 
innovations from the remainder of the data set demonstrates how easy it is to confuse 
disruptive innovations with other innovations that routinely occur. All four conditional 
statements encoded in the dummy variables needed to be met to be included in cluster 3. 
This demonstrates the need for engineering and technology managers to understand the 
specific conditions under which disruptive innovation occurs. 
The central questions of this research ask whether a taxonomy derived from a 
statistical sampling of shifts in dominant design can help reconcile the theories 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation. The taxonomy shown in Table 23 successfully 
classified 47 of the 100 shifts in dominant design collected in this research sample (as 
validated in the rejection of hypothesis 6). This taxonomy also substantiates the typology 
constructed from theory (research question 1 .c.i) and shows specific clusters of 
innovation that correspond to the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. 
A second question asks whether there are cases where both theories seem to 
operate. One example of both theories operating was discovered in the pilot study. As 
previously discussed, the introduction of the DEC PDP-3 series minicomputer 
incorporated a design that contained both disruptive and discontinuous innovations. 
Coded with the dummy variables used in the second analysis of the research data set, the 
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DEC PDP-8 minicomputer would be represented by the data set [Pi = 1, P2 = 1, P3 = 1, 
Z>4 = 1, Z)56 = 1, D-i = b]. Three data points in Table 24 have similar coding. Further 
deconstructing the variables D4, D56, and D7 into the original values of P4, P5, P6, and 
P7, there are two examples in Table 24 that have the same data set as the DEC PDP-8. 
The first example is the introduction of computer aided design software into the 
traditional designs services industry. The introduction of computer graphics programs 
started in the 1960's and displays the typical disruptive-like trajectory of a low end 
market innovation and continues today to provide easy to use software for home and 
office use (Duan, 2003). However, computer aided design became a core component of a 
larger transition to computer aided production engineering which helped shaped 
discontinuous-like competition within major industries as they competed to improve 
quality and reduce cost (Beit-On, 1999). This example displays aspects of both theories. 
The original design software was not very capable and took advantage of disruptive like 
market opportunities to provide low-end and new market opportunities to customers who 
previously had no easy access to industrial design services. However, once backed by 
significant industrial investment by market incumbents, the computer aided design 
exceeded the capabilities of traditional design methods while reducing cost in what look 
like a discontinuous shift in dominant design. 
The second example is the transition from liquid fuel to solid fuel rockets in the 
guided missile and space propulsion unit manufacture. Fought (2009) describes a 
discontinuous sequence of innovation in the generational change of ballistic missile fuels 
as performance is improved and cost is reduced. The first generation of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles was fueled by liquid fuels which were expensive and required refueling 
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since liquid fuels could not be stored for long periods of time. The second generation 
used liquid fuel with the capacity to be stored for longer periods of time. The third and 
current generation of ballistic missiles uses solid fuels that are relatively inexpensive, 
safer to store, easier to make, and provided quicker reaction times [P4 = 1, P(, = -1]. 
However, solid fuels had always existed in the low end markets of explosives from the 
invention of gunpowder. The improvement of solid fuel from the low end market of 
good enough to better than existing liquid fuels shows many of the traits of a disruptive 
market innovation [P7 = b]. 
In each of these three cases, aspects of both discontinuous and disruptive theory 
are present while neither should be classified as a traditional discontinuous or disruptive 
innovation. Also, in a broader sense, many of the shifts in dominant design classified 
here as outliers share aspects of both theories. These results point to the need for 
researchers to expand existing theories in order to explain the how shifts in dominant 
designs occur when aspects of both theories are present. Engineering and technology 
managers should keep in mind that the theories of innovation are incomplete and many 
opportunities for innovation may be present even though not well described by 
discontinuous or disruptive theory. 
A third question of this research explores whether there are examples of shifts in 
dominant design where neither theory seems to operate. Further examination of cluster 2 
provides some insight into this question. The first two subgroups in cluster 2 have 
already been discussed. They appear to be innovations very similar to discontinuous 
innovation that did not require the introduction of new technology to achieve a shift in 
dominant design. The third subset appears similar to the disruptive innovations in cluster 
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3 but were introduced into the main market rather than in low end or new markets (P7 = 
a). As before, these eight data points must be deconstructed into their original values into 
order to examine what these cases represent. 
Three of the eight data points in cluster 2 came from shifts in dominant designs 
where the performance variables remained unchanged (P4 = 0 and P5 = 0) while the cost 
was reduced (P& = -1). An example of this type of shift in dominant design is the 
introduction of on-site manufacture of industrial oxygen and nitrogen in the industrial gas 
manufacturing industry. On site manufacturing provides high quality industrial gages at 
a reduced cost because cryogenic shipping of the industrial gas is eliminated from the 
process (Chapman, 1995). The first users of on-site industrial gas were the large 
chemical plants with high demand but improvements in on-site manufacture are 
expanding the market for on-site manufacture to lower end markets. These three 
examples resemble disruptive innovation more than discontinuous innovation. Although 
introduced into the main markets first, on-site manufacturing creates a disruptive business 
model that undermines the business of traditional centralized manufacture. 
However, the remaining five data points are examples where performance along 
expected parameters remained the same or degraded (P4 = 0 or -1), but main market 
customers were willing to pay more (P^ = 1) for a new feature or attribute (P5 = 1). An 
example of this type of innovation is the introduction of pre-packaged bagged salads into 
the fruit and vegetable market industry: 
As Americans spend less time preparing the meals they eat at home, the 
convenience of fresh-cut produce has become more important. Bagged 
salads (washed, cut, and ready-to-eat salads) are now a major sector of the 
produce industry... Growth of the fresh-cut industry may also have 
structural impacts. Bagged salads require substantial capital investments in 
plants and machinery, in excess of $20 million for a processing plant. This 
creates a significant barrier to entry, particularly when the fixed assets have 
relatively limited use outside of processing salad ingredients. Research and 
development to produce sophisticated films to manage product 
transpiration/respiration rates and extend shelf life is also costly (Calvin et 
al.,2001:3). 
Innovations like bagged salads do not produce a better salad and are therefore not 
discontinuous. They increase costs for the consumer and the industry (P6 =1) and 
compete in the main markets of the industry (P7 = a) and are therefore not disruptive. 
These appear to be innovations where customers are willing to pay more for a design that 
is easier to use. Adner & Levinthal (2001) discussed the interaction between product 
performance and price and introduced the concept of thresholds into the literature of 
innovation. The innovation of bagged salads suggests that researchers should distinguish 
between what a customer is willing to pay for performance or performance cost (P4 and 
Pe) and what a customer is willing to pay to make a design easier to use or utility cost (P5 
and P6). These utilitarian innovations [PA = 0 or -1, P$ = \,Pe = 1, and Pj = a] are 
examples where neither discontinuous nor disruptive theory seems to apply. 
Table 26 lists every example from the 100 data points collected where this pattern 
of utilitarian innovations was observed. Admittedly, the example of the Oreotm cookie in 
this list seems out of place; however, consider the following description: 
In the enviable position of being the No. 1 selling cookie in America since 
its introduction in 1912, the Oreo, made by Nabisco, East Hanover, N.J., a 
brand of Kraft Foods, was a true innovation — two chocolate disks with a 
creme filling in between. Among the first "interactive" foods, Oreos allow, 
in fact encourage, consumers to be creative when eating them. From 
dunking them in milk, twisting them apart, eating the creme first or slowly 
nibbling or quickly gobbling a handful, consumers can take ownership and 
make eating Oreos into a very individual creative experience (Toops, 2009: 
6). 
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Perhaps there is a range of utility that encompasses this type of innovation. For 
designs that are difficult to use, customers may be willing to pay for easier use. For 
designs that are already easy to use, some customers may be willing to pay for more 
fun. In either case, in order to qualify as a shift in dominant design, the innovation 
must be able to compete in the main markets of industries. 
While the typology developed from existing theory (Table 19) is largely 
substantiated, this research suggests it can be improved given the results of this 
research. Identifying the locus of innovation may not be necessary when 
classifying innovation. Both discontinuous and disruptive innovations used new 
technologies. All shifts in dominant design incorporated some change in core 
components. Architectural change was present in all examples of disruptive 
innovation observed here but is also often present in some discontinuous 
innovations. The factors identifying the locus of innovation do not seem to be 
reliable variables for the classification of innovation. 
Additionally, the classification systems of innovation need to be able to 
describe other groups of innovations that are neither discontinuous nor disruptive. 
One group identified here are innovations that improve the utility of a product or 
service, often with an added cost for consumers. These modifications are reflected 
in the proposed typology shown in Table 27. 
Validity of the Second Research Sample Results 
The reliability of the second research sample results were tested by randomly 
splitting the variate into two groups and testing the resulting cluster solution for 
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TABLE 27 
Proposed Typology for Classifying Shifts in Dominant Design 
Dimensions of 
Typology 
Product 
Utility 
Market 
Performance 
Performance 
Existing 
Interdependent 
Variables 
Product Performance 
along Establish 
Parameters (£>4) 
Customer Shift in 
Established 
Parameters or 
Reduced Cost (£>56) 
Where was the New 
Product Introduced? 
(D7) 
Discontinuous 
Innovation 
Better 
Main Industry 
Disruptive 
Innovation 
Same or Worse 
Yes 
Low-end or 
New Market 
Utilitarian 
Innovation 
Same or Worse 
New 
Parameters 
with Higher 
Cost 
Main Market 
internal consistency as recommend by Hair et al. (2006). The k=3 cluster solutions of the 
two groups were nearly identical to each other validating the repeatability of the analysis. 
A series of five random data sets were constructed with a Monte Carlo approach taking 
care to ensure that each variable in the randomly constructed variates displayed similar 
characteristics to the research sample as recommend by Aldenderfer et al. (1984). A 
comparison of the average values for Dunn's Coefficient Normalized and Average 
Silhouette Width for the second analysis result and the Monte Carlo result are shown in 
Table 25. The Monte Carlo solution posits the hypothesis that there is no actual cluster in 
the data. It is interesting that a comparison of the values in Table 28 does not allow 
rejection of the possibility of a Type 1 error. This suggests that the methodology used 
here is capable of forming well defined clusters whether clusters are present or not. 
Fisher's exact test compares the cluster results to the mean results of the random samples. 
The Fisher's test indicates that the frequency of data points grouped in clusters 1, 2, and 3 
were significantly larger than seen in the random data sets (p < .01). 
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TABLE 28 
Comparison of the Three Cluster Solution from the Second Analysis 
with a Monte Carlo Three Cluster Solution 
Solution 
Second Analysis Three Cluster 
Ave Monte Carlo Three Cluster 
Dunn's Coefficient 
Normalized 
0.608 
0.724 
Average Silhouette 
Width 
0.622 
0.736 
Additionally, external validity of the second research data set was established with the 
rejection of the null hypotheses 4 and 5. Therefore, the validity of the second research 
sample result is based upon the demonstrated repeatability of the methodology, the 
proportions of the three clusters formed as compared with Monte Carlo samples and the 
external validity established with the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The use of taxonomies to test this typology highlights both strengths and 
weaknesses in the ability of existing theory to describe the practice of innovation. This 
discussion of the research study will address two remaining questions. First, how well 
does the data structure of the taxonomy created here support the theories of innovation 
(research question 2.a)? Second, how might the theories of innovation be improved to 
better fit the empirical data, and is new theory required (research questions 2.b)? 
Discussion of the Research Study 
This research began with a review of the current state of literature of innovation 
from the perspective of a contextual technologist (research question 1 .a). The literature 
reviewed was organized, and several themes were developed. First, theories of 
component performance that classify innovations according to the price and performance 
of a dominant attribute were reviewed and the theory of discontinuous innovation was 
described. Second, theories that integrated component performance and markets were 
reviewed. These theories explore interactions between customer preferences in the 
market and the technological development of components to classify innovations. Third, 
theories of component performance and system architecture were reviewed. These 
theories introduced a view of the product itself as a system. Lastly, theories of system 
architecture and markets were reviewed. These theories explore interactions between the 
system design or architecture and the industry as a whole. It is here that the theories of 
disruptive innovation are located. 
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Next, this research built a typology by deconstructing the theories of 
discontinuous and disruptive innovation into their component variables. The new 
technology (Pi), new core component (P2), performance along established parameters 
(P4) and main market (P7) variables best described the expected observable 
characteristics in discontinuous dominant designs. The new architecture (P3), 
performance along expected parameters (P4), performance along new parameters (P5) or 
cost (Pe), and competition in low end and new markets (P7) best described the expected 
observable characteristics in disruptive dominant designs. An integrated typology was 
constructed from these variables that predicted groupings of discontinuous and disruptive 
design shifts in a single framework. From this framework, three sets of hypotheses were 
formed (research question l.b). 
This research finds that the theories of discontinuous and disruptive innovation 
can be integrated (research question 1 .c.i). The integrated typology constructed here was 
tested using a taxonomy constructed from a random sample of shifts in dominant design 
observed in North American industries. In both tests of this typology, the shifts in 
dominant design that appeared to be discontinuous were found both with and without the 
use of new technology. Additionally, nearly all the shifts in dominant designs observed 
in this research required some change to their core components. This suggests that the 
ability of the integrated typology to distinguish between discontinuous and disruptive 
design shifts would be strengthened by the removal of the new technology variable, P\, 
and the new core component variable, Pi, from the typology (Hypothesis l.a, l.b. 3.b, 
6.a). 
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The presence of disruptive innovation was^not obvious in the first taxonomy 
created here. The theory of disruptive innovation as described in Hypothesis 2 
encompasses more variety, more conditional statements, than does the theory of 
discontinuous innovation. As a result, the methodology was unable to distinguish any 
large groups ( > 5 design shifts) of discontinuous innovation in the first taxonomy. 
Therefore, a set of dummy variables were created to focus the methodology's ability to 
form disruptive groups and a second taxonomy was created. The hypotheses tested in the 
second analysis were relabeled from 1, 2, and 3 to 4, 5, and 6 to distinguish between a 
test from the first analysis and a test from the second. 
In the second taxonomy, a solution with three clusters was chosen to test the 
integrated typology. The first cluster of the taxonomy contained shifts in dominant 
design that have all the expected attributes of discontinuous innovation. A second cluster 
of the taxonomy contained shifts in dominant design that have all the expected attributes 
of disruptive innovation. A third cluster contained shifts in dominant design that were 
neither discontinuous nor disruptive. The remainder of the taxonomy contained outliers -
combinations of variables that occurred so infrequently that they were removed from the 
cluster analysis in order to strengthen the ability of the methodology to form well defined 
clusters. 
Contributions to the Theories of Innovation 
This research found several examples where both theories seem to operate 
(research question 1 .c.ii). It seems that the forces of innovation described in the theories 
of discontinuous and disruptive innovation can combine with greater variety than current 
theory predicts. Designs may contain more than one type of innovation. The introduction 
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of the DEC PDP-8 introduced a design incorporating discontinuous and disruptive 
components. New technologies like computer aided design software may initially seem 
disruptive (limited capability and low end market appeal). However, in the case of 
computer aided design, the performance of the software grew so rapidly that it far 
outstripped existing technologies, a characteristic of disruptive innovation. Our theories 
of innovation need to evolve to describe the variety of innovation. 
Daneels (2004) raised concerns over the possibility of selection bias in the small 
number of cases studies chosen ex ante in order to substantiate the claims of disruptive 
innovation. The same critique could be levied on the theory of discontinuous innovation. 
Anderson & Tushamn's (1986, 1990) research only included a small number of case 
studies. The results of this research strengthen the claims of the theories of 
discontinuous innovation (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) and disruptive innovation 
(Christensen, 2006) by providing further evidence of the generalizability of each theory 
within a relatively large research population that minimizes the likelihood of selection 
bias. 
As stated before, existing research presents a confusing picture of how best to 
integrate these theories. This research proposes and validates a typology based upon 
interdependent variables drawn from the literature of innovation that researchers can 
build upon to fully integrate these theories. 47% of the research sample was identified as 
shifts in dominant designs that displayed all the predicted aspects of discontinuous or 
disruptive innovation. 
This research extends the work of Gatignon et al. (2002), which suggests that 
innovations are best described by product complexity, locus of innovation, innovation 
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type, and innovation characteristics. Much of the literature on discontinuous innovation 
(Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Dosi, 1982; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994) emphasizes the 
role of new technology in the emergence of new dominant designs. This research 
provides several examples of discontinuous-like innovation, shifts in dominant designs 
that improved performance and were introduced and competed directly in the main 
markets of industries that achieved their success largely on the basis of architectural 
innovation. 
This research also found examples where neither theory seems to operate 
(research question l.c.iii). The second analysis of the research sample found several 
examples where the shifts in dominant designs occurred with no improvement or 
degraded performance along the expected parameters of the industry (P4 = 0 or -1) and 
customers who were willing to pay more for the new design (P(, = 1). These cases are 
best understood through the lens of Christensen & Raynor's "jobs to be done" theory 
which states: 
Predictable marketing requires an understanding of the circumstances in 
which customers buy and use things. Specifically, customers - people and 
companies - have "jobs" that arise regularly and need to get done. When 
customers become aware of a job that they need to get done in their lives, 
they look around for a product or service that they can "hire" to get the job 
done. This is how customers experience life (Christensen et al., 2003a: 75). 
In essence, Christensen & Raynor's theory describes a simple relationship between a job 
- the task that a customer wants to perform; a tool - the product or service that helps the 
customer accomplish the task; and the customer who wants to complete the task. 
Disruptive innovations look for circumstances where the tool exceeds the needs of a 
significant segment of customers and provides those customers an alternative tool that is 
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good enough for most tasks and that is delivered with new attributes or reduced cost that 
competes asymmetrically with incumbent products and services. 
This research contributes to the jobs theory by suggesting that researchers 
differentiate between the cost/benefit calculation of the tools ability to get the job done 
and the cost/benefit calculation of how hard it is to use the tool. Each of the innovations 
in Table 26 either makes it less difficult to accomplish a task or makes it more 
pleasurable. These innovations are labeled utilitarian because they are motivated by an 
improvement in the utility of the product or service. 
Contributions to Practice 
This research contributes to the practice of innovation by confirming the both the 
value and generalizability of the theories of discontinuity and disruption in the shifts of 
dominant design seen in industry. When all of the observable attributes of discontinuous 
innovation are present, engineering and technology managers should consider whether 
their industry is in an era of incremental change or an era of ferment as described by 
Anderson & Tushman (1990). They should take into account the competence enhancing 
or competence destroying aspects of aspects of their design that produce the improvement 
in performance that is characteristic of discontinuous innovations as recommended by 
Tushman & Anderson (1986). The success or failure of a discontinuous design project 
may also be affected by the complementary assets of the manager's company or industry 
as shown by Rothearmel & Hill (2005). Finally, managers should analyze what 
customers are willing to pay for performance in the industry, what Adner & Levinthal 
(2001) call functional utility threshold as they determine the price points of their designs. 
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Similarly, when all of the observable attributes of disruptive innovation are 
present, the prescriptions of Christensen, Anthony & Roth (2004) are most relevant: 
Begin with an analysis of the marketplace. Will customer accept a design 
meets or underperforms existing designs? What business models are in 
place? Are new models emerging that could be applied to your design? 
Evaluate the competition from the perspective of Adner's (2002) models 
of competition. What symmetric and asymmetric motivations are in 
place? 
Make strategic choices in line with your firm's abilities and motivations. 
If a disruptive model is chosen, evaluate the need to spin out an 
independent organization in order to compete against existing markets. 
However, engineering and technology managers should also be aware that many 
times their designs may contain some but not all of the observable attributes of either 
theory. This research suggests that managers should distinguish designs from the 
innovations described by theory. The theories tend to describe situations where each 
design represents one innovation. However, as was shown here, designs may contain 
more than one innovation. In these situations, managers should consider aspects of both 
theories in their planning. 
Limitations of the Research Study and Recommendations for Further Research 
This research was limited to the ex ante descriptions of innovation that Daneels 
(2004) laments. Christensen (2006) explains that new theories first describe the 
phenomena they observe. Over time, the theory develops to be able to explain why and 
ultimately predict the likelihood of various events. Perhaps, individually the theories of 
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discontinuous and disruptive innovation have reached the point that they can predict the 
path of some innovations, but this research has described several examples of 
innovations not well described by either theory. Further research will explore theories 
that integrate the theories of innovations and therefore improve our ability predict 
innovation. 
This research was limited to exploring significant effects in the research 
population as described by the research objectives. As a result, the outliers of the 
research sample received little attention. Further research is intended to explore the 
significance of the outliers in the research sample. Additional research is also needed to 
integrate the perspective of contextual technology with the other perspectives of 
innovation as described Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour (1997). 
Ethical Concerns 
This research faithfully endeavors to adhere to standards and ethics for research 
established by Old Dominion University and the Academy of Management as described 
in the Academy of Management Code of Ethics (2005). This research does not involve 
human subjects, animals, biohazardous materials or radioactive materials. 
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APPENDIX A: CITATION COUNTS FOR THE THEORIES OF CONTEXTUAL 
TECHNOLOGY USED IN FIGURE 19 
This appendix explains the procedures I used to estimate the relative importance 
of the literature as displayed in Figure 19. Citation counts are often used to measure the 
impact of research articles (Sharplin & Mabry, 1985) and research journals (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Bachrach, & Podsakoff., 2005) with a field of research. "It is well accepted 
that measures of citations frequency provide objective means of evaluating the impact of 
scholarly research on other research" (Sharplin et al., 1985: 141). Citation counts from 
the Institute for Scientific Information's (ISI) Social Sciences Citation Index is the most 
commonly used tool for measuring this variable (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). 
Unfortunately, many of the articles from our literature search and the few books cited are 
not included in the ISI database. Fortunately, Google Scholar™ has proved to be a 
comparable source of citation analysis in the business, engineering, and social science 
research (Harzing, 2008). This research uses the Google Scholar ™ database to estimate 
the relative importance of the literature reviewed in Chapter Two 
Data and Sample 
The data for this analysis comes from the 20 primary research articles referenced 
in Chapter Two that describe the theories of radical innovation from the perspective of 
contextual technologists. All of the articles in this data set were found in the Google 
Scholar™ database. 
Procedures 
Google Scholar ™ searches and categorizes papers, theses, books and articles 
across many research disciplines, (http://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html) 
Search returns measure how often the searched for reference is cited by other articles in 
the database. The author and citation year (e.g. Abernathy & Townsend, 1975) was 
entered into the search field of the database. Google Scholar identifies which returns 
are citation counts. Each citation count confirmed that the number of citations listed 
were associated with the desired reference article or book. Often, several citations counts 
were returned by the database for same research article. This appears to have occurred 
because a single article was sometimes coded differently in the database. A scan of some 
of these multiple entries indicated that they could be summed for a total citation count 
with great concern for double counting citations. In one case the initial author search was 
unsuccessful in identifying citations. In this case, the article title was used to identify the 
reference in the database. In cases where are large number of returns (>500) were noted, 
the name of the first author cited was used to further constrain the search criteria. There 
are three editions of Christensen's book, The Innovator's Dilemma. For this case, the 
database was searched for all three editions. It was noted that nearly all citations were 
referenced to the first edition. Therefore, the citation count of the first edition was used. 
With the limitations cited here, the final citation count for each article is the summation 
of all relevant citations in the Google Scholar ™ database. The data retrieved from this 
procedure is displayed in Table 29. 
Equation Al was used to set the size of the circle displayed in Figure 19 of 
Chapter Two. This arithmetic transformation so the relative area of the circle in the 
figure would correspond with the size of the citation count. 
(Number of Citations)m 
Radius of Circle Plotted (inches) = 100 (A1) 
When two references are plotted on the same time line and the same year, the larger of 
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TABLE 29 
Citation Counts from the 20 Reference Articles 
Reference # Citations Reference # Citations 
Abernathy & Townsend, 1975 
Utterback & Abernathy, 1975 
Utterback & Abernathy, 1978 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986 
Anderson & Tushman, 1990 
Adner & Levinthal, 2001 
Rothaermel & Hill, 2005 
Murmann & Frenken, 2006 
Abernathy & Clark, 1985 
Veryzer, 1998 
61 
878 
1284 
1809 
797 
111 
21 
26 
713 
205 
Chandy & Tellis, 1998 
Danneels, 2002 
Hermann et al., 2006 
Henderson & Clark, 1990 
Christensen, 1992 
Christensen, 1993 
Christensen, 1997 
Adner, 2002 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003 
Markides, 2006 
Gavindarajan & Kopalle, 2006 
175 
167 
3 
2118 
28 
121 
2922 
110 
358 
8 
7 
the two are plotted. If the citation count is less than 100, the size of the circle is plotted at 
0.1 inches in order to enhance visibility of the data point. 
Discussion of Results 
Obviously, references from twenty years ago have had more opportunity to be 
cited than articles published in 2006. However, this simplistic procedure does highlight 
the importance of the Tushman & Anderson's (1986) theory of discontinuous innovation 
and Christensen's (1997) theory of disruptive innovation in the literature of contextual 
technology. The results here also highlight the significance of Henderson & Clark's 
(1990) theory of architectural innovation. 
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APPENDIX B: SHIFTS IN DOMINANT DESIGN USED IN THE PILOT STUDY 
1. DEC PDP-8 16 Bit Minicomputer w/core memory and integrated circuits, 1965, 
Minicomputer Industry 
New Dominant Design. Developed as a successor to the PDP-5, The DEC PDP-8 
was Digital Equipment Corporation's most popular minicomputer. Anderson & 
Tushman (1990) identified the PDP-8 as a discontinuous innovation because it is one of 
the first minicomputers to introduce the integrated circuit. Voelcker (1988), however, 
pointed out that the first generation of PDP-8 had only a rudimentary integrated circuit 
known then as the "flip chip." According to Voelcker, DEC intended to use integrated 
circuits modules on the first design but had difficulties making the processor work, so the 
first generation of PDP-8's was constructed with discrete components. However, 
integrated circuits became standard on the PDP-8b and contributed to improved processor 
speed at two-thirds the price. Customers valued the PDP-8 because of its reliability, 
reduced size and reduced cost. A big factor in both the increased reliability and reduced 
cost was DEC's introduction of an automated wire wrapping production process that 
eliminated the need for hand assembly. 
Old Dominant Design. Packard-Bell 250 Minicomputer with solid-state circuits, 
1960 (Anderson etal., 1990). 
Customers. The DEC PDP-8 has been described as the "first personal computer 
for engineers and scientists" (Voelcker, 1988: 86) Voelcker noted that the PDP-8 became 
popular in industry and academia because of its reliability and reduced cost. 
New Technology. {P\ = 1) The DPD-8 introduced integrated circuits and core 
memories into minicomputers (Voelcker, 1988). 
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Core Technology. (P2 =1) The "Flip Chip" design introduced integrated circuits 
and core memories as new core components (Voelcker, 1988). 
System Architecture. (P3 =1) The PDP-8's architecture was new compared to 
previous dominant designs although based on the architecture of the PDP-5. "... the 
PDP-8's success was due to everything coming together at the right time: a working 
PDP-5 architecture, new half-size modules that reduced the size of the machine, and-in 
place of hand assembly-wirewrapping machines for high-volume, reliable 
manufacturing." (Voelcker, 1988: 87) 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 =1) The Packard Bell had an 
average CPU cycle time of 12 microsecs (Computer, 1961). Anderson & Tushman 
(1990) document the PDP-8 CPU time as 1.6 microsecs. The DEC PDP-8 maintenance 
manual (1966) documents the cycle time as 1.5 microsecs. (The time of 1.5 microsecs 
was used to calculate the variable X4.) 
Performance Along New Parameters. (P5 = 1) Voelcker (1988) reports smaller 
size as a new attribute. The Packard Bell was 73inches high x 24 inches wide x 28 inches 
deep for a total of 600 lbs. The PDP-8 was 34.1 inches high x 21.5 inches wide x 21.75 
inches deep for a total of 225 lbs. This reduction in size and weight is a classic example 
of what Christensen would call a shift in competitive value. 
Cost Performance. (P6 = -1) The Packard Bell 250 cost $49, 500 in 1961. The 
first PDP-8 cost $16,000 in 1965. 
Industry. {Pi = c) The PDP-8 was introduced directly into the new minicomputer 
industry. However, Voelcker (1988) noteed that the real popularity for the minicomputer 
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came because it was appropriating customers who could not afford the low end of the 
mainframe market whose computers costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
2. Boeing 707-120 Jet Airplane, 1958, U.S. Airline Industry 
New Dominant Design. As predicted by the theory of discontinuous innovation 
(Anderson et al., 1990), the Boeing 707-120 was not the first jet aircraft to be purchased 
and offered to airline customers. The British Overseas Airway Corporation (BOAC) flew 
the first prototype jet on 27 July 1949 and a 36-seat version began service on 2 May 
1952. While the 500 mph Comet 1 was the first, the Boeing 707-120 became the 
dominant design when Pan American Airlines placed orders for twenty Boeing 707s and 
twenty-five Douglas DC-8s. The rest of the airline industry quickly followed suit. The 
707 offered quicker service (600 mph), more seats, and the potential for transatlantic 
flight (Davies, 1972). 
Old Dominant Design. Douglas DC-7C Piston Engine Airplane, 1956. In 1956, 
the dominant design in aircraft manufacture was the Douglas DC-6/7 series aircraft. 
These two aircraft designs accounted for 408 of a total of 787 new aircraft operated by 
U.S. domestic and international airlines or on order as of December 31, 1955 (Air 
Transport Association of America, 1956). The Douglas DC-7C was a popular and 
comfortable piston-engine aircraft. The CD-7C had four R-3350 Wright engines with 
110 seats and a cruising range of 4,250 miles and a max speed of 355 mph (Davies, 
1972). 
Customers. U.S. Airlines. 
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New Technology. (P, = 1) The Boeing 707-120 four Pratt & Whitney JT3C-6 jet 
engines with a total takeoff thrust of 13,500 lbs compared to the 3,250 lbs of thrust 
developed by the DC-7C's piston-engines (Davies, 1972). 
Core Technology. (P2 = 1) The new engine is a change in the core technology of 
an airplane. 
System Architecture. (Pj = 0) The basic architecture of the airplane did not 
change other than to make a larger body to accommodate more passengers and to take 
advantage of the greater power of the jet engines (Davies, 1972). 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 =1) The airline industry uses a 
productivity measure known as seat-miles that takes into account the speed of the aircraft, 
the number of seats, and the range of the aircraft in a given market (Davies, 1972). X4 
was calculated using data from Davies (1972), the DC-7C's seat-mile productivity was 
roughly 60 million seat-miles per year. The Boeing 707-120's productivity was 200 
million seat-miles per year. 
Performance Along New Parameters. (P5 = 0) No significant change in other 
performance factors are reported in Anderson & Tushman (1990), Davies (1972), or Air 
Transportation Association Annual Reports. 
Cost Performance. (P6 = -1) While airline costs remain relatively stable through 
this period, the question is how to estimate the aircraft cost. According to the 1957 
edition of the Air Transportation Association Annual Report, the largest four engine 
airliners of 1956 cost roughly $2M and the new four engine jet aircraft on order were 
$6.25M. These figures are representative of the DC-7C and the Boeing 707-120. 
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However, this is a business. A business evaluates purchases for their ability to 
create profit. The profit of an airplane is directly related to the available seat-mile 
productivity since the airlines charged by the seat mile. Therefore, this research 
measures Pe by estimating changes in the expected profit. The Lockheed Electra was 
introduced in 1959 as a turbo-prop and cost $8.70 per seat-hour (The operating costs per 
seat hour estimate operating costs of each aircraft per hour and divide by the number of 
seats). The B707-100B is representative of a jet from the same era and cost $6.93 per 
seat-hour. These costs were estimated for the year 1973 in Taneja (1976). This results in 
a 20% reduction in cost. 
Industry. (P7 = a) The Boeing 707-120 was introduced directly into the main 
airline industry. 
3. AN/AR Series Owens Machine Bottle Manufacture, 1903, Bottle Manufacture 
Industry 
New Dominant Design. The Owens Automatic Glass Blowing machine was the 
first fully automatic glass blowing machine placed into operation. It had a significant 
impact in industry in general because high quality glass bottles were plentiful and 
inexpensive. It used a system of arms and piston-powered blowers to turn the gobs of 
glass into bottles. It is credited with helping to stamp out child labor in the glass bottle 
industry (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1983). 
Old Dominant Design. Hand blown glass bottle in a shop manned by six men 
and boys (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1983). 
Customers. Glass Bottle Manufacturers 
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New Technology. (P\ = 1) The automatic glass blower introduced a new 
technology into the industry (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
Core Technology. (Pi = 1) The Owens machine was revolutionary in core design 
as the process of producing glass bottles transitioned from hand blown to machine 
manufacture. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) The Owens machine was revolutionary in 
architecture as the process of glass bottle manufacture was transitioned from hand blown 
to machine manufacture. 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4=l) According to the 
American Society for Mechanical Engineering (1983), a typical team of six men and boys 
could hand produce 2880 bottles per day at a cost of $1.80 per bottle. The Owens 
AN/AR machine could produce 72,000 bottles per day and would be manned by two men 
on 12 hour shifts at a cost of 10 to 12 cents per gross of bottles. 
Performance Along New Parameters. (P$ = 0) While the quality and consistency 
of the bottles improved significantly (American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1983), 
the bottle continued to serve it original purpose to the public. 
Cost Performance. (Pe = -1) Research failed to turn up cost for the machine. 
However, if profitability is the measure, then this innovation was very profitable reducing 
the cost of bottle manufacture from $1.80/bottle to the 10 cents per 144 bottles. 
Industry. (P-j = a) The Owen machine was introduced directly into the bottle 
making industry. 
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4. XEROX Telecopier 495,1984, Digital Facsimile Machines 
New Dominant Design. The first process for transmitting facsimiles was 
patented in 1943 (Coopersmith, 1993). Coopersmith (1993) documented early attempts 
to market facsimile newspapers, the use of facsimile transmission in World War II, and 
the first successful widespread commercial use of facsimile equipment by Western Union 
to supplement telegrams in the 1950s. Through 1980, U.S. manufacturers were 
producing analog machines that produced a page in 2-3 minutes. The digital facsimile 
machine has been called a discontinuous innovation (Baum et al., 1995). The XEROX 
Telecopier 495 (whose attributes are listed below) is considered representative of the 
digital facsimile equipment which replaced analog machines (Perna, 1984): 
• Transmission over ordinary voice grade telephone lines. 
• Compatible with earlier generations of machines (optional) 
• Diagnostics 
• Monitors to ensure transmission received 
• Time/date/terminal ID stamp 
• Automatic Dialer (optional) 
• Automatic Receive 
• Automatic Paper Cutter 
• Transmission speed of 9600 b/s and 24 sec/page 
• 9600 digital modem with lower speed compatibility 
• Low bit error rate 
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Old Dominant Design. Group 2 Analog Facsimile Machines. Analog machines 
are described as smelly, slow, costly and of low quality (Coopersmith, 1993). The Group 
2 machines used analog transmission and offered transmission at approximately 3 
minutes per page (Baum et al., 1995). 
Customers. Business for general office communication 
New Technology. {P\ = \) Shift from analog to digital technology 
Core Technology. {P2 =1) The digital transmission process is core to the 
function of the system. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 0) The basic architecture of the machine remained 
the same. 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 = 1) Transmission speed of a 
single page is used as a primary established industry metric. The digital XEROX 
transmitted at 24 sec/page. The Group 2 standard was 180 sec/page. From a 
performance perspective, the Group3 XEROX machine transmitted 2.5 pages per minute. 
The Group 2 standard machine transmitted .33 pages per minute. These values translate 
to a 658% improvement in transmission speed. There were several other improvements 
noted such as the ability to use standard paper, automatic dialing, and an improvement in 
overall quality. 
Performance Along New Parameters. (Ps = 0) The desirable functions of the 
facsimile machine did not shift to new parameters. 
Cost Performance. {P(, = -1) The XEROX Telecopier 495 sold for between 
$11,995 and $15,395 in 1981 (New York Times, 1981). While this research failed to turn 
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up a specific cost for the equipment, prices in the industry were clearly falling as each 
new generation of equipment was introduced (Buzzell, George, & Arkin, 1996). 
Baum et al. (1995) compared the cost per month for a business to operate a group 
2 and a group 3 fax machine. In 1984, there was on average a 66% savings in cost to 
operate a Group 3 digital machine if the company was transmitting between 10 and 20 
pages a day. The cost per month to the business was used to calculate cost 
performance. 
Industry. (P-j = a) Each generation of facsimile machine went head to head in the 
office industry (Baum et al., 1995). 
5. Radial Automobile Tires, 1970, Automobile Manufacturing 
New Dominant Design. Sull et al. (1997) analyzed the develop of the radial tire. 
They note that five tire manufacturers dominated the U.S. landscape in the early 1970's: 
Goodyear, Firestone, Uniroyal, BFGoodrich, and General Tire. Developed first in 
European markets, radial tires offered many advantages. While they cost 30-50% more, 
their longer life translated to a lower cost per mile basis with fewer trips to tire dealers for 
replacements. Unfortunately, manufacture of the radial tire meant significant 
infrastructure and training costs in the industry and lowering profits. 
Old Dominant Design. Bias Ply Automobile Tires 
Customers. Automobile Manufacturers and Owners 
New Technology. (Pi = 1) In a bias tire, layers of rubber-coated fabric are 
embedded in the tire at an angle (Sull et al., 1997). In a radial tire, rubber coated fabric 
ran directly across the tire and included a layer of steel wire coated with rubber. 
Therefore, the belts ran perpendicular to the travel of the tire. 
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Core Technology. {Pj = 1) The addition of the steel wire was a change in core 
technology. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) The requirements for construction of a radial tire 
were more exacting than for a bias ply tire (Sull et al., 1997). 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 =1) Radial tires lasted 40,000 
miles vs 12,000 miles for a bias ply tire, were safer, and had better gas mileage (Sull et 
al., 1997). 
Performance Along New Parameters'. (P5 = 0) The desirable features of tires did 
not shift to new parameters. 
Cost Performance. (i56= 1) Radial tires were 30-50% more expensive than bias 
ply tires. When combined with their longer life, radial tires translated into roughly a 50% 
reduction in overall cost of ownership (Sull et al., 1997). 
Industry. (Pj = a) The radial tire market directly competed with the bias ply 
market and customers forced industry leaders to adopt the radial tire at significant cost. 
The first major automobile to make the radial tire standard was the 1970 Ford Lincoln 
(Sull et al., 1997). If anything, this was a high market invasion. 
6. HP ThinkJet Printer, 1984, Desktop Printer Industry 
New Dominant Design. In 1984, Hewlitt Packard introduced both the LaserJet 
and the ThinkJet printers (HPVirtualMuseum, 2008). The LaserJet was the ultimate 
office printer with high quality printing and quiet operation. Hewlitt Packard marketed 
the ThinkJet as a "personal printer for your personal computer"(HP ThinkJet Marketing 
Brochure, 1984). It offered a new method of printing thermal ink jet at reduced 
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resolution and speed and at reduced cost. Christensen called the inkjet printer "a classic 
disruptive product, relative to the laser jet business" (Christensen, 1997: 116) 
Old Dominant Design. Laser Printers 
Customers. Personal Computer Users and Businesses 
New Technology. (P\ = 1) Ink Jet technology was new. 
Core Technology. (P2 =1) The core technology change was from laser to ink-
jet. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) Reduction in size and portability changed the 
architecture. 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4—I) Speed of the 1984 
ThinkJet was 150 characters per second. Resolution was 96 dots per inch (graphic) and 
used a 11x12 character cell. The 1984 Laserjet printed at 8 pages a minute and with 300 
dots per inch resolution. Resolution decreased by 68% and speed decreased by 78% (if 
one assumes roughly 2000 characters per page). 
Performance Along New Parameters. (P5 =1) The Laserjet could fit on a 
desktop, but the ThinkJet was smaller in size at just 7 lbs. It was also portable with a 
battery pack. The offer of portability offered a new capability that the LaserJet could not. 
Also, the ThinkJet was highly valued for its quiet operation compared to dot matrix 
computers. 
Cost Performance. (i>6= -1) The Laserjet cost $3500 (HPComputerMuseum, 
2008b) while the ThinkJet cost $495 (HP_Computer_Museum, 2008a). 
Industry. (Pj = c) The ink-jet provided a quality printer to a new market of 
computer users. It eventually invaded the laser printer market causing laser products to 
move up-market (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
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7. Steel Industry Minimill, 1995, Structural Steel 
New Dominant Design. Christensen (1997) describes the rise of steel minimills 
from the manufacture of steel rebar to their head to head competition with Major U.S. 
Integrated Steel Mills. 
Old Dominant Design. Integrated Steel Mill 
Customers. Structural Steel Manufacturers 
New Technology. (P\ = 0) Minimills use electric arc furnaces with essentially 
the same processes as an integrated mill just smaller in scale. It is hard to argue that the 
electric arc furnace is a new technology. It has been part of the metal industry for many 
years. For more info see: The Electric Furnace: Its Evolution, Theory, and Practice by 
Alfred Stansfield (1914). 
Core Technology. (P2 = 1) Even though no new technology is involved, the 
electric arc is a change in the core technology of an integrated mill. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) As Christensen (1997) noted, the processes of the 
minimill and the integrated mill are similar though at a different scale. However, this 
change in scale offers new value in the production of steel. The most economical way to 
run an integrated plant is at full capacity for long periods of time because of the cost of 
heating and cooling the primary furnace. Minimills, however, can be easily stopped or 
started in response to market demand. This offers great economic value to steel 
manufacturers. 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 = 0) The performance of the 
minimills lags the integrated plants but as they catch up, they capture market share. 
191 
Therefore, X4 is set at 0 to reflect their need to match industry quality. A recent industry 
journal compared minimills with integrated mills: 
Minimills and integrated mills are producing steel whose internal cleanliness is 
about the same.. .In physical properties, the integrated mills are better and have a 
wider range - but the minimills are improving in this area. In surface quality, the 
integrated mills have the advantage, although the minimills have improved here, 
too...(Triplett & Berry, 1998: 88) 
Performance Along New Parameters. (Ps = 1) The adaptability of the minimill 
process to changing economic demands is of great value to steel manufacturers. 
Cost Performance. {P(, = -1) Christensen (1997) estimated a 15% cost reduction 
in the operation of a minimill. 
Industry. (Pj = b) Christensen (1997) documented the rise of the minimills from 
rebar to structural steel. 
8. 5.25 inch Hard Disk Drive, 1981, Hard Disk Drive Industry 
New Dominant Design. This is the core technical disruption that the theory of 
disruptive innovation is built upon (Christensen, 1997; Christensen et al., 1996). 
Old Dominant Design. 8 inch Hard Disk Drive 
Customers. Computer manufacturers 
New Technology. (P\-0) Christensen & Bower (1996) demonstrates that 
essentially no new technologies were used in developing the smaller drives. 
Core Technology. (P2 = 1) While it is not a new technology, the 5.25 inch drive 
replaced the 8 inch drive. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) A new system architecture allows for the reduced 
cost and size. 
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Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 = -1) Both capacity and access 
time are significant measures of performance. The capacity of the 8-inch drive in 1981 
was 60 Mbytes and the 5.25 inch drive was 10 Mbytes. The access time of the 8-inch 
drive was 30 msec and 160 msec for the 5.25-inch drives. 
Performance Along New Parameters. (P5 = 1) The weight of the 8-inch drive 
was 21 lbs and the 5.25-inch drive weighed 6 lbs. 
Cost Performance. (P(, = -1) Christensen & Bower (1996) emphasized the cost 
per megabyte change noting that the cost per megabyte of the 8-inch drive is $50 and 
$200 for the 5.25-inch drive. This analysis however is using product cost to measure P^. 
The 8-inch drive cost $3000 and the 5.25-inch drive cost $2000. 
Industry. (P-] = b) Christensen demonstrated that the 5.25-inch drive was first 
introduced into the desktop industry before it invaded the minicomputer industry. It was 
his prototype for describing the low-end disruption. 
9. Balloon expandable Stent Placement, 1996, Health Industry 
New Dominant Design. Christensen & Raynor (2003) described the introduction 
of balloon angioplasty as a disruptive innovation to cardiac bypass surgery. Balloon 
Expandable Stent Placement (Trant, O'Laughlin, Ungerleider, & Garson, 1997) has since 
become a much more effective procedure in some cases and has the same disruptive 
earmarks that Christensen & Raynor (2003) noted. 
Old Dominant Design. Cardiac Bypass Surgery 
Customers. Heart Disease Patients 
New Technology. (Pi = 1) The balloon expandable stent is a new technology. 
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Core Technology. (P2 =1) The core technology of a stent is completely different 
than a cardiac bypass. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) The process and procedures are completely 
different arguing that this is an architectural change as well. 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 = 0) Trant et al (1997) found 
stents and surgery to be statistically equal in the treatment of Branch Pulmonary Artery 
Stenosis. 
Performance Along New Parameters. (P5 = 1) The less invasive nature of the 
procedure is an important factor in the procedure's popularity. 
Cost Performance. (P(, = -1) The average total charges (including outpatient 
charges) were $58,068+/-$4372 for surgery and $33,809+/-$3533 for stents (Trant et al., 
1997). 
Industry. (P7 = c) Christensen & Raynor (2003) explained that balloon 
angioplasty and then stent procedures were first performed "against non-consumption" in 
that they were first used to treat people who were not sick enough to require surgery. As 
the procedure improves, it now competes directly against surgery for effectiveness. 
10. Internet Stock Brokers, 2000, Financial Services 
New Dominant Design. Internet Stock Brokers 
Old Dominant Design. Full Service Brokers 
Customers. Individual Investors 
New Technology. (P\ = 0) The Internet already existed. The advent of online 
brokerage accounts developed with existing technology. 
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Core Technology. (P2 = 1) The use of the internet to conduct stock trades 
introduced a core technology into the financial services model. 
System Architecture. (P3 = 1) The architecture of the broker interaction has 
changed from phone and face-to-face contact to computer based interaction. 
Performance Along Established Parameters. (P4 = -1) It is hard to measure a 
change in established parameters. The personal relationship provided by a traditional 
stock broker was intended to provide the customer with valued advice. The shift to an 
internet stock broker provided less of this traditional value exchange. 
Performance Along New Parameters. (Ps = 1) In the online version, the 
customer has access to much more information in order to make their own investment 
decisions. This is a completely new value experience. 
Cost Performance. (P^ = -1) Full Service Brokers cost approximately $150/trade 
while many online brokers cost about $7/trade (Claude-Gaudillat & Quelin, 2006). 
Industry. (P-j = b) Internet broker first invaded the discount broker industry 
before moving into the territory of the full service broker. 
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APPENDIX C: SHIFTS IN DOMINANT DESIGN IN THE FIRST RESEARCH 
DATA SET 
Single Cluster (k=l) Solution 
Industry NAICS Code Old Dominant Design New Dominant Design 
12 Data Points with Observed Values of Pt = 1, P2 = 1, P3 = 1, PA = h Ps = 0, P6= - 1, and P1 = a 
Creamery Butter 
Manufacture 
Sheet Metal Work 
Manufacturing 
Roasted Nut and Peanut 
Butter Manufacture 
Dairy Cattle and Milk 
Production 
Gasoline Engine and 
Engine Parts 
Manufacturing 
Ship Building and 
Repair 
Soybean Processing 
Motor Vehicle Steering 
and Suspension 
Components Manu 
Animal Slaughtering 
Industrial Mold 
Manufacturing 
Industrial Truck, 
Tractor, Trailer, and 
Stacker Machinery 
Manufacturing 
Hydroelectric Power 
Generation 
311512 
332322 
311911 
112120 
336312 
336611 
311222 
336330 
311611 
333511 
333924 
221111 
Batch Processing 
Traditional Design 
Batch 
LTLT Pasteurization 
Distributor/Rotor 
In Hull Construction 
Pressing 
Dependent Front 
Suspension 
Traditional 
Die Maker 
Breakbulk Shipping 
Pelton Impulse Turbine 
Continuous Processing 
CAD/CAE 
Continuous 
HTST Pasteurization 
Electronic Ignition 
Modular Construction 
Solvent Extraction 
MacPherson Strut 
Boxed Beef 
CAM/Rapid Tooling 
Comtainer Shipping 
Francis Reaction 
Turbine 
7 Data Points with Observed Values of Px = 1, P2 = 1, P3 = 1, P4 = 1, P5 = 1, P6= 1, and P1 = a 
Office Equipment 
Merchant Wholesalers 
Nonfolding Sanitary 
Food Containers 
Manufacturing 
Professional 
Organizations 
Exam Prep and tutor 
services 
Other Building 
Equipment Contractors 
Telephone Apparatus 
Manufacturing 
Frozen Fruit, Juice, and 
Vegetable 
Manufacturing 
423420 
322215 
813920 
611691 
238290 
334210 
311411 
2 Tier Buy and Sell 
Paper Milk Carton 
Face to Face networking 
Traditional Small Group 
Tutor 
Manual Door Opener 
POTS 
Block Freezing 
Lease and Service 
agreements 
HDPE Milk Carton 
Internet Networking 
Online Aided Small 
Group Tutor 
Automatic Garage Door 
Opener 
Digital ISDN 
Individual Quick 
Freezing 
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SHIFTS IN DOMINANT DESIGN IN THE FIRST RESEARCH DATA SET 
(Continued) 
Industry NAICS Code Old Dominant Design New Dominant Design 
6 Data Points with Observed Values of P, = 1, P2 = 1, P3 = 1, P4 = 1, Ps = 0, P6= 1, and P7 = a 
Water Supply and 
Irrigations Systems 
Appliance Repair and 
Maintenance 
Abrasive Product 
Manufacturing 
Automotive Exhaust 
System Repair 
Skiing Facilities 
Specialized Freight 
Trucking, Local 
221310 
811412 
327910 
811112 
713920 
484220 
Filtration 
Manufacturer Training 
Organic bonded grinding 
wheel 
Standard Exhaust 
Natural Snow 
Hand Lift Dump Truck 
Filtration and 
Disinfection 
Outsourced Training 
Vitrified Grinding 
Wheel 
Catalytic converter 
Machine Snow 
Hydraulic Lift Dump 
7 Data Points with Observed Values of Px = 1, P2 = 1, P3 = 0, P4 = 1, Ps = 0, P6= - 1, and P7 = a 
Printing Ink 
Manufacturing 
Sheer Hosiery Mills 
Support Activities for 
Animal Production 
Other Lighting 
Equipment Manufacture 
Cut stock, Resawing 
Lumber, Planing Mills 
Other Household Textile 
Product Mills 
Iron Foundries 
325910 
315111 
115210 
335129 
321912 
314129 
331511 
Oil Based Ink 
Silk Stockings 
Manual Sheep Shears 
Carbon Bulb 
Circular Saw 
Shuttle Looms 
Malleable Iron 
Soy Based Ink 
Nylon Stockings 
Machine Shears 
Incandescent Bulb 
Band Saw 
Shuttleless Looms 
Ductile Iron 
7(0,l,l,l,0,l,a) 
7 Data Points with Observed Values ofP1=0,P2=l,Pi=l,P4=l,Ps = 0,P6= l , andP7 = a 
Amusement Park 
Other Insurance and 
Employee Benefit Funds 
Police Protection 
Computer Training 
Nature Parks and Other 
Similar Institutions 
Promoters of Performing 
Arts, Sports, and Similar 
Events with Facilities 
Veterinary Services 
713110 
525190 
922120 
611420 
712190 
711310 
541940 
Day Park 
Negligence Liability 
Constables 
Non-Standardized 
training 
Bureau of Biological 
Survey 
Clubs/Municipal Teams 
Cattle/Pet Doctors 
Destination Theme 
Worker's Comp 
Insurance 
Police Force 
IT Certificates 
National Wildlife 
Refuge System 
National League 
General Practice 
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SHIFTS IN DOMINANT DESIGN IN THE FIRST RESEARCH DATA SET 
(Continued) 
Industry NAICS Code Old Dominant Design New Dominant Design 
8 Data Points with Observed Values of /», = 0, P2 = 1,P3 = 1, P4 = l,Ps=0,P6= -1, andP7= a 
Motion Picture Theaters 
Direct Health and 
Medical Insurance 
Carriers 
Commercial and 
Industrial Repair 
Facilities Support 
Services 
Building Inspections 
Services 
Lessors of Nonfinancial 
Intangible Assets 
Regulation of 
Agricultural Marketing 
and Commodities 
926140 
Shellfish Fishing 
512131 
524114 
811310 
561210 
541350 
533110 
926140 
114112 
Single Screen 
Traditional Indemnity 
Plans 
Corrective Maintenance 
In-House Service 
Decentralized Building 
Codes 
Product Line Franchise 
Local/Regional Boards 
Wild Crawfish Capture 
Multiplex 
Managed Care (HMO, 
PPO, etc) 
Preventive Maintenance 
Large Scale 
Management Services 
Standardized Codes 
Full Service Franchise 
National Cheese 
Exchange 
Crawfish Aquaculture 
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